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The main aim of this thesis is to analyse and explore the philosophical justifications for 
freedom of speech during the nineteenth century and their application as political praxis. 
In this work, specific types of free speech argument are identified and examined in the 
light of the ideological stance of those who sought to argue for freedom of speech, 
primarily from key ideological perspectives of the nineteenth century, utilitarianism, 
liberalism and socialism. Initially three types of free speech argument are identified: the 
accountability argument, the liberty argument and the truth argument. However, on an 
inspection of socialist arguments for freedom of speech, the author suggests that a fourth 
sufficiently distinct type of free speech argument is present, particularly within the more 
mature works of socialist radicals and agitators. Though the arguments for freedom of 
speech overlap within different ideological and historical contexts, a case is made for a 
relatively distinct type of free speech argument within the socialist political praxis of free 
speech. Furthennore, in examining key political and philosophical texts, and an analysis 
of the free speech arguments in nineteenth century political pamphlets and newspapers, 
the argument is made that in order to gain a thorough understanding of political history 
and philosophy a holistic approach should be adopted, one which looks at ideas, context, 
history, artefact, and political praxis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1: Introduction: Aim ofthe Thesis 
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide an investigation into the theory and 
practice of freedom of speech during the nineteenth century. This analysis is 
unique in that not only does it seek to combine an exploration of philosophical 
arguments for freedom of speech emanating from a range of political and 
philosophical perspectives during the nineteenth century, it also evaluates these 
arguments in the context of political practice or praxis. I 
The focus of the thesis then is to examine and explore the ideas of free speech -
the philosophical arguments for freedom of speech and the application of these 
ideas through praxis and in relation to the specific context in which they were 
developed during the turbulent years of the nineteenth century. This exploration 
will be made in relation to the way arguments for free speech were articulated and 
represented through the penmanship of radicals, dissenters and agitators of the 
day, the work of which was predominantly represented in radical political 
newspapers, pamphlets and journals; this particular mode of transmission is dealt 
with here, as it was the main form of mass political communication during the 
nineteenth century. As we will see, the struggle for freedom of speech during the 
nineteenth century should be seen in the light of the economic and political 
landscape of Britain, which witnessed massive social upheaval and change. 
Indeed the consequences of industrialisation and the assertion of laissez-faire 
political economy have an important role in shaping many of the arguments to be 
1 Borrowed from Marxism, praxis is the 'willed action' in which a theory or theoretical stance 
becomes a practical social activity. 
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explored herein. Moreover, I will demonstrate that arguments for freedom of 
speech were often made to underpin wider political objectives, from widening the 
political franchise, to the socialisation of the working classes into an acceptance 
of laissez-faire economic policies. 
In order to maintain some sense of structure and order, in what could be 
philosophical and historical chaos, I have organised this exploration around three 
predominant currents of radical political thought during the nineteenth century: 
utilitarianism, liberalism and socialism.2 These main currents of political thought 
form the theoretical backdrop of radical politics during the nineteenth century 
and, as such, all offer various conceptions of freedom of speech, with differing 
stimuli and motivations. As we will see, the range of arguments used by agitators 
and activists during the nineteenth century often overlap and indeed merge, and it 
is a key purpose of this thesis to unravel and clarify the types of arguments used 
by radicals during this period. 
What though is the main motivation behind this work? As we will see there is a 
wealth of literature on the 'development of the radical press', the 'history of the 
newspaper trade' and the 'struggle for a free press' during the nineteenth century. 
It is of crucial importance to note that this thesis sets itself apart from the majority 
of other work on issues regarding free speech during the nineteenth century by 
analysing the historical features of such arguments, their philosophical structure 
and their application as represented in populist political literature. In short this 
thesis seeks to examine arguments for free speech during the nineteenth century, 
in terms of their philosophy, their mediation, their articulation and their context. 
A study of freedom of speech which examines the main currents of radical 
2 I would like to thank Geraint Williams for suggesting early on in my studies that I adopt a 
structure similar to that provided in his Political Thought and Public Policy in the Nineteenth 
Century, with R. Pearson (New York: Longman, 1984). 
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thought and application to free speech during the nineteenth century, has not been 
done before in this way. This thesis then seeks to add to the literature that has at 
its focus the various 'histories' of freedom of speech and the freedom of the 
press. In addition to this, the author also sees this thesis as a valuable contribution 
to works on freedom of speech that have as their focus a more theoretical analysis 
by exploring the theory and practice of freedom of speech within a specific 
historical context. In undertaking this work, I am also asserting that theory and 
practice should not be analysed separately, but seen as a whole within the bounds 
of historically specific contexts. As such, this thesis is also presented as a 
contribution to the literature on the history of political ideas, as it demonstrates a 
way of exploring political ideas that is grounded within the social, political and 
historical context of the period under investigation. 
This introduction will proceed as follows. After discussing the scope and focus of 
this work, some key definitional issues will be addressed. Firstly, in order that we 
can gain an understanding of the types of arguments for freedom of speech used 
during the nineteenth century, I will highlight the main types of philosophical 
arguments for freedom of speech to be examined throughout this thesis. This is an 
important preliminary task as we will see there was a range of arguments used in 
different circumstances and for different ends, and at this early stage it is 
important, for purposes of clarity and thoroughness, that an understanding of the 
different types of arguments for freedom of speech are highlighted. Furthermore, 
in outlining these different types of arguments, or as I term them - typologies of 
free speech - I am providing a theoretical base line from which a more detailed 
investigation into theory and practice will be made. 
After a discussion of the types of free speech argument present in this thesis, I 
will work through what I understand to be the 'language' of free speech; that is, 
what exactly is it that I am referring to when I discuss freedom of speech? Am I 
referring to the process of simply freely uttering words openly and free from 
censure from authority; am I referring to freedom of expression with reference to 
the arts, literature and other means of expression; or is free speech meant as the 
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freedom of the press? It is important that this issue is cleared up sooner rather 
than later. As we will see it is the latter definition that I have in mind for various 
reasons and I will set these out below. 
Following the discussion on terms of reference, I then move on to discuss the 
methodological tools that I have employed throughout this thesis. Indeed, the 
methodological position that I have adopted is itself a key aspect of the way that 
the thesis is representative of a new body of work in that it places equal weight on 
the history and theory of freedom of speech. 
Finally in this introduction I review relevant literature within this field. As noted 
there has been much work already undertaken on free speech and its development 
during the nineteenth century, and as part of this introduction I will provide an, 
albeit brief, overview of the array of literature on this topic. This brief survey will 
perfonn a dual function by firstly highlighting the breadth and depth of literature 
within this field (some of which has been used as useful secondary material) but 
more importantly it highlights a gap in the literature. The literature review will 
demonstrate the lack of attention by many authors to, for example: key historical 
contextual features of nineteenth century political philosophies of free speech; the 
internal structure of these ideas; the articulation and mediation of these ideas and 
the implicit and explicit motivation behind such theories - how these ideas 
developed and matured to fit the changing circumstances of the nineteenth 
century. Furthermore, the literature review will highlight differing types of 
analyses of freedom of speech during the nineteenth century, from relatively 
uncritical surveys such as those provided by Robertson3 and Burt which echo 
enlightenment and progress as winning the battle for freedom of speech; to more 
3 J. M. Robertson, A Short History of Free Thought (London: Watts & Co., 1915). 
4 J. B. Bury, A History of Freedom of Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1952). 
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sharp critical analyses from the likes of Hollis,S Wiener,6 and Curran and Seaton7 
who stress more complex, economic and social factors impacting on the 
'struggle' for freedom of speech and press freedom. 
The remarkable courage of the early radicals directly involved in the 
struggle against state repression of the press, and their passionate 
commitment to the concept of a free press is well documented. It has 
suffused the nineteenth century campaign against state economic 
controls of the press with a glow of libertarianism that the much 
quoted sentiments of middle-class radicals like Cobden seem merely 
to echo and corroborate. This has given rise to the belief that the 
campaign against 'the taxes on knowledge' was inspired by 
libertarian ideas 'grounded in Milton, Locke, Mill, and the 
Enlightenment' , albeit sustained by a substratum of special 
interests.8 
As we will see, the divergence in analysis is sharp. Having dealt with all these 
important introductory preliminaries, Chapter Two can at last get under way. 
1.2: Scope ofthe Thesis 
Philosophical echoes from the nineteenth century are present in many of the 
conceptions of free speech we have with us today; justifications for free speech 
which are, in an assortment of various forms, either enshrined in constitutions or 
implicit within legal frameworks. However, an analysis of these echoes and how 
modem day political philosophers have sought to reinterpret and reapply some of 
those key ideas falls far beyond the scope of this thesis. Also, this thesis does not 
S P. Hollis, The Pauper Press, A Study in Working-class Radicalism of the 1830's (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1970). 
6 J. H. Wiener, The War of the Unstamped. The Movement to Repeal the British Newspaper 
Tax, 1830-1836 (London: Cornell University Press). 
7 J. Curran & J. Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, The Press and Broadcasting in Britain 
(London: Routledge, 1999). 
8 J. Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control: An Historical Perspective'. In G. 
Boyce, J. Curran, and P. Wingate, eds. Newspaper History: From the Seventeenth Century to 
the Present Day (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1983), p. 53. 
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seek to take a 'great thinkers' approach to free speech which often place specific 
contributions to political philosophy outside important historical contexts, with 
little or no emphasis on the contextual parameter in which these ideas were 
mediated. Although key ideas from radicals such as Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill will be examined, they will be done so with reference to the social and 
political culture in which they were articulated and sought to gain influence. 
Having said this, the thesis is not a history of free speech, as this has been 
provided elsewhere.9 I will however, provide a brief history of freedom of speech 
before the nineteenth century so that some sense of historical dynamic and 
philosophical movement can be gained. 
In terms of the scope of the thesis, it is primarily concerned with the ideas and 
praxis of freedom of speech that emerged during the nineteenth century. The 
historical scope of the substantive parts of the thesis mainly cover the years up to 
1860 primarily because many of the formal legal restraints on the press were 
removed by the end of the 1850s. Of course there were other emerging concerns 
about the potential effects of an increasing franchise, and these concerns will be 
highlighted; however, the key aspects of political agitation analysed here focus on 
attempts to remove formal censorship in the form of taxes on the press. Another 
point which should be raised here is that although the focus of this study is 
Britain, important philosophical currents will be analysed that have no fixed 
geographical base. As we will see, many of the political movements, especially in 
the early years of the nineteenth century, were heavily influenced by thinkers who 
originated outside of Britain. For example, Mill talks of the influence of the 
Saint-Simonians; de Toqueville's influence is very strong also, and of course 
Marx's contribution to political philosophy is immense. Thus some reference to 
theory that originates from outside Britain is inevitable in a study such as this. As 
9 The literature review herein points to examples of such work. 
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we will see, the debates and arguments that are the focus of the thesis are of 
pivotal importance to a time of vast technological, political and social change in 
Britain. The development of mass education which enhanced literacy rates, 
advances in communications technology and the vibrant philosophical climate, all 
contributed to the stimulation of new thinking in terms of rights and the limits of 
the rights of individuals and groups. 
To recap then, this thesis is not a history of the struggle for free speech, nor a 
history of the newspaper industry; nor is the thesis a survey of political 
movements during the nineteenth century even though many of the issues I will 
be exploring stem from strong political currents that often buttressed political 
groups. Nor is it an examination solely of the ideas that fed the struggle for free 
speech; indeed as I point out below in my section on methodology, it is in fact a 
combination of all of these, a combination that makes this work distinctive. 
1.3: Structure 
Following this introductory Chapter, I move to Chapter Two which provides an 
historical and philosophical overview of arguments for freedom of speech that 
preceded the nineteenth century. This chapter examines the political and religious 
turmoil of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and explores the struggles for 
religious freedom and toleration that inspired many radicals and dissenters during 
the nineteenth century. The chapter also briefly looks at the emergence of the 
Enlightenment and the impact this had on developing arguments for toleration 
and freedom of opinion. From the calls for religious toleration emanating from 
John Milton, to the John Wilkes affair in the late eighteenth century, this chapter 
covers a relatively vast historical space and as such provides only a cursory 
glance at some of the key events and themes that impacted on the nineteenth 
century. In essence, this Chapter Two provides an introduction to the historical 
and philosophical background of freedom of speech up until the nineteenth 
century and as such provides a precursor to the main substantive chapters. I argue 
that the importance of this chapter is evidenced in the way it draws attention to 
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the importance of the Enlightenment in contributing to a new view of mankind 
which then impacts on later arguments for freedom of speech. 
Chapter Three will provide the all important social, economic and cultural 
context on which the main substantive chapters will be framed. Again 
methodological considerations are paramount here, as the importance of 
highlighting the context of the philosophical arguments for free speech has 
already been mentioned and is an important thread that permeates this entire 
thesis. Chapter Three will demonstrate that the changing social and economic 
features of the nineteenth century did much to shape the nature of the 
philosophical and political debate around free speech. I argue that such changing 
features impacted massively, mainly because of economic and political 
considerations centred around the gradual shift in political power and the 
emerging middle-class elite. 
The next three chapters of the thesis form the main bulk of this work and focus on 
utilitarian theory and praxis of free speech, followed by liberal and then socialist 
theory and praxis. These chapters will be structured similarly, as I initially 
highlight the basic theoretical parameters on which the justifications of free 
speech are made. From this I move more specifically to the theoretical structure 
of the arguments for free speech before moving on to provide examples of how 
these ideas were mediated and articulated in the public sphere, through radical 
newspapers, journals and pamphlets. These ideas are articulated by the main 
proponents of the ideas in question, and by lesser known individuals interpreting 
and advocating such ideas. Finally in each chapter I provide an evaluation of the 
arguments and their articulation in relation to the methodological stance 
undertaken. Although this outline is a useful starting point, it will be useful to go 
into a little more detail of the substance of each chapter. 
Chapter Four examines the utilitarian philosophy and praxis of freedom of 
speech. As such the chapter begins by highlighting the main components of 
utilitarian thought as provided by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. From this 
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analysis of the foundations of utilitarianism, I look more closely at utilitarian 
arguments for freedom of speech. Here we initially see that such arguments were 
primarily concerned with advancing democratic government and stemming 
abuses of authority via a form of the accountability argument for free speech. 
However, on closer analysis of the utilitarian praxis of freedom of speech, rather 
than an assertion of democracy we see that a form of anti-democratic paternalism 
is expressed in many of the political tracts and pamphlets. Rather than advocating 
democracy, as had Bentham, the utilitarian praxis of freedom of speech expressed 
a deep desire to place the emerging middle-class into a position of power, not 
only over the machinery of government, but also over the so-called 'lower orders' 
so as to ensure the smooth running of the free market. Through an exploration of 
arguments which sought an end to the 'taxes on knowledge' this paternalistic 
feature of the utilitarian justification for free speech is examined with reference to 
historical evidence and involves a re-evaluation of utilitarianism's theoretical 
structure. Indeed, for the so-called lower orders, I argue that the utilitarian free 
speech argument was less about providing mass education for the working classes 
and more an argument for moral censorship and social control. 
Chapter Five examines liberal arguments for free speech which again, as we will 
see, have their roots in the development of the free market but also in the 
secularist movements of the nineteenth century. In this chapter I devote some 
attention to the work of John Stuart Mill. After looking at Mill's early newspaper 
writings, which dealt with freedom of speech, I move on to explore some key 
issues and themes in On Liberty, with reference to some critical and some not so 
critical analyses. Importantly, Mill is also explored with regard to his conception 
of equality, and its relation to liberty and freedom of speech. Here I suggest that 
Mill's arguments in On Liberty are undermined by his view of political economy 
and his distrust of egalitarianism. Having looked at Mill in some detail, I then 
move on to more mainstream liberal arguments for freedom of speech, which 
were centred around the predominantly middle-class 'Association for the Repeal 
of the Taxes on Knowledge', centering on key arguments and activity. Again here 
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I argue that liberal arguments for freedom of the press are contextually bound to 
the development of the free market and the struggle for political power. As such, 
an important feature of this activity was to stifle working-class interests and 
subsume working-class movements within the 'logic' of liberalism. Again, 
education is a key factor, as the role and function of education via a cheap 
popular press meant that barriers to publishing must be removed and markets 
must be opened up to competition. Justifications for freedom of speech have at 
their root market considerations against monopoly and the disempowerment of 
working-class radicalism. I argue that such middle-class activity sought to 
empower the middle-classes by attempting to pacify working-class radicalism; 
free speech here again is a form of social control. I conclude by noting that 
although Mill's arguments should be seen as a distinct and more sophisticated 
form of free speech argument than those of mainstream liberalism, Mill's specific 
conceptions of liberty and equality, and their relation to his views on political 
economy, raise serious questions about the application of Mill's theory to 
political practice. 
The concept of equality is revisited in Chapter Six, in which I examine socialist 
justifications for free speech. This chapter looks initially at conceptions of 
socialism and key elements of the theory. I then focus on early working-class 
radicalism, which viewed freedom of speech as a means to political emancipation 
through representation in government. From this we move on to more 
sophisticated justifications of freedom of speech which are constructed to de-
mystify the prevailing social relations and assert a class agenda to politics and 
social change. I analyse the philosophical structure of these ideas and suggest 
initially that they have their roots in the typologies of freedom of speech as 
represented in previous chapters. However, in examining the more developed 
analysis of socialist agitators, I suggest that we see a shift in emphasis that makes 
the socialist arguments sufficiently different from those highlighted in previous 
chapters. By exploring the analysis of the more sophisticated socialist radicals 
such as Henry Hetherington and Julian Harney we see socialist arguments for 
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freedom of speech taking on a particularly distinct character, emphasising class 
solidarity, brotherhood, equality and freedom from oppression. This distinctive 
type of argument is articulated further when we examine Marx's contribution, 
which represents a far more sophisticated form of the argument for freedom of 
speech for socialists as it combines a thorough analysis of class, economics and 
history within its make up. Finally in this chapter I speculate on how the socialist 
justification for freedom of speech might operate within the context of an 
idealised socialist society. Indeed, I speculate on whether a socialist justification 
of freedom of speech is necessary within the context of an idealised socialist 
society, and if so, what are its limits. 
I then conclude the thesis in Chapter Seven by briefly revisiting the discussion of 
the main substantive chapters and by arguing that the main motor force behind 
the various arguments for free speech lay in the contextual bindings of developing 
nineteenth century capitalism. I make a final methodological point by asserting 
that in future any discussion of political philosophy should take into account both 
the context and the mediation of ideas. 
Finally, I am aware that I have not been able to provide a comprehensive study of 
all the examples in which arguments for freedom of speech were made; this I 
think would have been unrealistic, given my chosen methodological stance and 
the relatively limited space. Moreover, I have not included every single example 
of the theory and praxis of free speech, only those that were part of the main 
currents of political thought during the nineteenth century. To provide an analysis 
of all examples of the praxis of free speech, in the light of my method and focus, 
would have been too great a task given the limitations of time and space. It is 
hoped that this work will act as a starting point, at least methodologically, from 
which further investigation can be made. The thesis seeks to offer a flavour of the 
history, philosophy and praxis of free speech during the nineteenth century and in 
doing this, I have highlighted the three most obvious examples: utilitarian, liberal 
and socialist. There were others, but let us leave these for another day. 
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1.4: Philosophical Typologies o(Free Speech 
Historically and philosophically there have been numerous justifications for 
freedom of speech. It will be helpful for this study if we can isolate in 
philosophical terms, specific kinds of arguments that have been historically 
deployed during the nineteenth century. I must point out, however, that in 
identifying specific 'orthodox' typologies of freedom of speech, I am not 
asserting that the types of arguments that exist are mutually exclusive in political 
practice. Furthermore, I am not asserting that the typologies of free speech 
outlined below are the only types of argument that exist for freedom of speech. 
However, as I am focussing on the argument and praxis of free speech during the 
nineteenth century, it is necessary for me to highlight the main types of orthodox 
argument that were deployed during this important historical period. As will 
become evident, often arguments for freedom of speech overlap at different times 
and in different circumstances; but in identifying types of arguments for freedom 
of speech in this introduction, I am setting up a frame of reference from which we 
can view the philosophical arguments and praxis in the main substantive chapters. 
The typologies I shall outline here fall into three main categories: Firstly, 
arguments for freedom of speech that stem from a commitment to holding those 
in power accountable to the majority. I shall call this typology the 'accountability' 
argument, as it relates specifically to the role that free speech plays in guarding 
against abuses of power and supporting representative institutions. Secondly, I 
highlight a type of free speech argument that stem from a conception of 
individuality; I will call this type of argument the liberty argument. Finally I point 
to arguments for freedom of speech that assert a commitment to uncovering and 
attaining the truth; I will call this type of argument the truth argument. 
i, The Accountability Argument 
The accountability argument is based on the assertion that groups or individuals 
who hold political power are intrinsically self interested. That is, they are 
essentially committed to maintaining and possibly expanding their hold on the 
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instruments of power that they have at their disposal. Such a view maintains that 
self-interested governments have to be held accountable by those whom they 
govern, and a key means of promoting a sense of accountability is freedom of 
speech. Freedom of speech allows those who do not directly hold political power 
to check those in authority and stem abuses of power. Hence, those in power are 
held accountable by public scrutiny via freedom of speech, usually through 
freedom of the press. This argument for freedom of speech, speech that 
challenges authority and attempts to highlight 'errors' in governance, has 
political, moral and epistemological dimensions to it, and I shall deal with each of 
these in tum. 
In terms of its political dimension, the accountability argument is, on the surface, 
relatively straightforward. Free speech is necessary to ensure good government, 
primarily by holding those in power accountable in a public arena. In doing so, 
any perceived wrongdoing or error enacted by government, can be challenged in 
an open arena of public debate that is facilitated by freedom of speech. It is clear 
then that in order to justify such an argument it is necessary to show that authority 
in government is not intrinsic to government and that there is another 'higher' 
authority to which governments should be held accountable. This could be God, it 
could be the people, or it could be a specific abstract concept. 
A very early example of notions of accountability is provided by Pericles in his 
funeral oration in Thucydides's History of the Peioponnesian War. In this speech 
Pericles highlights the virtues of democratic political systems and goes on to note 
that accountability is indispensable to the Athenian system of democracy: 
If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private 
differences; if to social standing, advancement in public life falls to 
reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to 
interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is 
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able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his 
condition. to 
He continues: 
[ ... ] ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, 
are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, 
regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious 
but as useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we 
cannot originate, and instead of looking on discussion as a 
stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable 
preliminary to any wise action at all. II 
Thus we can see that even in ancient Athens, the virtue of being able to 'judge 
events' and discuss policy are indispensable to the workings of a living 
democracy. Other examples of the accountability argument surface with the 
emergence of modem democratic political institutions. With the development of 
democracy, it became clear that in order to operate according to the principles of 
equality, governments should obviously be held accountable. Instead of God, the 
sovereignty of the people that is asserted and free speech is necessary to fulfil two 
important components of accountable democratic systems. Firstly, in a democracy 
it is important that the sovereign people have at their disposal all information 
regarding the dealings of government. Information regarding the practices, 
procedures and outcomes of political life needs to be made available to all within 
a democracy so that governments can be seen to be operating according to the 
wishes of the sovereign people. For example, at the end of the 18th century John 
Wilkes was prosecuted for publishing parliamentary proceedings. The 
controversy surrounding this affair was a very important development in the 
struggle for freedom of speech, and I will focus on this in a little more detail in 
Chapter Three. However, related to the dissemination of information relating to 
10 Thucydides, History of the Peioponnes;an War (London: Everyman, 1993. [circa 411 B.C.]), 
p.89. 
II Thucydides, History of the Peioponnesian War, p. 90. 
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politics and governance, is the notion that the people also have a role in 
responding, in a public arena, to those in power. This brings me to my second 
point relating to the accountability argument, that being the idea that the people 
themselves have the right in a democracy to publicly censure perceived 
government error or misdeed. Hence freedom of speech is necessary to allow 
such censure to occur unhindered from government interference. Here then we 
can see two closely related arguments for freedom of speech that are intrinsic to 
the accountability argument; freedom of speech then is essential to democratic 
government. 
We can see examples of the accountability argument throughout history; 
however, the philosophical basis on which the accountability argument is 
developed can and does change in different contexts. We can now turn to the 
moral and epistemological dimensions of the accountability argument. In 
highlighting differences in the basis of the accountability argument, it is worth 
briefly looking at the works of Thomas Paine and Jeremy Bentham. Though 
writing at roughly the same time, Paine's and Bentham's justifications of 
democracy, and in turn the accountability argument, rest on differing moral and 
epistemological conceptions of man. Thomas Paine in his Rights of Man argues 
that all governments should be held accountable at all times; not though to some 
divine entity, but to the people at large. For Paine, in order for a democratic 
society to operate effectively, and according to certain inalienable 'natural rights', 
those in government should be held accountable by a free and unrestricted press. 
Speaking of the National Assembly of France in 1791, Paine notes that: 
Speech is, in the first place, one of the natural rights of man always 
retained; and with respect to the National Assembly, the use of it is 
their duty, and the nation is their authority. They were elected by the 
greatest body of men exercising the right of election the European 
world ever saw. They sprung not from the filth of the rotten 
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boroughs, nor are they the vassal representatives of aristocratical 
ones. Feeling the proper dignity of their character, they support it. 
Their parliamentary language, whether for or against a question, is 
free, bold, and manly, and extends to all parts and circumstances of 
the case. 12 
Thus the accountability argument for freedom of speech in this sense makes 
claims to notions of natural rights which are best expressed in the context of 
democratic political systems and their operation. As we will see in the next 
section focussing on the 'liberty' typology, notions of natural rights can play an 
important role in the construction of arguments for freedom of speech. However, 
conceptions of rights and the accountability argument are not mutually inclusive. 
For example, Jeremy Bentham argued that natural rights are nothing more than 
'nonsense on stilts' and that the only measure for governments was how far they 
went in promoting the happiness of the majority of the people. Bentham argued 
that democracy was the best political system, but this was not based on a 
conception of natural rights as it was for Paine; for Bentham, democratic 
institutions were viewed as the best form of government because they were the 
systems most likely to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number. It 
was in relation to Bentham's principle of utility that all actions and all systems 
should be judged and not some abstract notion of rights whether they be 'liberty', 
'equality' or 'fraternity'. It was the consequences of democracy, and its tendency 
for promoting happiness in the greatest number, that underpinned it, rather than 
conceptions of a-priori rights. For Bentham, freedom of speech is necessary for 
holding those in power accountable in the same ways as Paine, but Bentham's 
justification differs morally and epistemologically from Paine because democracy 
is not viewed by Bentham in terms of its connection to 'so-called' inalienable 
rights, but in terms of its tendency to maximise utility. As Arblaster notes: 
12 T. Paine, The Rights of Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 [1791]), pp. 141-142. 
18 
Since each person pursued his or her own well being, it followed 
that each person would vote in his or her own interest. The sum total 
of individual votes ought therefore to promote the utilitarian 
objective of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The only 
people who could be trusted to pursue the good of the people were 
the people themselves, acting through their elected and accountable 
representatives. 13 
For Bentham, freedom of speech was necessary, as it ensured that public debate 
and censure checked government abuses of power. As we shall see, the views of 
Paine and Bentham were very influential especially during the earlier part of the 
nineteenth century and I will return to these arguments in more detail below. 
First, it is necessary to move on to the next typology of free speech, that being the 
liberty argument. 
ii, The Liberty Argument 
The liberty argument for freedom of speech deployed during the nineteenth 
century can be summarised as follows: freedom of speech is a necessary 
expression of the 'natural rights' of man; it is a fundamental component of what it 
is for men and women to be free. Barendt summarises this view when he notes 
that 'people will not be able to develop intellectually and spiritually, unless they 
are free to formulate their beliefs and political attitudes through public discussion, 
and in response to the criticisms of others.' 14 In philosophical terms this 
perspective has been developed in terms of positive and negative liberty. IS 
Briefly, positive conceptions of liberty can be summarised as freedom 'to'; 
13 A. Arblaster, Democracy (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1987), pp. 44-45. 
14 E. Barendt, Free Speech (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 14. 
IS In his essay entitled 'Negative and Positive Freedom', G. C. MacCallum Jr. challenges the 
view that the distinction between positive and negative freedom is 'sufficiently clear'. What 
MacCallum asserts is a formula based upon a triadic notion of freedom. He notes that freedom 
is where 'x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z.' G. C. MacCallum 
Jr., 'Negative and Positive Freedom' in D. Millar ed., Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). p. 102. 
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whereas negative conceptions ofliberty are usually articulated as freedom 'from'. 
Firstly, positive freedom - freedom 'to'; in relation to freedom of speech, this 
positive freedom is usually expressed as freedom to speak, communicate, convey, 
and express. In his discussion of positive liberty or freedom, Berlin makes the 
following point: 
The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on 
the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and 
decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of other men's 
acts of will. I wish to be a subject not an object; to be moved by 
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes 
which affect me, as it were from outside. 16 
In relation to freedom of speech this conception of positive freedom is asserted as 
the freedom to express oneself as directed by ones own rational energies. Positive 
liberty is centred on an agents rational self direction. In addition to this concept of 
positive of liberty, Berlin also asserts a negative conception of liberty. This aspect 
of liberty should be seen as freedom from, as opposed to freedom to. Berlin notes: 
I am normally said to be free to the degree that no man or body of 
men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is 
simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. I? 
Arguments emanating from negative conceptions of freedom have as their 
starting point notions of individuality and the protection of expressions of 
individuality from external forces. Such arguments are pertinent to freedom of 
speech most notably in relation to discussions about censorship, as freedom from 
censorship is perceived by many liberals, as a fundamental human right, with a 
few notable exceptions that are again linked to freedom 'from' arguments. In 
political philosophy, probably the most important example of this conception of 
liberty emanates from John Stuart Mill in his book On Liberty. I will focus on 
16 I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 131. 
17 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 122. 
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Mill in detail in chapter five, however, it is worth summarising his arguments 
here, for clarity's sake. 
Prominent in Mill's thOUght is the notion of the autonomy of the individual; for 
Mill, it is a necessary condition of a fulfilled life. As such the autonomy of the 
individual is not suppressed in any way unless the actions arising out of that 
autonomy impact on the autonomy of another or other individuals. Mill famously 
states in On Liberty: 
[ ... ] that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self protection. That the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 18 
As such we can see Mill's argument here as comprising a negative conception of 
freedom, with the negative aspect acting as an a-priori restraint. Mill continues to 
note that unless men and women are protected from interference, humanity, with 
its propensity to diversifY and experiment, will not develop and flourish. With 
regard to freedom of speech, we can see clearly how such conceptions of positive 
and negative freedom underpin arguments for freedom of speech and freedom of 
expression within the confines of the liberty argument. Such an argument states 
that rational expressive acts should be given space as they are a fundamental 
component of human flourishing; however, people should also be protected 
against expression that takes away or limits in any way their ability to freely 
express themselves. 
According to this typology, no overarching power can or more pertinently should 
stifle human expression as this would impede human flourishing and 
18 J. S. Mill, On Uberty, in Collected Works, Vol. XVIII Edited by A. P. Robson and J. M. 
Robson (London: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 223. 
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development. Part of what it is to be a rational human being, is to be able to freely 
express opinions usually through a free press. This very briefly is Mill's primary 
argument in On Liberty, where he sees a potential threat to liberty mainly 
emanating from the weight of public opinion. As Mill famously states '[i]f all 
mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of a contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, that he, 
if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.'19 However, 
although the broad argument presented in On Liberty, has been summarised 
above, in Chapter Two of On Liberty, Mill attempts to justify freedom of speech 
with partiCUlar arguments which assert the search for truth as a key manifestation 
of the expression of individuality. These particular justifications will be explored 
below in Chapter Five, for now though it is necessary to deal with the truth 
argument as the third typology of freedom ofspeech.20 
iii. The Truth Argument 
The truth argument is an argument that posits that a necessary component of what 
it means to be a rational human agent is an unconstrained search for the truth or at 
least (in the case of John Stuart Mill) some movement towards the truth. This 
epistemologically centred typology is based upon a number of suppositions about 
the truth: Firstly, and obviously, for such an argument to have any force, there 
must be a belief in truth existing, and in a way that can be understood by the 
human senses or intellect. Secondly man must be capable of attaining the truth by 
'intellectual industry' or agency; there must be some belief in the human capacity 
to attain at least an approximation of the truth. Thirdly, the truth argument is 
based on the supposition that truth is valuable to human existence; it has to be 
19 Mill. On Liberty. p. 229. 
20 As noted. this overview of the typologies of freedom of speech serves as an introduction to 
the main arguments; in Chapter Five I will focus more closely on Mill's arguments for freedom 
of speech as presented in On Liberty. 
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seen as something worth pursuing as an end in itself, and in this sense is very 
much a part of enlightenment thinking. Frederick Schauer summarises the truth 
argument succinctly when he notes that: 
Throughout the ages many diverse arguments have been employed 
to attempt to justify a principle of freedom of speech. Of all these, 
the predominant and most persevering has been the argument that 
free speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery 
of truth. Open discussion, free exchange of ideas, freedom of 
enquiry, and freedom to criticise, so the argument goes, are 
necessary conditions for the effective functioning of the process of 
searching for the truth. Without this freedom we are said to be 
destined to stumble blindly between truth and falsehood. 21 
It is only in an open arena where debate is unconstrained by external force that 
the discovery or at least movement towards the truth is possible. Schauer goes on 
to point out that historically figures such as Milton and Mill have used arguments 
for freedom of speech that have as their base a commitment to the unhindered 
search for the truth. However, I will tum to Milton's and Mill's arguments in later 
chapters, for now, it would be useful to examine the truth argument in a little 
more detail. The truth argument posits that freedom of speech is necessary to the 
discovery of truth, or at least, a movement towards some conception of the truth. 
For this to occur, no external constraints on freedom of speech should exist as 
only within the context of an open free market of ideas can the truth be attained. 
This market analogy is useful as it posits that, as in a free market, there exist a 
number of competing perspectives, viewpoints or ideas; from this pool of ideas, 
those which stand up to the scrutiny of competition (competing arguments) or 
those which win over the competition in debate should be posited as, if not the 
truth, then a movement towards an approximation of the truth. This argument is 
probably most prominently associated with the arguments of John Stuart Mill; 
21 F. Schauer, Free Speech a Philosophical Enquiry (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), p. 15. 
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however, as we will see, the market analogy used in relation to Mill's arguments 
mayor may not be helpful. Given this doubt, it may be useful to seek an example 
of the truth argument, at this preliminary stage, elsewhere. 
As noted, for the truth argument to have any force, the truth as an end must be 
perceived as having intrinsic value. This type of argument is prominent in the 
work of both Plato and Aristotle and it is worth considering the arguments present 
in Plato's Apology as an example of this type of argument. Key to understanding 
the truth argument for freedom of speech in the Apology, is an understanding of 
the Socratic elenchus or method. Socrates' elenchus is a dialectic form of cross-
examination in which the questioner (in this case Socrates) refutes an opponent's 
thesis by drawing out contradictory elements of his argument. For this method to 
operate, free discussion must be allowed. At no point in any Platonic dialogue 
does Socrates attempt to silence his opponent by any other means than the 
refutation of his opponent's arguments. Socrates' main focus is on the pursuit of 
happiness and virtue, for himself and for the whole of Athens. Such an existence 
can only be attained through complete knowledge, which in turn can only come 
about through unencumbered debate and rational argument, argument that moves 
towards specific understanding and some model of the truth. 
It is evident therefore that some concept of free speech must be in operation, as it 
is necessary because the dialectical progression towards knowledge can only 
come about through open discussion and unfettered debate. W.F. Campbe1l22 
argues that similarly to liberal theories of the market, the Socratic elenchus seeks 
to bring about the most rational outcome in debate; this can only surface in a 'free 
market' of ideas. Mara23 too brings out the crux of the Socratic justification of 
22 In W. F. Campbell, 'The Free Market for Goods and the Free Market for Ideas in the 
Platonic Dialogues.' History of Political Economy, Vol. 17, No.2, (1985) pp. 187-197. 
23 In G. A. Mara, 'Socrates and Liberal Toleration.' Political Theory, Vol. 16, No.3, August 
(1988) pp. 468-495. 
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free speech in tenns of the Socratic elenchus. By highlighting the arguments in 
the Theaetetus and Protagoras, Mara's position is that although Socrates is 
implicitly intolerant of ideas that conflict with his own views, this intolerance 
does not resort to any advocacy of censorship or physical restraint of other ideas, 
but only an intellectual bombardment of those ideas that are intended to leave his 
opponent in no other position than one that forces him to question his ideas more 
thoroughly. Socrates is only intolerant of those ideas that would make free speech 
impossible. Mara notes that: 
Plato's Socrates is undoubtedly committed to the possibilities of 
conclusive knowledge and perfected practice. But these possibilities 
are not rigid standards used to condemn imperfect thoughts or 
actions. Rather they are conditions that make intellectual and moral 
progress (learning and improvement) coherent and feasible.24 
A much more generous account of Socrates' defence of free speech and his 
contribution to liberty of speech and thought is made by a much later 
commentator on the trial of Socrates. Libanius, writing in the fourth century AD, 
clearly portrays Socrates as an explicit advocate of free speech; so much so that 
Socrates almost takes on the mantel of what would be called a 'civil libertarian' 
today. Libanius's Apology has Socrates praising Athens as the city where wisdom 
is the foundation of its greatness, and free speech is its life breath. In this account 
Socrates argues that Athens had free speech 'so that free from all fear, we might 
exercise our spirits by learning as we do our bodies by physical exercise. '25 
However, Stone notes, Libanius' Socrates seems too explicit an advocate of 
notions of democracy and their implicit (in this instance) connection to freedom 
of speech. On the contrary however, Socrates was never an advocate of 
democracy; his lifetime's work proved this beyond all doubt. Libanius' account 
24 Mara, 'Socrates and Liberal Toleration', p. 489. 
25 I. F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (London: Little Brown & Co., 1988), p. 210. 
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of Socrates' explicit call for free speech does not sit easily with Plato's or 
Xenophon's accounts, which both assert that Socrates argues that not all men's 
opinions are of equal value. However, in Libanius' account of the Apology, it is 
clear that Socrates is making an important point that does not come over as boldly 
in Plato or Xenophon's account, that of the hypocrisy of the charges brought 
against him: 
Your freedom of speech is based on the assumption that every man's 
opinion is of value, and that the many are better guides than the few. 
But how can you boast of your free speech if you suppress mine? 
How can you listen to the shoemaker's or the tanner's views when 
you debate justice in the assembly, but shut me up when I express 
mine, though my life has been devoted to the search for truth while 
you have tended to your own private affairs?26 
As Stone points out, if Socrates invoked freedom of speech as a basic right of all, 
as in Libanius's account, he would have 'struck deep at the heart' of the 
hypocrisy of the court and the validity of the charges brought against him. 
However, this point does not resonate as clearly in Plato or Xenophon's account. 
It is clear though that whichever interpretation of Socrates' justification of 
freedom of speech one adopts, the theme of Socrates as defender of free speech, 
emerges even if the scope and consistency of his defence is somewhat unclear. 
The method that Socrates employs carries with it an implicit argument for 
freedom of speech, even though he has no conception of rights and freedoms. 
This said, some of the themes touched on in my brief discussion of Socrates, will 
no doubt surface again later in the pages of this thesis as these themes are 
resonant and helpful to an understanding of nineteenth century ideas on free 
speech; not only in terms of the context in which they were framed, but also in 
terms of the impact these ideas had upon other philosophical justifications of free 
speech. 
26 Stone, The Trial of Socrates, p. 212. 
26 
As will become clear later, 'ripples' or 'echoes' of these arguments are evident in 
a number of the arguments given greater attention later in this work, most 
specifically the emphasis on wisdom and the search for knowledge present within 
utilitarian and liberal justifications of free speech. I should point out finally, 
similarly to the accountability argument, that the truth argument is not an 
argument for freedom of speech as an end in itself; as Schauer rightly points out, 
such an argument is instrumental as a vehicle or 'means of identifying and 
accepting truth' .27 This instrumental aspect of freedom of speech is not 
uncommon in the types of arguments used, as we have seen in the accountability 
argument summarised above. As such these types of argument should be seen as 
arguments which lend support to broader ideas or values, and not as principles in 
their own right. At this stage of the thesis, only the liberty argument can be 
isolated as a type of argument for freedom of speech that is independent of 
instrumental motivating factors, as freedom of speech is not a means to an end, 
but it is framed as an end in itself as it is part of the natural flourishing of man; it 
is a principle in its own right. It remains to be seen whether such arguments, 
instrumental or essential, can live up to this weight of expectation placed on them 
in political practice during the nineteenth century, and I will return to this 
question when focussing on the praxis of each theory. For now, it is worth 
summarising the discussion of the typologies of free speech. 
It has been the purpose of this section to highlight three distinct but not 
necessarily exclusive types of argument for freedom of speech that were used by 
political activists during the nineteenth century. I will of course go into greater 
detail in the substantive chapters below, but I feel at this stage for purposes of 
clarity, that some philosophical base line is drawn and the types of arguments 
used are separated out in raw detail. I have outlined three types of argument that 
27 Schauer, Free Speech, p. 16. 
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underpin many of the free speech arguments that were used during the nineteenth 
century. Firstly, I have highlighted the accountability argument, which posits that 
within a democracy free speech is necessary to curb abuses of power and ensure 
the smooth operation of democratic systems. This argument will be seen in 
practice in various forms in all three substantive chapters within this thesis. 
Secondly, I have highlighted the liberty argument. This type of argument states 
that fundamental 'rights' to freedom of expression exist, and no government or 
authoritative agency has the right to curb the operation of these rights. Such rights 
themselves are regulated internally by notions of positive and negative freedom. 
This argument and its expression will be analysed more fully in chapter five. 
Finally, the argument that the truth is only attainable when restraints on 
communication are absent. The unconstrained market of ideas makes possible, at 
best the attainment of truth, at least the movement towards the truth; again in all 
three substantive chapters, the search for truth as a motivating factor emerges. 
In the beginning of this section I noted that the creation of philosophical 
typologies of freedom of speech would serve to promote structure and clarity 
within the thesis, as each philosophical justification can then be related back to its 
typology or typologies. However, I would like to raise the possibility of a fourth 
distinct typology of free speech that was deployed during the nineteenth century, 
a typology that on the surface has elements of those types of argument briefly 
highlighted above, but differs in such a substantive way as to be a separate 
typology in itself. I will return to this point in Chapter Six. In the final substantive 
chapter of this thesis, we may see the emergence of a fourth typology of freedom 
of speech. This possible fourth typology should not be perceived as totally 
unconnected from the typologies highlighted above. We may see, however, that 
this fourth type of argument is distinct enough during the nineteenth century to be 
perceived as an argument or typology in its own right. 
1.5: The 'Language' of Free Speech 
28 
The actual phrase 'freedom of speech' came into existence in England around the 
middle of the eighteenth century but the words 'freethinker' and 'freethinking' 
first appear in English literature at about the end of the seventeenth century. Such 
tenns relate to the struggles against religious orthodoxy that date back to the 
middle ages. In England as in the rest of Europe, the phenomenon of free thought 
against religious orthodoxy had existed in specific fonn long before it could 
express itself in propagandist writing, or in any generic phrase apart from 'atheist' 
or 'infidel': 
The title of "atheist" had been from time immemorial applied to 
every shade of serious heresy by the orthodox, as when early 
Christians were so described by the image adoring polytheists 
around them; and in Latin Christendom the tenn infidelis, translating 
the amcrto~ of the New Testament, which primarily applied to Jews 
and pagans, was easily extensible as in the writings of Augustine, to 
all who challenged or doubted articles of ordinary Christian belief, 
all alike being regarded as consigned to perdition.28 
Phrases approximating to free thought occur soon after the Restoration.29 But it 
was not until 1713 that Anthony Collins's Discourse of Free Thinking, influenced 
by the growth of a group calling themselves 'freethinkers', that the word started 
to reverberate in contemporary discourse. In 1718, the journal Freethinker was 
published by Ambrose Philips, and the phrases 'freethought' and 'freethinker' 
gained a wider more general recognition. In terms of how historians such as J.B. 
Bury and J .M. Robertson understood the development of the language of free 
speech, the tenns 'free thought' and 'free thinker' approximate to the term 'free 
speech', as speech is an extension of those thought processes, As Bury himself 
notes: 
28 Robertson, A Short History of Free Thought, p. 1. 
29 See Robertson, A Short History of Free Thought, p. 4. 
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If a man's thinking leads him to call into question ideas and customs 
which regulate the behaviour of those about him, to reject those 
beliefs which they hold, to see better ways of life than those they 
follow, it is almost impossible for him, if he is convinced of the 
truth of his own reasoning, not to betray his silence.3o 
Robertson notes that 'free thought may be defined as a reaction against some 
phases or phase of convention or tradition. '31 Robertson is distinguishing between 
thought which can be said to be free, (I am free to think about whatever I choose 
assuming that I have the mental and physical capacity to do so), and critical 
thought based upon rationalistic exercises. Historically speaking, free thought in 
the latter sense is the practice of men and women calling into question the 
sacrosanct and the authoritative, most notably in criticising church and state. As 
we will see, the way in which this free thought manifested itself was in dissenting 
literature - pamphlets or tracts etc. most prominently during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.32 In contemporary discourse, the term 'free thought' is little 
used other than in works of history. Moreover, the terms free thought, free speech 
and particularly freedom of expression tend to be associated with wider freedoms 
and of course with notions of toleration, which are of course linked to the 
philosophy of liberalism. Although this thesis is not an investigation into the 
meaning of toleration or its history, it does acknowledge that the language of free 
speech, both philosophically and historically intertwine with the language of 
toleration and free thought, as I demonstrate in Chapter Two. Because of their 
methodological stance, I feel that both Bury and Robertson do not provide a 
robust enough analysis of either the language of free speech or its articulation. 
Part of this deficiency is due to them not sufficiently accounting for the changing 
30 Bury, A History oj Freedom oj Thought, p. 7. 
31 Robertson, A Short History oj Free Thought, p. 9. 
32 What I will highlight in Chapter Two, is the way that free thought transposed itself into 
arguments for freedom of the press before the onset of the nineteenth century. As such, the 
discourse moved from arguments in favour of free thought into discussions around free speech 
which was encapsulated in the various struggles for a free press. 
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contextual significance of the development of free speech. This is manifested in 
part in their reluctance to disengage with the term free thought and its association 
with secularist movements throughout history. More importantly however, their 
analysis echoes a romanticised view of 'the struggle' which locates activity 
within the realm of specific individuals who are dislocated from any historical 
processes. 
Where then do these definitional discussions leave us with regard to the language 
of free speech that is identified within this thesis? It is clear from large amounts 
of literature that exist on the history of freedom of speech, that sometimes the 
terms of engagement so to speak, are not dealt with sufficiently. Usually works 
that concentrate solely on the internal coherence or structure of philosophical 
arguments for free speech do this as a matter of course, as it is part of their 
motivation to interpret, understand and explore meaning and coherence. 
However, this feature of philosophical exploration of free speech is not without 
terminological difficulties as Geoffrey MarshaIP3 notes. Marshall argues that key 
definitional issues exist in much political philosophy on free speech; in particular, 
he highlights tensions in the way that the exploration of philosophical arguments 
for free speech - what he terms 'foundational' arguments - rest with 'applicatory' 
justifications such as freedom of the press and freedom of expression. 
Metaphorically speaking, applicatory justifications would be represented 
cartographically noting the contours and boundaries 'that determine the limits of 
the protection offered by the free expression doctrine[s] when faced with 
particular facts or types of issue. ,34 
33 G. Marshall, 'Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory', Public Law. Spring. (1992) pp. 40-
60. 
34 Marshall, 'Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory'. p. 46. 
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Marshall explores the question of whether freedom of the press, i.e. freedom to 
print, and freedom of speech (or freedom of expression) rest on the same or 
similar philosophical foundations. He notes that in contemporary law the 
temporal 'distance' between foundational arguments which have their roots in 
Mill's On Liberty are not 'flexible' enough for the multifaceted nature of modem 
life. These foundational arguments cannot, he argues, account for the increasingly 
complex communication practices of contemporary society. He notes that Mill's 
arguments in relation to modem law seem uncomfortably seated. Such discomfort 
prompts the creation of a 'multi-tiered' theory which ranks applicatory 
justifications according to practical considerations. In short, Marshall separates 
the foundational arguments from the applicatory, noting that in modem 
civilisation foundational arguments such as Mill's cannot be applied to the 
complex multiplicity of communication practices that modern society presents us 
with, as free speech 'has many mansions, some more inviolate than the rest. ,35 On 
the face of Marshall's argument then, we have a separation between theory and 
practical considerations. Again, my methodology overcomes Marshall's concerns 
by fixing the foundational arguments to their communication practices within the 
given context under investigation. In Marshall's tenns, I intend to reunite the 
'foundational' and the 'applicatory' within the context of nineteenth century 
political thought and praxis. Of course, this approach does not have the problems 
of temporal distance as the foundational theory found in On Liberty fits easily 
into the applicatory processes of the nineteenth century. The point I am making 
here is that in a work such as this, philosophy and praxis (i.e. arguments for free 
speech and their application) can and should be united both in tenns of abstract 
notions of 'freedom of speech' and their practical articulation: in this context - the 
'freedom of the press'. The distance between theory and practice that Marshall 
argues exist in the contemporary setting, are less evident during the nineteenth 
35 Marshall, 'Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory', p. 53. 
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century. Moreover, foundational and applicatory systems intertwine as issues 
pertaining to freedom of speech during the nineteenth century were manifested in 
discussions around freedom of the press. Thus it naturally follows that when I use 
the tenn freedom of speech, I am also implicitly relating it to the idea of freedom 
of the press, as free speech during the nineteenth century, meant on the whole, 
freedom of the press.36 
It would of course be more difficult to apply this methodology to a contemporary 
situation. More difficult but not impossible. We have historical (albeit recent) 
evidence of the articulation of ideas, whether they are present in statute or in 
constitutional practice; we have historical (again though recent) evidence of the 
mediation of these ideas, whether they be through complex socialisation practices 
or through the channels of the mass media; and we have dissenting conceptions of 
free speech as advocated by various groups, groups that have refonnulated (with 
varying degrees of success) the notion of free speech. Two good examples could 
be the 'Blue Ribbon Campaign for Internet Freedom' and the 'Electronic 
Freedom Foundation.' Both of these organisations have realigned arguments for 
free speech to encompass freedom of speech on the internet. Also, these 
organisations have re-articulated and refonnulated notions of freedom of speech 
to fit into new communication and infonnation technologies; they have done this 
foundationally, by developing ideas (though derivative) that fit into applicatory 
constraints and applicatory potentials. Importantly, the mediation of their ideas is 
via the technology they seek to protect - the internet. Although they speak of 
internet freedom, their arguments rest on re-applications and re-articulations of 
arguments for free speech. Thus, despite Marshall's concerns, theory and practice, 
or foundational and applicatory arguments, can be analysed if the appropriate 
36 This approach is not without its difficulties as as we will see, in On Liberty J. S. Mill did not 
use the term free speech. Instead Mill talked of 'complete liberty of thought and discussion 
within the political order.' I will return to Mill's defmitional issues in Chapter Five. 
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context and their constraining features are accounted for. It seems then, given that 
discussion is moving around notions of process, it would be a good place to 
address issues relating to methodology and related problems of analysis. 
1.6: Methodology and Problems of Analysis 
How after all can politics be understood save as action made 
meaningful by thought or thought given substance in action? Yet the 
separation of 'ideas' as something distinct from 'ordinary politics' 
had for a long time been a feature of much political science.37 
History is concerned with the relation between the unique and the 
general. As a historian, you can no more separate them, or give 
precedence to one over the other, than you can separate fact and 
interpretation.38 
Only when philosophy discovers in the dialectical course of history 
the traces of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and 
recurrently close otT the path to unconstrained communication, does 
it further the process whose suspension it otherwise legitimates: 
mankind's evolution toward autonomy and responsibility.39 
Ideas are the lifeblood of political philosophy. They form the soul of the body 
politic. However, when exploring ideas that make up the soul of the body politic, 
often the veins, arteries and other vital organs are neglected. An interpretation of 
the way that ideas are mediated, interpreted and articulated with reference to the 
37 R. Barker, 'Introduction', Political Studies, Vol. 48, No.2, (2000) pp. 221-222. See also 
Barker's 'Hooks and Hands, Interests and Enemies: Political Thinking and Political Action', 
Political Studies, Vol. 48, No.2, (2000) pp. 223-238. Here Barker highlights the division of 
political analysis into 'two distinct zones' and argues that maybe 'a shift in emphasis' should 
take place in which 'the account is given a fuller dimension without pursuing homogeneity [ ... J.' 
p.235. 
38 E. H. Carr, What is History (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 65. 
39 J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (London: Heinemann, 1972, [1968]), p. 315. 
The quotation is taken from Habermas's inaugural address at Frankfurt in 1965 and forms the 
appendix of that work. 
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context in which they were developed is often overlooked.40 One of the main aims 
of this thesis then is to articulate an approach that seeks to shift the balance (in 
some small way) in favour of providing a more rounded exploration of political 
philosophy in terms of the ideas themselves, how they were articulated and the 
context in which they were developed and sought audience. It would be 
inappropriate (and indeed nigh on impossible given the limitations of space and 
time) to analyse all aspects of political philosophy in this way; I will however, use 
this method of enquiry to explore what has been termed by many writers on the 
subject 'the struggle' for free speech during the nineteenth century. 
This study then is fundamentally about history and political theory. The above 
quotations from Barker, Carr and Habermas help to emphasise the interwoven 
relationship between ideas and political action. This study intends to provide an 
investigation of a type of theory (free speech) by taking into account specific 
historical features of it, but also, by highlighting the connection between theory 
and practice, I will have provided an account of the praxis of free speech. Such 
praxis is demonstrated here, in my analysis of the ideas that sought to develop or 
justify a notion of freedom of speech and how they were represented in 
sympathetic newspapers, journals and pamphlets during the nineteenth century. In 
other words this study seeks to analyse different theoretical conceptions of free 
speech theory and provide an insight into how these conceptions were articulated 
40 On writing a later draft of this thesis. I came across an article by Andrew Chadwick entitled 
'Studying Political Ideas: a Public Discourse Approach' in Political Studies. Vol. 48, (2000) pp. 
283-301. I was heartened to read that Chadwick also was largely dissatisfied by the approach of 
many political philosophers who were negligent or thought it was not important to explore the 
way in which ideas in political philosophy are mediated and received by their audience. 
Although my approach differs to some degree from Chadwick's Public Political Discourse 
approach, they are similar in that they both ensure that historical evidence, the ideas themselves 
in question and importantly, the historical context are all explored with equal weight. 
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in the public sphere. In doing this, the praxis of free speech is illuminated and 
philosophical subtleties and tensions are highlighted, as theory itself is articulated 
and mediated through specific media. This study is an attempt to unite in a 
methodologically sound way, the historical features of free speech to their 
contextually bound philosophical ideas and their means of mediation. 
i, Practicalities 
In terms of practicalities, the materials at my disposal are vast, the focus of the 
investigation has no shortage of 'raw data' to explore and analyse. As such, 
philosophical and political treatises that have impacted on ideas of freedom of 
speech will be consulted and explored. This exploration will provide a 
philosophical base line on which the relevant pamphlets, journals and newspapers 
will be considered as these will provide the main bulk of material under 
investigation. I should note however, that the newspapers and periodicals 
consulted are not representative of a complete survey of the radical political press 
during this period; it would, I feel be both almost impossible and inappropriate 
given the scope of this study to include every example of radical dissent pertinent 
to this discussion. What I have hoped to do is provide good examples of those 
newspapers and pamphlets that provide some real substance to the philosophical 
arguments that they sought to expound and develop. In addition to this material, a 
wide range of secondary materials will be made use of where appropriate, to add 
stability to the fabric of the study. 
Obviously, most of the work in this thesis rests upon interpretation of certain 
texts, be they represented in seminal works of political philosophy or in 
pamphlets, journals and newsletters. Of course, a great deal of study has been 
devoted to the different ways of understanding and interpreting such texts, and 
given that I am asserting a particular methodological framework for the study of 
ideas and history, it is necessary to for me to embark on a brief investigation into 
some of the key arguments and debates that surround the issues of interpretation; 
some of these have helped me in the development of my methodological 
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fonnulations and some I have rejected outright. In working through some of the 
methodological issues present in a work such as this, by accepting and discarding 
various methodological positions, it is hoped that a clearer understanding of my 
methodological stance can be arrived at. 
ii. Dimensions of Interpretation 
Henneneutics, the study of methods of interpretation, originated as a technique 
for understanding classical and religious literature in the middle ages. It 
developed in the hope of discovering the text's original or hidden meaning. It was 
the German philosopher Frederich Schleiennacher (1768-1834) however, who 
first approached henneneutics as an epistemological problem. Schleiennacher 
argued that much misunderstanding of philosophical texts occurs due to the 
inevitable temporal and sometimes spatial 'distance' between the author and the 
interpreter. What Schleiennacher argued was needed in order to fully understand 
any author's work, was the employment of a method which would reveal the 
author's true meaning at the time of writing. Schleiennacher noted that the main 
problem with then current philosophical analysis, was the notion that somehow 
interpreters were claiming objectivity in the interpretation of texts: their 
interpretation was the true interpretation. This 'false objectivity', expressed in 
interpretations of philosophical texts, was for Schleiermacher, tantamount to a 
falsification of texts. Schleiermacher argued that false representations of past 
works were due to the inability of the interpreter to fully understand the author's 
true meaning. Such false objectivity could be avoided however, if the interpreter 
made an attempt to understand both the language in which the author expressed 
himself and the message expressed in the passage or text. This latter 
consideration was Schleiermacher's primary concern, as it was necessary for the 
reader to go beyond the surface message ofthe text in the light of the interpreter's 
own language, in order to reach the original or intended meaning. As we will see 
in the course of history, Schleiermacher was not alone in his aspirations. 
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In attempting to expand henneneutical theory and develop a 'science of 
interpretation,' Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) sought to advance a theory of 
historical knowledge that would be of equal weight to the theories of the natural 
sciences. Dilthey argued that 'there was a special access to historical facts which 
made historical knowledge possible and at least as certain as knowledge of the 
natural world.'41 Following on from Dilthey, R.O. Collingwood (1889-1943) 
further developed ideas that were based on the recovery of the 'real meaning' or 
subjective components of an author's text. Collingwood's analysis of historical 
knowledge, an analysis which he termed 'thought in the second degree', has 
similarities with current work in the philosophy of social science that seeks to 
explain social actions and their specific meanings in relation to the perceptions 
and experiences of social actors. For Collingwood, the actions of philosophers are 
actions which are purposive, but unlike actions undertaken in the present, are not 
'directly' accessible to empirical observation. Therefore, they must be understood 
with reference to further documentary evidence, which involves 'getting inside 
other peoples heads' and 'looking at the situation through their own eyes'.42 
Following on from this, historical knowledge can only be gained therefore by 're-
thinking' past thOUght that has been disseminated in literature. According to 
Collingwood, what is necessary in historical research, is a 're-enactment of past 
thought in the historian's own mind, where these thoughts could be objectively 
known by being subjectively lived. '43 
The historians of political thought noted above are just some of the historical 
writers that opened up debates about history and interpretation, particularly in 
relation to developing ways of understanding the meaning of philosophical texts. 
41 J. G. Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (London: University Press of 
America, 1987), p. 106. 
42 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 215. 
43 Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 107. 
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However, it was not until an article in History and Theory entitled 'Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas' that this re-evaluation of historical and 
philosophical research entered a new phase of development. The author of the 
article was Cambridge historian Quentin Skinner. Heavily influenced by 10hn 
Dunn and 1. G. Pocock, Skinner argues that 'orthodox' methods of historical 
investigation which have embraced methods which seek to uncover 'hidden 
meanings' or assert the 'autonomy of the text' as primary are essentially flawed. 
Moreover, 'in striving to appropriate the 'classical texts' to the present, the 
'orthodox' historians of ideas have generated both mistaken empirical claims and 
conceptual confusion; they have ignored the uniquely historical question of what 
the various thinkers intended to say, and have instead deployed interpretative 
techniques which are not properly historical. ,44 Skinner's insight is useful and I 
will return to Skinner's observations below. 
So far this assessment of methodology has concerned itself with those historians 
of ideas who seek to uncover the 'true' intentions of a given philosopher and who 
focus on methods which concentrate on extemalised forms of linguistic action, 
and on the 'nagging' problem of the distance (psychological, temporal and 
cultural) between the author and the interpreter. The emphasis has been on 
developing a 'method' that is based on a translation of written speech. What has 
been neglected in the attempts to generate a more efficient method of uncovering 
past events, is a thorough re-framing of the historical structures within which 
political philosophy is posed. This 'deficiency' in philosophical interpretation has 
been purportedly addressed by the approach of H.G. Gadamer (1900-1989). 
Gadamer argues that it is not necessary to develop a 'method' of interpretation, as 
it is precisely this pre-occupation with method, that has obscured the true 
44 J. V. Femia, • An Historicist Critique of .. Revisionist" Methods for Studying the History of 
Ideas', History and Theory, Vol. 20, No, 2, (1981) p. 157. 
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character of human understanding; by equating understanding of the history of 
ideas with the understanding of the natural sciences (see Dilthey above) only 
assumptions based upon false premises can be generated. Gadamer rejects the 
notion that 'adequate' understanding requires some sort of 'elimination' of the 
circumstances of the interpreter. Gadamer argues 'that in view of the finite nature 
of our historical existence, there is something uniquely absurd about the whole 
idea of a uniquely correct interpretation. '45 In addition to this view, Gadamer 
stresses that the meaning of a text is never reducible to an author's intention nor 
(importantly) the context in which they wrote. What is important is the reading of 
the text in an open and discursive fashion, or conducting the interpretation as a 
process of 'question and answer' between the author and the interpreter; with the 
interpreter's own historical existence playing an important role in the 
understanding of the text: 
the concern of the interpreter should not be with what some 
individual may have thought but with what is said as it appears or 
presents itself to the reader. There can be no final or 'correct' 
interpretation, because the interpretative horizon stands in the 
moving tradition ofhistory.46 
What Gadamer is in fact attempting to convey, is a process of understanding that 
is not based on, in his view, idealistic notions of objectively finding the true 
meanings of texts, but a process of understanding, in which the interpreter and his 
or her unique existence, play an important role in uncovering meaning: 
To interpret well does not require a blocking out of preconceptions, 
because it is only through these preconceptions that the meaning of 
the text can really be made to speak for us. Thus it would be 
excluding the very thing that makes understanding possible.47 
4S H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 1989 [1975]), p. 107,267-69, 
289. 
46 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 114. 
47 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 114-115. 
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Other critical approaches include the work of Michel Foucault (1926-1984), who 
analyses text not as a relationship between the author and the document, but with 
the 'hidden meanings of the text' and the power structures present therein. 
Foucault's work in this area (particularly in discourse analysis) has, over the last 
twenty years, presented philosophy with a 'significant challenge to positivist 
rationality' and argues for alternative agendas, focusing on social practices and 
communicative action. Because of this focus on power, Foucault was able to 
emphasise the social and material conditions in which ideas developed, and thus 
identify a key component of the production of so-called truth. Along with 
Derrida, Baudrillard and Lyotard (and others), Foucault has been influential in 
contributing to a developing post-modern literature on studying history and the 
history of ideas. 
In furthering the merits of post-modern approaches, Keith Jenkins in On 'What is 
History? >48 posits that the historical approaches of historians such as Edward H. 
Carr and Geoffrey Elton are no longer useful in our now 'post-modern age.' What 
Jenkins terms 'upper and lower case histories' are now redundant and this 
'redundancy' Carr and his modernist contemporaries display, is magnified as 
Jenkins sets them apart from post-modern historian Hayden White and 
philosopher Richard Rorty, both of whom locate their historical spins within 
deconstructivist, post-modern, post-marxist discourses. He notes that 'those who 
will be the best guides to history today are those who not only know all about the 
collapse of upper case and lower case versions [of history] into uncertainty, but 
who like it and can accept it. '49 Such analyses are not to be found within the 
context of this thesis as I contend (and as highlighted by Jenkins's last statement 
above) that post-modern approaches display a deep lack of faith in the human 
48 K. Jenkins, On 'What is History?' (London: Routledge, 1995). 
49 Jenkins, On 'What is History?', p. 10. 
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subject to grasp and understand the human condition. Moreover, this failure is 
surely an indication of the culture of low expectations that pervades post-modem 
approaches (and to some degree so called post-modem society). It is an admission 
that the human subject should lie down and accept its fate, as we are powerless 
de-centred entities with no social or historical power. Moreover, many post-
modem analyses deny that we are even capable of making sense of history and 
politics in any meaningful way, as structures, drivers and motivators which are 
located beyond the subtle interplay of identity and artefact are ignored and often 
denied. 
iii, Modernism Restated 
The nature of this study, having a fixed analysis in terms of its emphasis on 
history and theory, necessitates a more holistic and contextually specific 
approach. To be adequately understood, the development of free speech needs to 
be examined in relation to the specific historical conditions that gave rise to it, as 
well as to the subtle interplay of ideas and events. I argue that context should be 
an overarching element of the way we understand events and processes and these 
should not be dislocated from a linear, dynamic view of history. What this study 
seeks to do is return to the historically and contextually bound interplays that 
surrounded the philosophical ideas of free speech during the nineteenth century, 
and place them within a frame of reference that can locate specific drivers and 
motivators, whilst at the same time giving attention to subtlety and artefact. 
Although the work of Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Collingwood offer good 
historical pointers on the development of interpretative techniques, they cannot be 
of use here as they look for the meaning of ideas whilst not paying sufficient 
attention to context and mediation. 
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Similarly void of contextual and historical sensitivity are those approaches 
developed by Gadamer and particularly Foucault.so Such approaches are far too 
heavily relativistic and as such can only offer (although sometimes useful) 
snapshots of events and processes in question. They cannot, in my view, provide 
a dynamic perspective or fully rounded approach that is warranted when studying 
the history of ideas and their articulation and mediation. An overemphasis on 
subjective, reflective approaches, although providing interesting detail and 
insight, in my VIew, does not provide or even offer adequate historical or 
philosophical insight into any particular struggle or controversy. Contemporary 
trends, both in the history of ideas and in political theory have embraced 
relativism and sought to divorce themselves from so-called grand narratives. 
Instead, they highlight complexity and chaos as 'key features' or 'emerging 
themes' within a given action. 
Having highlighted some of the options open to a historian of political thought, I 
will now tum to those ideas that have contributed to the analysis presented in this 
thesis. In doing this, I will tum again to Skinner's article Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas. Skinner criticises two common 
approaches that he argues give rise to various interpretative inaccuracies. Firstly, 
Skinner rejects the approach which insists upon the 'autonomy of the text' as its 
own meaning. He notes: 
The whole point, it is characteristically said, of studying past works 
of philosophy (or literature) must be that they contain "timeless 
elements," in the form of ''universal ideas," even a "dateless 
wisdom" with ''universal application".sl 
so However, I do point to Foucault's Discipline and Punish as a good analysis of the restrictive 
potential of utilitarianism. 
51 Q. Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', History and Theory, 8, 
(1969) pp. 3-53. 
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Defenders of this approach, according to Skinner, reject the notion that context 
has anything substantial to contribute to the interpretation. Skinner (in a similar 
vein to Schleiermacher) argues that interpreters of a given piece of work using 
this method of analysis, are in effect imbuing the text with timeless 'universal 
truths' with 'universal application'. According to Skinner, the danger in 
attempting to unravel historical texts in this manner, is that our expectations 
about what someone must be saying or doing will determine what we understand 
the thinker to be saying. Skinner calls this flawed approach the 'Priority of 
Paradigms' , which leads the interpreter to committing all manner of 
methodological and interpretative errors.52 The interpreter credits the author with 
an 'inner meaning' which he or she feels that the philosopher is trying to convey; 
Skinner terms this the 'mythology of coherence'. The example which Skinner 
uses is enlightening: if for example, in examining Hooker's laws, the scholar can 
find no coherent meaning, the moral is to look harder for that coherence, because 
according to orthodox scholarly practice it is surely there. Thus the interpretation 
imbues any given text with a coherence that may not be there. In further 
illustrating examples of methodological inefficiency, Skinner cites interpretations 
of the work of Thomas Hobbes particularly focusing around perceived meaning in 
Hobbes's political philosophy. He notes: 
[ ... ] it becomes the duty of the exegete to discover the 'inner 
coherence of his (Hobbes's) doctrine' by reading the Leviathan a 
number of times, until - in a perhaps excessively revealing phrase -
he finds that its argument has assumed coherence. 53 
The second common approach which Skinner rejects as inappropriate concerns 
the over use of context, 'the [ ... ] "religious, political and economic factors" which 
determine the meaning of any given text and so must provide "the ultimate 
52 Errors which include what Skinner terms the mythology of doctrines, historical absurdity, the 
mythology of parochialism etc. 
53 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding', p. 16. 
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framework" for any attempt to understand it. '54 This overemphasis on context 
implies a notion of causation, which for Skinner is also methodologically 
unsound. However, Skinner does not reject the notion of context outright. It is the 
linguistic component of the contextual setting that is important in the study of the 
history of ideas, in that the context, rather than being detenninant, sets the 
framework for 'recognising' meaning. He notes: 
The appropriate methodology for the history of ideas must be 
concerned, first of all, to delineate the whole range of 
communications which could have been conventionally performed 
on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance, and 
next, to trace the relations between the given utterance and this 
wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention 
of the given writer. Once the appropriate focus of the study is seen 
in this way to be essentially linguistic and the appropriate 
methodology is seen in this way with the recovery of intentions, the 
study of all the facts about the social context of the given text can 
then take its place as a part of this linguistic exercise. 5s 
Skinner's observations contribute to the methodological framework of this thesis 
in that I take heed of his warnings about misinterpreting the intentionality of an 
author and also of placing too much emphasis on determining contextual factors. 
However, Skinner's approach fails to acknowledge the notion of power within the 
linguistic historical context, something that this thesis will highlight by noting the 
structural components relevant to shifting the balance of power within free speech 
discourses. In order to develop this aspect of the work, I have drawn on the work 
of Jurgen Habermas (1929-). 
Habermas attacks the problem of interpretation differently as he develops a 
methodology' that places more emphasis on notions of historical context, 
particularly in relation to the existence of power dynamics within a given social 
54 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding', p. 3. 
55 Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding', p. 49. 
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structure, in which texts can be perceived as instruments which express social 
power or cultural persuasion (a feature that Habermas in particular was critical of 
Gadamer for ignoring in his analysis). Habermas argues that 'so-called' positivist 
models of knowledge, represented in whatever form, characterise a one-sided 
nature of understanding. One-sided, in the sense that other, more reflective or 
critical modes of understanding and explanation, are not allowed to develop, as 
culture and institutions within the public sphere only serve the narrow interests of 
those in powerful positions; Haberrnas links this process with industrialisation 
and the development of capitalism. He argues that when analysing texts, a more 
critical approach should be adopted, and that one should take into account the 
underlying themes or motives of a particular piece of work. Haberrnas's analysis 
is useful particularly with regard to his explanation of the development of power 
laden communication practices. Habermas argues that with the development of 
capitalism came new modes of communication and communication practices. 
Such communication practices were eventually monopolised by the middle-class 
which took ownership not only of the means of the dissemination of ideas, but 
also the language in which these ideas were manifested. So for example, within 
this thesis, utilitarianism's arguments for free speech will be explored in relation 
to how utilitarianism's arguments are structured, by drawing on their own 
expositions and others' interpretations of them; how they were interpreted and 
employed by those who were sympathetic to such arguments; and how they were 
mediated in the public sphere. All this will be undertaken in relation to the 
emergence of utilitarianism's arguments within the context of the development of 
laissez-faire capitalism in nineteenth century Britain. The actual practice of 
defending free speech, mediated through the radical press for example, with 
reference to particular instances, will allow a direct correlation between theory 
and practice to be made. Thus, the meaning of utilitarianism's justification for 
free speech is not solely interpreted on its own and examined for its internal 
strengths or inconsistencies, but in relation to the practice of that argument as it 
occurred - the specific conditions that gave rise to the argument - and its 
mediation in praxis. The arguments for free speech then, will be explored and 
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explained in relation to the specific historical conditions of capitalism and the 
power relations that were intrinsic to this phase of history. 
Finally in tenns of methodology, I take inspiration from the work of historian 
E.H. Carr when he notes: 
The historian and the facts of history are necessary to one another. 
The historian without the facts is rootless and futile; that facts 
without the historian are dead and meaningless. My first answer to 
the question 'What is History?' is that it is a continuous process of 
interaction between the present and the past.56 
As we can see from the above quotation, a fine line is walked between the 
analysis and even recognition of fact and subjective interpretation of features of 
history, such features are represented in particular artefacts in the history of ideas. 
Artefacts (which are similar to Skinner's linguistic context) in tenns of this study 
include the particular means by which the ideas of free speech were articulated 
and mediated, most notably in the different strands of the radical press of the 
nineteenth century. It is this focus on context and artefact that I find most 
appealing in Carr's analysis, as a key source of material under investigation in 
this thesis is a specific type of artefact of political thOUght during the nineteenth 
century - the radical press. It is of vital importance to note that the radical press 
are focussed on here because they are one of the main conveyers of political 
ideas, they are the artefacts. They are examples of the subtle, subjective (but 
contextually bound) materials that Carr asserts are so important when studying 
history and the history of ideas. 
In this work, I also take inspiration from E.H. Carr's optimistic, modernist 
framework, as I believe this approach, coupled with Habermasian critical insight, 
and Skinner's contextual linguistic sympathies, provides a clearer account of the 
56 Carr, What is History?, p. 30. 
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theory and practice of free speech. Moreover, Carr and Habennas are leant upon 
in particular, because I draw similar conclusions to them about the state of 
contemporary western intelligentsia, in the latter half of the twentieth century and 
for Habermas at the beginning of the twenty first. These conclusions echo 
concerns about a perceived lack of faith in humanity that materialise from a large 
amount of contemporary social and political theory. Such lack of faith in the 
future is best exemplified most prominently in post-modernism's lack of faith in 
humanity itself. Carr was aware of this during the 1960s, 70s and early 80s noting 
that we have to keep hold of a vision of humanity and mankind that is dynamic 
and positive for the future. 
1.7: Brie(Review o(Relevant Literature 
Having identified methodological gaps in the literature and how I seek to fill 
some of these gaps, it is now necessary for me to note where this study sets itself 
apart from, though hopefully adding to, literature on free speech during the 
nineteenth century. First of all, although I will be highlighting literature that, in 
my view, falls short of the historical and philosophical roundedness that my 
analysis seeks to attain, I must note that I am indebted to the vast array of 
secondary literature which has illuminated my study and been of use in 
constructing this thesis. Also, academic custom and rigour state that is necessary 
in a work such as this that relevant literature is subjected to some scrutiny, some 
of which will be inspected more closely than others. Moreover, by highlighting 
the main foci of literature within this field, I am also demonstrating that a gap 
exists, a gap which this thesis seeks to fill. 
It must be noted however, that at this stage of the thesis, to go into great detail of 
all the literature that I have consulted for this work would be folly, as large 
portions of relevant literature are consulted in depth later in the work. For now, it 
is enough that I provide a sketch of the main works that merit mention. 
The first notable book on the development of free speech that I came across when 
undertaking my literature search was the already mentioned, 1.B. Bury's A 
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History of Freedom of Thought, (1913). In this volume, Bury chronologically 
charts the development of free thought from ancient Greece and Rome, through 
the Middle Ages and the Reformation, finishing with the birth and development 
of rationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Written from a strongly 
secularist perspective, Bury is uncompromising in his attack on the forces of 
oppression that have stifled free thought and its development over the ages. A 
similar secularist albeit more comprehensive work is that by 1.M. Robertson in 
his almost ironically titled A Short History of Freethought, (1915). This two 
volume work covers a much wider area than that of Bury, in the sense that not 
only does he chart the development of free thought in the West in greater detail, 
but also provides examples of the development of free thought under ancient 
eastern religions in India, Egypt, China. Robertson also goes on to chart the rise 
of free thought in Israel; and under Christianity, and Islam. His first volume ends 
at the Reformation and the rise of what he terms modem free thought. Volume 
two of this work continues in a similar historical vein reviewing the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in great detail. Robertson is charting the 
broad development of free thought across Europe, in addition to paying close 
attention to British and German free thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In the final section of this volume, Robertson concentrates on 
propaganda and culture, surveying the broad movement of popular culture and its 
dynamic affect on the change in the balance of free thOUght in modem times. 
Both Bury's work and that of Robertson were invaluable to me during the early 
stages of this work as they provided an historical overview, albeit largely 
secularist, of the 'struggle' for free thought and the rise of arguments for press 
freedom. Another other work that is of a similar nature include Wickwar's The 
Strugglefor Freedom of the Press, 1819-1832, (1928). This work has been useful 
in highlighting points of resistance to arguments for free speech as well as 
examples of the arguments themselves. 
The main emphasis of A.L. Haight's Banned Books 387 B.C. to 1978 A.D. (1978) 
is on Censorship in the United States. However, the book also covers an 
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extensive catalogue of banned titles from Homer, Socrates and Confucius, 
through to the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Although the work does not have any 
substantial analysis and is more of a collection of titles that have been banned, 
this book is invaluable for its wide coverage of banned material. Focusing more 
narrowly on political censorship, R.J. Goldstein in Political Censorship of the 
Arts and the Press in Nineteenth Century Europe, (1989), surveys the context of 
political censorship during the nineteenth century before going on to analyse in 
detail political censorship of the press, caricature, theatre, Opera and the cinema 
focusing mainly on Britain, France and Germany. Donald Thomas's A Long Time 
Burning. The History of Literary Censorship in England, (1969), charts the 
development of the powers of the censor from 1476 to the Twentieth Century. 
Although this book is of a general nature, in terms of its chronological structure 
and analysis, this work has two interesting chapters on the fight against 
censorship during the nineteenth century. In Chapter Ten, Thomas argues that it 
was in fact historians rather than the philosophers who justified the existence of a 
free press. This assertion is an interesting one, and one to which I will examine in 
greater detail in the following chapters. In Chapter Eleven, Thomas is concerned 
with Victorian censorship, and seeks to ascertain its true purpose; particularly 
with reference to so called 'indecent' literature. This book also has a large 
Appendix, which consists of numerous documents and passages which he uses to 
illustrate the different aspects of literary censorship in England. A similar work, 
but one which is more a catalogue of censorship is by H.B. Bonner. Entitled 
Penalties Upon Opinion, (1934). This book provides details of censorship trials 
from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, up to the nineteen thirties. The majority 
of highlighted cases in this work stem from the nineteenth century. The main 
emphasis of this volume is on the many trials for heresy and blasphemy, and 
Bonner makes no secret of the fact that she intends this book to be a reminder of 
the extent and injustice of intolerance through the ages. Alex Craig's The Banned 
Books of England and Other Countries (1962) charts the control of books from 
the grip of the Roman Church in Medieval Europe to the 1959 Obscene 
Publications Act. Again, this work devotes considerable space to the nineteenth 
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century, in particular to books and publications that were seen to 'corrupt or 
deprave'. As well as focusing primarily on Britain, Craig also notes the trials and 
tribulations of controversial books in France and the United states. Books 
Condemned to be Burnt (1892) by J.A. Farrer, is again, a compendium of 
censorship (and the ritualised practice of book burning), from the book fires of 
the sixteenth century, to the late eighteenth century. 
Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776, The Rise and Decline of 
Government Controls, (1952) by Frederick Seaton Siebert, provides the reader 
with an historical overview of the development of free speech, (with particular 
emphasis on press freedoms) from the Tudor period, through the Stuarts and the 
Puritan Revolution to George III in the eighteenth century. Siebert's thesis is that 
the decline of government control of the press can be traced along three main 
lines of development. The first line represents the sheer number and variety of 
controls operated by central government. The second is the effort to enforce these 
controls, and the third is the degree of compliance to these controls. Siebert's 
work is an attempt to develop some sense of movement between the state and the 
forces advocating a free press. In a similar vein, but with more detail is Writing 
and Censorship in Britain, (1992) edited by Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells. 
This book is a compendium of articles tracing censorship from the Tudors 
through to the twentieth century. Of particular relevance to my research are the 
articles by Robert Goldstein, MJ.D. Roberts and David Saunders. In A Land of 
Relative Freedom: Censorship of the Press and the Arts in the Nineteenth 
Century (1815-1914), Goldstein notes that although Britain was seen by many as 
a land of freedom, where restrictions on the press were limited, as well as the fact 
that Britain welcomed 'dangerous' exiles such as 'Marx' and 'Metternich' etc., 
the authorities still feared the spread and influence of radical political ideas 
among the working class. Goldstein argues that one of the main ways around this 
problem was the creation of the stamp tax on the press, which, it was hoped, 
would deter the poor from purchasing newspapers. As I will demonstrate in later 
chapters, the issue of the stamp tax was a key political concern to many political 
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agitators, radicals and pamphleteers. In addition to noting the effects of the stamp 
tax, Goldstein also highlights the restrictions on the theatre and the arts. He notes 
the intentionally vague nature of the criteria for the censors and the crude 
methods of censorship. 
The second pertinent article in this collection is MJ.D. Roberts' Blasphemy, 
Obscenity and the Courts: Contours of Tolerance in Nineteenth Century England. 
In this chapter Roberts attempts to examine the nature of 'post-public legal 
constraints', which he argues were not the sole means of censorship. He notes 
that it is evident in many of the more notorious blasphemy and libel cases during 
the nineteenth century, that these cases were used to shape public opinion. This 
acted as an unofficial support mechanism for the law. The purpose of this was to 
attempt to make the costly and 'liberty infringing' alternative of 'blanket' law 
enforcement unnecessary. David Saunders' chapter entitled Victorian Obscenity 
Law: Negative Censorship or Positive Administration? argues that the view of 
censorship of 'obscene' literature, the so-called 'repressive hypothesis', is flawed. 
Instead, Saunders presents a picture of nineteenth century obscenity law as one 
that is independent from the concept of censorship. In his view, obscenity law 
should be seen in terms of demography and culture, rather than broad repression. 
He notes that obscenity law is in fact anything but a unified historical or 
theoretical project. Instead, it shifts from a 'medically backed solving of a social 
problem' to an 'aesthetically grounded procedure whereby works can be obscene, 
yet also of literary merit and thus legally publishable for the public good.' 
The growing freedoms of the press during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, and the story of how the press liberated itself from control, is well 
documented by Politics and the Press 1780-1850 (1949), by Arthur Aspinall. 
Aspinall stresses the affects of industrialisation and education on the populace. 
He notes that the number of people who could .exercise judgement on the 
government of the day, and on public affairs generally, had a significant effect on 
the growth of press rights and wider press legislation. The effect of this was the 
growth of independent newspapers and pamphlets which, as we will see later, set 
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out to challenge oppression, injustice and the powers of church and state. A. J. 
Lee's The Origins of the Popular Press, 1855-1914 argues that the early 
'struggles' for freedom of the press in the nineteenth century were 'fought out on 
largely liberal terms'57, he notes that '[h]istorically the struggle of the press in 
Britain was conducted in the rhetoric of liberals and by liberals'. As I will 
demonstrate, this was not an accurate description of events. He goes on to discuss 
how, as the press grew into a large scale industry, the 'early liberal vision of a 
cheap press' became hampered. Stephen Koss provides a useful overview in The 
Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain (1981) in two volumes. Volume 
one focuses exclusively on the nineteenth century with the second exploring 
reverberating themes of the twentieth century. The main theme to which Koss 
gives attention is that of the relationship between newspapers and Parliament, 
highlighting the role that the press played in serving the specific interests of those 
members of Parliament, either directly or indirectly, that were willing to 'support' 
their political stance. He highlights in particular the massive expansion of the 
newspaper industry after the repeal of stamp duties during the 1850s noting that 
the press emerged increasingly as part of the established political culture during 
this time. 
The growth of Radicalism and Secularism during the nineteenth century, and the 
effects such groups had on free speech, is charted in great detail by Edward 
Royle, in Radicals, Secularists and Republicans (1980). In his work, Royle sets 
out the institutional history of secularism before he goes on to explore the 
structure of the secularist movement and its ideas. He concludes this work with a 
detailed study of the campaigns in which the secularist movement became 
involved highlighting the unique nature of the secularist viewpoint and the effects 
of these campaigns on contemporary Victorian society. Continuing this theme, 
57 A. J. Lee, Origins o/the Popular Press, 1855-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 15. 
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but in a more geographically restricted manner, lain McCalman's Radical 
Underworld. Prophets. Revolutionaries and Pornographers in London. 1795-
1840, (1988), traces the growth of the underground revolutionary republican 
Spensonian society, founded by Thomas Spence. In addition to highlighting the 
factors that created what was to become a 'cohesive political force', McCalman 
surveys the ideas and actions of the underworld, with particular attention given to 
the alehouse debating clubs and blasphemous chapels. In a more biographical 
work, Arthur Calder-Marshall's Lewd Blasphemous and Obscene (1972), surveys 
the 'trials and tribulations' of some of the nineteenth century's most notable 
radicals and free speech advocates, noting some of the more infamous and 
obscure events surrounding the lives of Hone, Carlile, Holyoake amongst others. 
Frede Castberg's Freedom of Speech in the West (1960), deviates slightly from 
the works noted above in that it is a comparative study of freedom of speech in 
France, the then Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. 
Castberg highlights the relative similarities in the constitutional make up that 
protects free speech in each of the countries mentioned. However, he also points 
out the many differences in which all of these states deviate in one form or 
another, from the principles of freedom enshrined in their prospective 
constitutions. In essence, Castberg's book is a comparative study of public law, 
mainly concerned with rules that affect freedom of speech 
Although Francesco Ruffini states in the opening chapter of Religious Liberty, 
(1912) that religious liberty is distinct from other forms of liberty, I feel that I 
must include this volume in my review, as an understanding of Church and State 
relations is crucial to my research, and it is for this reason that I give it a brief 
mention. In a similar vein to the volumes noted above, Ruffini highlights the 
chronological and geographical development of religious liberty, from the 
'precursors' of classical antiquity, through to the nineteenth century; scanning 
Europe in his analysis of the development of religious liberty, and the forces 
posed against it. 
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One recent addition to the wealth ofliterature on free speech and the development 
of the free press is The Powers of the Press (1996), by Aled Jones. Focusing 
heavily on the development of the 'mass communications media' during the 
nineteenth century, Jones explores the impact of this industry on the social, 
cultural and political life of Victorian England. He goes on to eloquently detail 
how the press challenged many aspects of the Victorian social and moral order 
and charts the tensions between this and the expansion of the commercial press 
industry and the prevailing moral imperatives. Lucy Brown in her Victorian News 
and Newspapers, (1985) notes in the opening section of the work that the book is 
about 'news' 'where it came from, how it was received, how it was handled, 
distributed and presented.' Looking at the role of technology and the character of 
reporting as well as the impact of advertising and the scope of news reporting, 
Brown notes that it was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century, after the 
repeal of the final stamp tax, that the newspaper became an established part of the 
'normal furniture' oflife for all social classes of the age. 
Although the works noted above have provided me with a wealth of references 
and pointers to primary material, an overwhelming feature of the works noted 
thus far denote a lack of historical contextual subtlety or significant reference to 
'linguistic artefact'. They take, with one or two exceptions, a predominantly 
'great thinkers' approach to the study of free speech, either in terms of charting 
the development of 'grand ideas' or focusing narrowly on particular individuals 
or events. Moreover, much of the work thus noted lacks any critical analysis 
particularly in terms of the development of particular ideas and their articulation. 
A number of notable exceptions however, do exists. 
Patricia Hollis in The Pauper Press. A Study in Working-class Radicalism of the 
1830s (1970), and Joel Wiener's The War of the Unstamped (1969) highlight the 
way that working-class radicalism impacted on radical journalism and political 
activities around issues of reform but then developed into a more sophisticated 
critical anti-capitalist tone. Both Hollis and Wiener are successful in providing 
good examples of the background and theoretical underpinning of working-class 
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radicalism along with their articulations in the radical working-class press. 
Although these two works are of great merit, they present mainly an historical 
account that is centred on the debates and struggles in the 1830s and although 
they do offer some insight into aspects of theory, a detailed analysis of the 
political theories of free speech is lacking. This said, Wiener's and Hollis's work 
should be seen as major contributions to this field, contributions that I have 
drawn from and hope to build upon and develop within the context of this work. 
Another work that provides a welcome exception to the largely idealistic view of 
press history is provided by James Curran and Jean Seaton and entitled Power 
Without Responsibility (1997). In this work the authors chart in great detail the 
development of the commercial press and its gradual monopolisation by the 
middle class. More importantly, however, this work attacks many of the 
assumptions and notions of works hitherto cited, most prominent of which is that 
the press itself was (and still is) a defender ofliberty, a 'fourth estate' which has 
the peoples' interests at heart and serves them unswervingly. This critical 
historical account of the development of a bourgeois press which acts as a 
mechanism for social control of the working class is another fine example of the 
break from traditional interpretations of press history. In an earlier work, entitled 
Newspaper History: from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day (1978), 
Curran, along with his co-editors - George Boyce and Pauline Wingate, provide a 
collection of essays that also take a more historically critical account of the 
development of the press through history. The work provides a collection of 
essays that look at historical processes and contexts and provide contextual and 
political evidence of the practices of the British Newspaper trade. The book not 
only focuses on 'society' and 'economy', but also on the values and belief 
systems of the newspaper elites and their minions. The work is of great value for 
its political insight into the dynamics of the development of the newspaper press 
as it offers a departure in terms of its analysis from other more traditional works 
noted above. Its departure is typified in its emphasis on political economy and 
culture and, as such, some of the themes emerging within this thesis have taken 
inspiration from the analyses represented in these volumes. As we will see, these 
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latter works in particular have provided me with inspiration in so far as they have 
sought explanations of the struggle for freedom of the press that focus on social, 
economic and cultural factors rather than on individual actors or romanticised 
versions of press history. Their main drawback is the relative lack of attention 
given to the detail of the political philosophies of free speech and it is this deficit 
that I hope to build upon in this work. 
Despite the difficulties in much of the literature hitherto cited, there is no doubt 
that the works mentioned above have provided this researcher with essential 
material and references for the thesis, and for this I am grateful. However, as 
noted above, I feel that this literature in particular provides me with a raison 
d'etre for my research, as the majority of this work, although comprehensive, 
makes no attempt to view free speech in terms of both philosophy and history 
which in my view, is crucial if a thorough understanding of free speech is to be 
gained. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Historical Context 
[ ... ] the writings of the pamphleteers and in the demands of political 
and religious minorities are to be discovered the seeds from which 
later grew the doctrines of religious toleration, democracy in 
government and liberty of the press. I 
2.1: Introduction 
The short quote above simply encapsulates a view about the development of 
freedom of the press as emerging out of the political and religious turmoil of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is the intention of this chapter to examine 
this process and look more closely at factors that impacted on the struggles for 
freedom of speech during the nineteenth century. Moreover, given that some 
historical insight is posited as a key methodological component of the analysis of 
this work, it is only fitting that some examination is given to those circumstances 
and events that provide a historical precursor to the political activity around 
freedom of speech during the nineteenth century. This chapter will provide such a 
precursor by exploring, albeit briefly, the social and political contexts that 
historically underpin struggles for freedom of speech during the nineteenth 
century. 
This historical overview, as well as providing a genuine historical flavour to this 
work, also serves as a methodological tool by highlighting key forces and effects 
which impacted on struggles during the nineteenth century, in terms of both the 
influence of philosophical ideas, from individuals such as Milton and Locke, and 
the sense of historical perspective that was prevalent during the nineteenth 
I F. S. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1952), p. 232. 
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century. It is my intention then, to capture the sense of historical process and 
some of the philosophical influences that were carried over into struggles during 
the nineteenth century. In noting this dynamic, I am providing a basis from which 
a closer analysis of free speech is to be made, and more importantly, a notion of 
the historical character of the struggle for free speech. 
The structure of the chapter will take a broadly chronological approach, and cover 
a relatively vast historical space; obviously in this short space, only a cursory 
account of historical events and processes can be provided; however, it is hoped 
that this account will provide a suitable horizon from which a clear sense of 
perspective can be gained. The first section of the chapter will briefly sketch key 
assertions of free speech that emerged after the invention of the printing press in 
1476. Most notably those defences that emerged following the Reformation and 
during the onset of the Enlightenment. Although the motivation for this chapter is 
mainly methodological, i.e. providing historical context, this historical context 
should not solely be perceived as a means of understanding processes during the 
nineteenth century. What this chapter also highlights is the nature of the context 
in which free speech was starting to become interwoven with new arguments 
relating to the emergence of new forms of social systems and the disintegration of 
feudalism, as well as the questioning of established forms of religious worship 
and the belief in human progress in matters of politics and economics. In addition 
to highlighting the measures and arguments that sought to advance free speech 
and some of the more potent arguments and examples of dissent which sought to 
curb censorial powers over this period, the chapter will also highlight the 
respective measures undertaken by Censors, Monarchs and Governments to curb 
freedom of speech and press freedom up until around 1779. 
2.2: Historical Narrative 
Before the onset of Enlightenment thinking, which reformed the intellectual 
landscape with ideas of natural inalienable rights, and justification for religious 
and political toleration, intolerance of dissenting religious opinions was 
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commonplace. Such intolerance is partially reflected in the struggle to control the 
press and curtail the influence of dangerous dissenting religious and political 
ideas. As we will see, struggles for press freedom were fought out over many 
years of political turmoil in which religious and political power shifted between 
Catholicism and Protestantism. As King notes '[r]eligious truth was assumed to 
be so self-evident that opposition to it was taken to imply evil, not error. During 
the Reformation this view was owned not only by Catholics, but also by the early 
Protestants'.2 This point is emphasised below as I start this historical narrative at 
the Reformation. 
Since William Caxton introduced printing in England in 1476 restraints upon 
printing have also varied in accordance with these shifting power struggles. When 
Henry VII came to the throne in 1485 he appointed Peter Actors as his Royal 
Stationer and the first official mechanism of censorship was commissioned, as it 
was the responsibility of the Stationer to grant patents only to selected printers in 
the name of the Crown. In 1538, supervised by the King, the first licensing 
proclamation to control and censor printing was drawn up which covered all 
books printed in English. All printing had to be officially viewed so as to 
determine its 'worth' prior to publication. This form of prior censorship 
continued in various forms until the end of the licensing system in 1695, so it is 
. worth considering its development in some detail. 
Over a number of years and as the number of printers grew, they organised 
themselves into what came to be known as The Stationers' Company, which was 
given its Royal charter in 1557. Essentially the role of the Stationers' Company 
was self censorship, as all books would be examined and licensed by the 
2 P. King, Toleration. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1976), p. 76. 
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stationers prior to publication. As Thomas3 notes 'The granting of this charter to 
the Stationers' Company was described with a spirit ofphilistinism which made it 
quite clear that, on the part of the authorities, this was a recognition of the 
dangers of literature rather than of its usefulness or dignity [ ... ].' Fines and prison 
sentences were imposed upon those who published unlicensed material or who 
had presses which were not registered and licensed by the Stationers' Company. 
For more serious transgressions of the code, in which blasphemous and seditious 
literature was produced, the guilty parties were penalised by execution. Despite 
such high penalties for avoiding licensing, many printers saw the value of what 
was seen by the authorities as 'blasphemous' or 'dissenting' literature as an 
expression of their beliefs. It is evident here that state intolerance of different 
religious beliefs, mainly at this time Protestantism, was backed up by state 
sanction, prosecution and even persecution. 
After the death of Queen Mary (1516-1558) and the accession of Elizabeth I 
(1533- 1603) in 1558, attempts were made to increase the existing powers over 
printing and in essence tighten the grip of censorship. The coronation of Elizabeth 
I also meant an end to Catholic rule, which England had witnessed under king 
Henry the VIII prior to the Reformation and Queen Mary during her short reign. 
However, Elizabeth was as intolerant of Catholicism as her father and grandfather 
were of Protestantism. This intolerance was reflected in Elizabethan press 
legislation, as under Elizabeth, England witnessed controls that would set the 
scene for press regulation for many years. However, as Hill notes, print also 
spread ideas of the Reformation throughout Europe4 as well as posing a threat to 
the established order. The threat of foreign Catholic intervention from France or 
3 D. Thomas, A Long Time Burning; The History of Literary Censorship in England (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 9. 
4 C. Hill, England's Turning Point, Essays in 17th Century English History (London: 
Bookmarks Ltd. 1998), p. 183. 
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Spain, and the possibility of a Puritan revolt within English borders provided the 
justification for the extension and imposition of censorship legislation, as it was 
thought that only with such an extension of legislative powers could political 
stability be maintained: 
The Tudor policy of strict control over the press in the interest of 
safety of the state was maintained throughout the sixteenth century. 
[ ... ] the English Sovereigns acted upon the principle that the peace 
of the realm demanded the suppression of all dissenting opinion [ ... ] 
Neither Parliament, the printers nor public opinion such as it was 
offered any appreciable resistance to the aggrandisement of the 
crown.s 
The form and articulation of these restrictions are numerous; however, it is 
important for this survey to highlight the main strands of legislation. The most 
important Elizabethan ordinance came in the form of the 1559 Injunction, the 
main elements of which were: 
1. All new printed material must be submitted before publication to either 
the Queen, six of the Privy Council, an ecclesiastical judge, or to the 
Chancellor of one of the Universities. 
2. Plays, pamphlets and ballads should be submitted for licence to print to 
the three ecclesiastical commissioners of London. 
3. If not forbidden by any of the three ecclesiastical commissioners, reprints 
of works on government and religion were permitted after inspection by 
the above. 
5 F. S. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476 - 1776: the Rise and Decline of 
Government Controls (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), p. 25. 
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4. The names of the licensers should be added to the end of every work as 
confinnation of their authorisation.6 
The foremost strands of regulation emanated from the Queen, the Privy Council, 
then other royal officials, the church hierarchy and ecclesiastical judges, and the 
Stationers' Company. As a result of the growing number of controls, the printers 
of the day found themselves surrounded by the ever watchful eyes of those keen 
to prosecute if they stepped out of line. Moreover, the measure and sophistication 
of such regulation reflects the force of intolerance which was fed in part by fear 
of insurrection or even worse, foreign invasion. This being said there was no 
shortage of printers who risked everything for a pittance to print a religious 
pamphlet or agitational flyer. The Refonnation was not complete and Catholics 
and Puritans alike practised their religion even though they risked persecution and 
death for their beliefs. Not only were books and pamphlets burnt openly by 
advocates of strict controls over print, but many a dissenter was burned at the 
stake for not following the word of the Protestant church and state. Examples of 
capital punishment did little to discourage men like Robert Parsons (1546-1610) 
who wrote the pro Catholic Christian Directory, or Edmund Campion, (1540-
1581) 'whose missionary zeal included acceptance of the fact that martyrdom for 
the Catholic faith might be their temporal reward.'7 Although Parsons and his 
secret press were never caught, he organised much Catholic resistance both in 
England and abroad with a view to restoring Catholicism as the church of 
England. Edward Campion wrote Decem Rationes (Ten Reasons) which heavily 
criticised the Anglican church and he was eventually found, tortured and executed 
for his agitation, another example of the acute intolerance of Catholic dissent by 
the Protestant authorities. 
6 See Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, pp. 56 & 57. 
7 Thomas,.A Long Time Burning, p. 10. 
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With the number of master printers increasing from eight in 1560 to over thirty by 
the end of the century,8 so the numbers of books and pamphlets that required 
licensing increased. As the respective authorities could not cope with the growing 
number of printers requiring licence, Elizabeth empowered other elite groups 
which could also license the publication of books. The new elite included: the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and York; the Bishop of London and the Vice 
Chancellors of Oxford and Cambridge. As we will see the grip of the censor was 
tightening. 
Over time it was becoming increasingly obvious that the regulation of 1559 was 
insufficient in keeping the writings of dissenters and agitators from the presses 
and ultimately from the public as growth in printing seemed to go on relentlessly; 
it was clear that more effective measures needed to be put into place. After much 
quarrelling over the nature and organisation of the new licensing system, 
Elizabeth issued the Star Chamber Decree of 1586. 'It was the most 
comprehensive regulation of the press of the entire Tudor period'.9 Following the 
suggestion of Archbishop Whitgift, the Decree placed a limitation on the number 
of printers, apprentices and presses, and authorised the Stationers' Company with 
the powers of search and seizure. Also, all books (with the exception of law 
books and books printed by the Queen's printer) were required to be licensed by 
the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London, whilst law books were 
licensed by the Justices.1O In addition to this, no printing could be undertaken 
outside London, Oxford or Cambridge. The enforcement and administration of 
the regulations were to be split between the church hierarchy and the Stationers' 
Company. 
8 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 56. 
9 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 61. 
10 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 62. 
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Although the controls over the press were very stringent during the reign of 
Elizabeth, the number of transgressions against the system increased. Such 
transgressions were partly fed by the threat of foreign invasion, and although this 
threat subsided intermittently during Elizabeth's reign, the rumblings of revolt 
remained from within English borders throughout her reign. Such rumblings 
emanated often from the printers themselves, mainly for economic reasons; the 
Puritans and Catholics for religious reasons and from Parliament itself for 
political reasons. It was clear that the system was beginning to crack under the 
weight of pressure from these three sources. However, even given the number of 
pressures upon the system there can be no underestimating the importance of this 
period of Elizabeth's reign in terms of the vehemence and ferocity of censorship 
legislation; as Siebert points out, 'Elizabeth's reign was the high point of the 
entire three-hundred year period [in] the number and variety of controls, 
stringency of enforcement, and general compliance with regulations. 'II As we will 
see, such a spirit of control over the press and almost paranoid fear of insurrection 
is well echoed during the nineteenth century 
After the death of Elizabeth in 1603, the Tudor system of censorship was passed 
on to the Stuarts. The licensing system which had been relatively successful 
(despite many attacks) in the Tudor period was now starting to strain under the 
social, economic and political changes that were taking place under the Stuarts. 
However, the anxiety of those who sought control of the press remained, such 
was their concern over printing, partly due to the increased amounts of literature 
being produced, and partly due to the growing ineffectiveness of the inherited 
Tudor legislation. As a result, the 1637 Decree of the Star Chamber was 
proclaimed. Siebert notes that by the 'decree of 1637 all printing was placed in its 
II Siebert. Freedom of the Press in Eng/and. p. 2. 
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hands. Printing outside the company was forbidden. The identification of the 
interests of the crown with those of the Stationers Company was complete. '12 
These controls were in place only a few years when the Long Parliament took 
over control of printing in 1640. As expected, as the power base of England 
shifted, so too did the basis on which many of the previous press regulations had 
rested. The officials of the Stationers' Company, set up by Royal decree, owed 
their powers to the Monarch, and as power shifted from the Monarch to 
Parliament, so did their allegiance. However, such a shift could not be made 
without much weakening of its power. In addition to the Stationers' Company, 
the other Royal enforcement agency of the press, the Star Chamber, was also to 
succumb to the new shift in power and was eventually abolished in 1641. 
Eventually, the chaos evident in the governing structures of the country soon 
filtered down to the controlling agencies of the burgeoning printing industry and 
for the first time the printers found themselves with new freedoms to print and 
publish without fear of punishment. 'Political and religious controversialists 
suddenly found the press open to them.' 13 However, the freedom which they 
enjoyed was not due to any free-thinking spirit of Parliament but the inability of 
the weakened enforcement agencies and of Parliament to control printed matter. 
In a sense we have an emerging notion of pragmatic tolerance, as political and 
religious turmoil meant that it was becoming no longer expedient, or even 
possible, to assert controls over the press to the degree that Elizabeth had done a 
hundred years earlier. However, by 1642 both Houses of Parliament were 
sufficiently troubled by the increasing glut of seditious literature available that 
they set up a temporary licensing system and gave enhanced powers of search and 
seizure to the Stationers' Company. However, not even the combined activity of 
12 Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, p. 134. 
13 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 173. 
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the Stationers' Company and both Houses of Parliament could subdue the 
printers, who were sensing chaos and attempted to take full advantage of the 
weakening system of restraint. On June 14 1643, spurred on by the weakness of 
its powers over printing, Parliament issued a new ordinance which would reclaim 
its powers over the press and regulate printing. Instead of the crown, Parliament 
would be the authority which would oversee printing in alliance with the 
Stationers' Company. Under the new act, all books, pamphlets and papers etc. 
were required to be licensed by 'persons appointed by Parliament and be entered 
into the Register at Stationers' Hall.' This new Order was the last straw for men 
such as John Milton, who, following his Doctrine of Discipline and Divorce 
(1643) (published without licence and unregistered) attacked the whole system of 
pre-licensing in his work entitled Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of 
Unlicensed Printing (1644). 
Milton's original career intentions were to become a poet; however, the political 
and religious turmoil of the English Civil wars and the interregnum, drew him 
into the sphere of public life. Although it went generally unheeded, Milton's 
argument in Areopagitica can be viewed as one of the first written defences of 
free speech, as much of the literature before Milton's defence of freedom to 
publish was of a seditious or heretical nature. The main stimulus of Milton's 
position stems from his belief that ultimate authority remains in the hands of the 
people and that they should resist tyrannical government. Much of Milton's 
justification of free speech has been connected to the later philosophical thread of 
John Stuart Mill, particularly in the realms of the uncovering of error and the 
search for truth in a 'free and open encounter'; also, as Arblaster notes, in terms 
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of the recognition that accepted truths degenerate into dead dogmas, the 
connection with J .S. Mill is established. 14 
Not only did Milton argue that censorship in the fonn of pre-licensing did no 
good, but also that such measures hindered the acquisition of knowledge in that 
censorship aids: 
[ ... ] the discouragement of all learning and the stop of truth, not 
only by dissexercissing and blunting our abilities in what we know 
already, but by hindering and cropping the discovery that might yet 
be yet further made, both in religious and in civil wisdom. IS 
He continues: 
If it be desired to know the immediate cause of all this free writing 
and free speaking, there cannot be assigned a truer than your own 
mild and free humane government; it is the liberty, Lords and 
Commons, which your own valorous and happy counsels have 
purchased us, liberty which is the nurse of all great wits; this is that 
which hath rarified and enlightened our spirits like the influence of 
heaven; this is that which hath enfranchised, enlarged and lifted up 
our apprehensions degrees above themselves. That our hearts are 
now more capacious, our thoughts more erected to the search and 
expectation of greatest and exactest things, is the issue of your own 
vurtue propagated in us; ye cannot suppress that unless ye reinforce 
an abrogated and merciless law [ ... ].Give me the liberty to know, to 
utter, to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties. 16 
The notion of liberty of printing then, was starting to emerge in dissenting 
discourses and to be articulated within the realms of ideas as well as pragmatic 
politics. 
14 A. Arblaster, The Rise and Fall of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 
156. 
IS J. Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973 [1644]), p. 5. 
16 Milton, Areopagitica, p. 37-38. 
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Another prominent figure that championed the cause of anti-censorship at this 
time was John Lilbume. Known widely as a 'great libeller' Lilbume was a 
prominent advocate of freedom of the press and much of his activities were 
concentrated upon criticising the licensing system and particularly the Stationers' 
Company, of which he wrote: 
[ ... ] that insufferable, unjust and tyrannical monopoly of printing, 
whereby a great company of the very same Malignant Fellows that 
Canterbury and his Malignant party engaged in their Arbitrary 
designs, against both the Peoples and Parliaments just privileges are 
invested with an arbitrary unlimited Power, even by a general 
Ordinance of Parliament, to print, divulge and disperse whatsoever 
Books, Pamphlets and Libels they please, though they be full of Lyes 
and tend to the poysoning of the Kingdom with unjust and 
Tyrannical Principles. 17 
Lilbume was in essence criticising the corrupt monopoly over printing with which 
the Stationers' Company was empowered. He argued that such monopolisation 
and control of printing 'hindered' freedom in matters pertaining to discussion and 
thought. He frequently found himself in trouble over his publications and was 
eventually brought to trial for publishing 'treasonable and venomous books' in 
1649. Fortunately for him, he was subsequently acquitted by a 'sympathetic' 
jury. IS 
After the execution of Charles I and the abolition of the House of Lords in 1649, 
the Commonwealth was set up with its authority in the hands of the Council of 
State, with its power based within the Army. From the period of the Long 
Parliament to 1660, the degree and type of legislation the press was subject to 
varied from almost complete freedom of the press in the early years of the Long 
Parliament to the strict curbs under the Council of State. After the Restoration 
17 J. Lilburne. Cited in Clyde, The Struggle for Freedom of the Press, p. 106. 
18 See Clyde, The Struggle for Freedom of the Press, pp. 193-194. 
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and the accession of Charles II to the throne, a new law which would mean a 
return to censorship via a pre-licensing system was enacted. The Licensing Act of 
1662 was almost identical to the Act of 1637, and ran until 1679 when it was 
repealed until its re-enactment in 1685. However, even though the formal 
licensing system was more relaxed until 1679, criminal prosecutions could still be 
made against obscene, seditious or blasphemous libels. Charles II made several 
attempts to reinvigorate prerogative powers over the control of printing but was 
mostly unsuccessful, as Parliamentary jurisdiction by this time was too firmly 
entrenched. One prominent supporter of Charles II was Sir Roger L'Estrange, 
who in his Considerations and Proposals in Order to the Regulation of the Press 
(1663) advocated a more severe enforcement and extension of the Licensing Act 
and argued that the number of Master Printers be reduced from 60 to 20. 19 As 
curious as it may seem now, but indicative of the political turmoil of the time, 
L'Estrange, an advocate of stricter press controls, found himself on numerous 
occasions imprisoned for his political views and writings. 
Obviously the political chaos and disorder of this period in English history 
warrants a great deal of attention and to skirt over this period is not to do it 
justice. Suffice it to say, the political disorder of the time is reflected in 
legislation towards the press. Rolph20 describes this period of censorship as 
having the character of a pendulum, what was orthodoxy to one regime or 
government was heresy to the next. However, Rolph's analysis lacks any real 
historical depth as he fails to provide an adequate explanation of why the 
pendulum swung in the way it did. As I demonstrate below, the emerging 
economic dimension of print as well as the expansion of commercial interests 
19 A. L. Haight, & C. B. Grannis, Banned Books. 387 B.C. to 1978 A.D. (New York: R.R. 
Bowker, 1978). 
20 C. H. Rolph, Books in the Dock (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1969). 
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impacts greatly on the shape and character of the struggle for freedom of the 
press. 
After the zeal and to some degree efficiency of the Tudors and the schizophrenia 
of the Stuart period, the eighteenth century saw a turning point in censorship 
legislation. Although it was generally agreed that political stability depended to a 
large degree upon government control of the press, the methods used prior to the 
turn of the century were seen by most as outdated and unworkable. Even the 
wealthier printers of the day longed for regulation. The powers of the Stationers' 
Company, which had lost its authority at the end of the previous century, were 
missed greatly by those printers who benefited from its hegemony, as their trade 
was being undermined by amateurs. It is clear here that the economic dimension 
of printing is beginning to emerge, with the increased numbers of 'amateur' 
printers now starting to impact on the trade of more established printers. The 
Regulation of Printing Act which had been adopted by Parliament in 1662, which 
gave the responsibility of control and regulation of the press to specific principal 
secretaries of state, and which was gradually allowed to lapse, failed to be revived 
(although many efforts were made) towards the end of the seventeenth century. 
However, the tone and target of the act is clear: 
No person shall presume to print any heretical, seditious, 
schismatical, or offensive books or pamphlets wherein any doctrine 
of opinion shall be asserted or maintained which is contrary to the 
Christian faith, or the doctrine and discipline of the Church of 
England, or which shall or may tend to be the scandal of religion, or 
the Church, or the Government or Governors of the Church, State or 
Commonwealth or of corporation or particular person or persons 
whatever.21 
Even though the licensing regulation was severe, it was, as noted, by no means 
efficient. A new more proficient system of regulation was necessary in order to 
21 Cited in Rolph, Books in the Dock, p. 36. 
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keep check on the growing amount of seditious and blasphemous pamphlets and 
newspapers circulating at that time. The eventual method of control which was 
devised by Queen Anne's ministers, not only placed restrictions upon printed 
matter but also raised additional financial revenue for the government. The 
revenue act of 1710 for the first time imposed a tax on printed matter. From this 
act the first Stamp Act, enacted in 1712, was used for the purpose of controlling 
'licentious, schismatical and scandalous publications. ,22 The tax would curb those 
'cheap' publications which depended upon sensationalism and scandal. Rather 
than put the onus on the pamphleteers and printers, those who wished to purchase 
such material would have to pay the tax. Stamp office registration was required 
on all newspapers and pamphlets printed in London. In addition to this, each 
publication was required to contain the name and address of the publisher for 
identification, with a penalty of £20 payable for non-compliance. The new stamp 
tax seemed to have had the desired affect of limiting circulation of certain 
publications and raising finances for the treasury. However, due to specific 
loopholes in the law, publications of less then six pages were exempt from 
taxation. This loophole and others like it was soon closed by Walpole in 1724 
when he became First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer. The 
stamp tax was raised several times through the century with much success. The 
'hawkers' and 'peddlers' found it increasingly difficult to sell their books, papers 
and pamphlets at a profit. As we will see, the stamp tax was the bane of radicals 
and dissenters during the nineteenth century. 
It was during this period of new measures which sought control of the press, that 
the first recorded instance of a conviction based upon grounds of obscene libel 
took place. A book by Edmund Curll, entitled Venus in the Cloister: or The Nun 
in Her Smock (1724), provided a fictional account of 'lewd' behaviour in a 
22 Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, p. 309. 
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convent. The book was subsequently thought be a threat to public morality, and 
thus a threat to the King's peace. The Attorney General noted: 
This is an obscene libel, and an offence at common law. It tends to 
corrupt the morals of the King's subjects [ ... ] I do not insist that 
every immoral act is indictable, such as telling a lie or the like; but if 
it is destructive of morality in general, if it does or may affect the 
King's subjects, then it is an offence of a public nature [ ... ].23 
Thus, as Rolph notes, the idea of 'obscene libel' had arrived. That is not to say 
that 'lewd' and 'obscene' literature had not existed before the trial of Curll, only 
that the perceived threat to public morality had not been addressed by the Kings 
Bench before this period.24 Until the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, the 
English Law of Obscene Libel, prompted by the case of Edmund Curll, remained 
essential as a weapon for controlling all literature. Other works which courted 
controversy during the earlier part of the eighteenth century include: Cleland's 
Fanny Hill, Cheyne's Pamela, Sterne's Tristram Shandy, Henry Fielding's Tom 
Jones and Amelia, Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe and Jonathan Swift's 
Gulliver's Travels, all these works caused a stir to say the least. 
Fiction in general, whether it be blatantly 'obscene' or merely 'titillating' was 
being increasingly viewed as harmful. Public moralist John Hawksworth in his 
magazine the Adventurer warns his readers of the dangers of such material in that 
it promotes evil rather than good. The moral backlash no longer continued in a 
puritan vein, it was just as vehement from non puritans such as Richardson, 
Johnson and Hawksworth to name but a few. 
23 Cited in Rolph, Books in the Dock, p. 55. 
24 In 1692 for example the 'Society for the Reformation of Manners' was formed to stop the 
'execrable Impieties of our most Scandalous playhouses, those nurseries of Vice and 
Prophaness' (Cited Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 74). Until its demise in 1738, the Society 
for the Reformation of Manners did its utmost to create a 'high moral climate' which the 
governments of the day were only too willing to respond to. 
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Any survey of the struggle against censorship would not be complete without a 
brief mention of John Wilkes (1725-1797). Wilkes was the editor of the North 
Briton periodical (est. 1762) and intennittent member of Parliament between 
1757-1790. Wilkes was a vehement critic of the Tory government and the ferocity 
of his attacks on the Bute administration heavily influenced Bute's eventual 
decision to resign. Thomas notes that the importance of Wilkes's political activity 
cannot be overestimated as 'in a comparatively short period of time Wilkes and 
his paper had created a substantial body of opinion which was not merely hostile 
to Bute's administration, but which regarded freedom of the press from political 
restraint as an end worth fighting for in itself. ,25 Steven Koss also notes that the 
controversy over Wilkes's agitation 'raised fundamental issues about press 
freedom that soon echoes from the perimeters of the English speaking world. '26 
In the famous North Briton No. 45 Wilkes attacked the King's speech on the 
'Peace of Paris' arguing that the King was nothing more than a mouthpiece of the 
ministry and that Britain had deserted its allies in the war between France and 
Spain. Following this attack, a long drawn out battle between government 
supporters and Wilkes's supporters ensued. Wilkes was eventually arrested but 
then released soon after citing Parliamentary privilege making him immune from 
prosecution. In 1764 however, he was tried in his absence, found guilty of 
sedition and expelled from Parliament. However, after the publication of the 
Essay on Women, the authorities made further attempts to convict Wilkes; and 
after spending time abroad, he returned to England and he was eventually arrested 
for publishing both the Essay on Women and North Briton, No. 45, which was 
considered both blasphemous and obscene. He was charged and sentenced to 
prison for a total of twenty two months and fined one thousand pounds. 
2S Thomas. A Long Time Burning. p. 92. 
26 S. Koss. The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain (London: Hamilton. 1981). p. 33. 
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In attacking the government in the pages of the North Briton in such a way and 
arguing against prosecution, Wilkes was also arguing for liberty of speech as well 
as true political representation. In doing this Wilkes's writing started to create a 
body of opinion which sought to question the whole mechanism and system of 
government at that time as well as to further the cause of liberty. The changing 
perception of public opinion was starting to recognise the value of the press in 
generating political intelligence, and as far as the people were concerned this was 
a good thing. The authorities however, viewed it differently. Whilst newspapers 
and pamphlets might be of value to those men of breeding and standing, the 
notion of a press for the so-called lower orders, a press that attacked government 
hypocrisy and mismanagement was certainly not. Indeed, as Patricia Hollis notes, 
during the 1770's Wilkes's struggle had established the right of newspapers to 
report Parliamentary debates;27 thus the people were now in a position to be better 
informed on matters concerning their government. The Wilkes affair helped raise 
the profile of issues that had their roots in the revolutions of America and France. 
Popular representation and liberty of the press were two of the most important 
rights that started to influence political activity at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Wilkes was a key actor in that he and his followers started to question 
the nature of power and governance in a manner not seen in Britain before; 
moreover as we shall see: 
the controversy surrounding him had popularised the notion of 
'liberty' and, more specifically, had raised the question of whether 
Parliament was as representative of the wishes of the electorate - to 
say nothing of the disenfranchised majority - as it ought to be. [ ... ] 
This question more than any other determined the nature of political 
censorship for over sixty years. 28 
27 Hollis. The Pauper Press. p. 28. 
28 Thomas. A Long Time Burning. p. 95. 
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Before, however, we move on to examine censorship and the philosophy and 
praxis of freedom of speech during the nineteenth century, some discussion of the 
pertinent intellectual developments during the enlightenment is necessary. This is 
dealt with in the next sections devoted to the emergence of Enlightenment 
thought and the rise of toleration. 
2.3: The Emergence ofthe Enlightenment 
The Enlightenment, with its emphasis on rationality and progress, brought with it 
more fully rounded, systematic and coherent arguments for freedom of speech.29 
Again it is not to say that these arguments stand alone outside of particular 
philosophical or historical paradigms, but fit within broader emerging political, 
economic and philosophical beliefs, as well as sometimes emerging as a 
particular reaction to oppression or injustice. It is clear that the political and 
religious tunnoil of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did much 
to complicate the way in which both the mechanisms of censorship and the 
reactions against controls manifested themselves. Along with such turmoil, we 
can also see how such chaos was reflected in the extent of religious and political 
intolerance, and in part explained by fear of political instability and revolution. 
Also highlighted in the previous section are examples of how such tunnoil 
impacted on the range, weight and importance of authority's control over the 
press. Clearly, the forces that sought to curb and counter these restrictions on the 
press reflected the massive changes taking place in politics, religion and society 
during these times. However, it is necessary to understand why such processes 
occurred when they did and what the driving forces of such processes were. For 
this, we briefly return to the Refonnation. 
29 See Bury, A History of Freedom of Thought; and Robertson, A Short History of Free Thought. 
Although I have criticised the romanticism and lack of critique evident in the work of writers 
such as Bury and Robertson, accounts such as this can provide useful examples of the force of 
rationalist arguments against oppression. 
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The wide ranging impact of the Reformation cannot be overestimated, as the 
seemingly arbitrary reorientation of religious worship raised questions about the 
nature of governance being more forged by natural forces rather than the law of 
God. Increasingly the notion of the Divine Right of Kings was coming under 
scrutiny by those that questioned the political chaos of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Moreover, after the intensity of battles between 
Protestantism (which was now splintering into a diversity of factions) and 
Catholicism, it became evident to those in power that a certain measure of 
tolerance was necessary to maintain order within national boundaries and lessen 
the prospect of conflict with foreign states. The foundations of toleration then 
stem from the emergence of a diversity of religious opinions after the sixteenth 
century Reformation and the gradual questioning of the Divine Right of Kings. 
Moreover, the rise of various forms of Protestantism across Europe, coupled with 
the gradual awareness that unfavourable religious opinions could not be changed 
forcibly, (an idea that emerged from Voltaire) meant that religious tolerance was 
the best pragmatic response to increasingly chaotic political events and processes. 
This sentiment is echoed by Christopher Hill who suggests that the rise of 
toleration was a 'practical response to changing social, economic and political 
conditions during the seventeenth century' .30 Given the gradual fragmentation of 
established power structures, and the emergence of new ones, Hill argues that 
only when the tensions that emerge as a result of this transformation are fought 
out to the point of exhaustion, and it eventually becomes apparent that no side can 
win outright, is a form oftoleration accepted. He notes that the: 
breakdown of one type of authoritarianism tends to lead to the 
temporary victory of another authoritarianism. Only when both sides 
have exhausted themselves can the possibility of neither winning 
30 In 'Toleration in Seventeenth-Century England', in S. Mendus, ed. The Politics of Toleration. 
Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Life (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 
27. 
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outright be grasped, and the small VOIce of reason make itself 
heard.J1 
Thus religious tolerance emerged as it gradually became apparent that religious 
persecution was simply not prudent, as deeply held religious convictions could 
not be changed even by coercion and torture. Toleration then is accepted, albeit 
reluctantly, by the recognition that forcible conversion of religious belief was 
unrealisable. 
However, there is more to this historical picture, as the seeds of toleration not only 
stemmed from the stand off between competing religious factions, but also from a 
rapidly advancing economic and intellectual climate. As Hill points out, the 
increasing awareness of other cultures and faiths that came along with the 
beginnings of world trade, especially in the Middle East and Asia during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, meant that it became necessary to tolerate 
different cultures and belief systems. Given that international trade rested on an 
acceptance (albeit reluctantly) of foreign cultures and religions it became crucial 
for those wishing to exploit the expansion of markets to accept that of which they 
would almost certainty have been intolerant of previously. Therefore, it was 
necessary to accept those differences, be they in religious belief or cultural milieu, 
as the opportunity to expand trade and commercial links could not be missed. 
Thus the contextual historical backdrop of the emergence of toleration was in 
place - all that was necessary now, was the intellectual ammunition with which to 
further promote tolerance. 
During the early seventeenth century the leading thinkers of the day were starting 
to view humanity as being able to shape its own destiny. Moreover, the rapid 
progress of scientific thinking influenced the belief that man, not God, was the 
master of his domain. The natural world was also to be mastered and the 
31 Hill, 'Toleration in Seventeenth-Century England', p. 42. 
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dominance of human intellect and industry over superstition and irrationality was 
necessary for the benefit of society. Faith in human judgement in all human 
affairs was asserted; man (it was argued) following an emerging rational dynamic, 
was now in a position to improve the lot of the mankind; the Enlightenment was 
here. 
From this period onwards, we see thinkers such as: Bacon (1561-1626), Hobbes 
(1588-1679) and Descartes (1596-1650), through to Locke (1632-1704); Voltaire 
(1694-1778); Hume (1711-1776); Condorcet (1743-1794) and Davy (1778-1829) 
amongst others, forging Enlightenment thinking and providing the intellectual 
ammunition by which mankind could shape its own destiny based upon rational 
principles and actions. During the Enlightenment, the search for knowledge and 
the move to better the circumstances of human existence were increasingly being 
placed within the realms of the mortal. Questions were raised concerning the 
relevance of recognising a 'spiritual architect' in human affairs. For the first time 
in history man was beginning to break free of the chains of religion and carving 
out his own destiny based upon rational thought and understanding of the world 
around him. Scientific inquiry and the attempt to understand the world in real 
instead of spiritual terms was a fundamental catalyst in the development of 
human understanding during the years of the Enlightenment. Such thinking 
impacted on politics, economics, science and religion for the next three hundred 
years. Human intellect was increasingly being perceived as the centrepoint for all 
decisions regarding the affairs of mankind. 
Along with this wave of optimism about the human intellect, came a revolution in 
the thinking behind the organisation of society along a more rationally guided 
plane. The idea that tradition, which was becoming viewed as that which 
engendered the stagnation of society, and which was largely backed up by 
religious foundations, should provide the motor force for society was increasingly 
being broUght into question. Old authorities were being scrutinised and new ideas 
that advocated a restructuring of old institutions were explored. Such ideas were 
not unsurprisingly greeted without enthusiasm by the church and state authorities, 
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as any ideas that challenged the basis of power and authority were perceived as 
dangerous and not to be tolerated. 
The emergence of Enlightenment thought then, brought with it notions of doubt 
about the existing order of things, both in spiritual terms and in relation to politics 
and society. In religious matters too, orthodoxy was brought into question, and 
given the turmoil and chaos of the seventeenth century in particular the orthodoxy 
shifted between degrees of intolerance towards the 'new religion' of doubt. This 
is an important element in terms of freedom of speech, as when the notion of 
doubt emerges, with it comes a desire for freedom of opinion. Such freedom is 
therefore necessary to promote greater understanding and a move towards the 
truth, as we saw in Chapter One, looking at the typology of the truth argument. 
The Enlightenment's preoccupation with doubt, and continued questioning of 
norms, creates a necessity for some articulation of alternative explanations, and 
with this there comes a basis for freedom of opinion. A key articulation of a 
'pragmatic' case for freedom of opinion, can be seen in the work of John Locke, 
whose ideas on toleration greatly influenced struggles for freedom of speech 
during the nineteenth century. 
Often seen as a key contributor in providing the cornerstone or foundations of 
liberal thought, Locke, most notably in his Letters on Toleration, is influential in 
studies on toleration. Locke's main argument is that the business of government 
should be separate from that of the Church. The civil life of individuals, their 
health and liberty, and the protection of their property should be the sole 
consideration for government. The spiritual considerations of men should be left 
to themselves and have no consequences for government. Locke argued that it 
would be absurd for governments to attempt to change the beliefs of individuals 
in spiritual matters, penalties could not change that which is held in 'their soul'. 
The forces of government no matter how brutal cannot compel a man into 
genuine religious belief of any kind. Essentially, any government which attempts 
to coerce specific beliefs is acting irrationally, as belief according to Locke, is 
something which is deeply held and cannot be altered by coercion. 
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The religious context of Locke's argument has to be stressed if one is to 
understand his particular reasoning. Locke's view is specific in the matter of 
religious toleration, and as such fits in with the fundamental tenets of religious 
belief. Deeply held beliefs cannot be coerced into individuals as it negates the 
fundamental religious concept of faith. As Mendus points out: 
[ ... ] its importance here is that religious belief is concerned with 
salvation, and salvation is to be attained only by genuine belief, not 
by insincere profession of faith. People can be threatened and 
coerced into professions of belief; they cannot be coerced into 
genuine belief.32 
However, it is also rational thinking that allows Locke to accept religious 
intolerance if it aids civil peace as civil peace is important to protecting the 
natural rights of man. So as Mendus points out, 'Locke's case is thus a minimalist 
and pragmatic case against [religious] persecution. It is not a positive case for 
diversity of religious belief ... '33 Locke was not making any claims for wholesale 
religious tolerance, only claims against certain specific reasons for religious 
intolerance.34 
Thus a specific or particular case for free speech cannot be heard in the writings 
of Locke. However, much of the tenets and themes of Locke's philosophical, or 
as Mendus would say pragmatic justification for free speech, can be traced 
through to liberal justifications of the nineteenth century. It is often considered 
32 S. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 26. 
33 Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, p. 26. Mendus goes on to highlight that 
although many commentators argue that Locke's argument is too historically specific to have 
any longer lasting impact on toleration outside the religious upheavals of the seventeenth 
century, Locke's arguments are in fact important in understanding and indeed justifying the 
nature of toleration in a diverse modem society, especially in terms of moral obligation. She 
notes that the 'ambitious' moral claims of liberal political theorist have less weight than the 
rationally based Lockean justification of toleration. Although narrower, such a pragmatic 
justification of toleration can provide the basis for a more egalitarian defence of toleration. See 
especially chapter 6. 
34 S. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, p. 26. 
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that John Locke's call for religious toleration is the foundation on which later 
articulations of free speech are made. These foundations, as we will see, are built 
upon in liberal thought during the nineteenth century. Particularly resonant in this 
example, and as we have seen prominent in much Enlightenment thought, is the 
emphasis upon rationalism as the foundation of liberty and freedom. 
2.4: Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to look both at the historical emergence of 
freedom of speech and the intellectual stimuli that went with it. The importance 
of recognising the dynamic of the interplay of ideas and events cannot be 
understated. Clearly, from the time of Henry VII to the concerns of the Bute 
administration of 1760's, one of the most crucial features of the rise of censorship 
was fear of political instability at least, and outright revolution at most. Authority 
of whatever fonn has always needed to keep a check on the printed word for fear 
of its effect on stimulating the masses into revolt. And, as we have seen, the 
availability of printed matter became more and more widespread as literacy rates 
grew among the population, and the measures and restrictions on the printed word 
also increased. Whether promoting political instability via attacks on the church 
or the dissemination of 'obscene' literature which would corrupt the morals of the 
nation and so affect its political make up, censorship, although not always 
successful, was seen as necessary in order to maintain the status quo. It is clear 
that over the last six hundred years of British history, power has not always 
remained in the same hands, from Catholic monarchs to Puritan overlords; from 
monarchy to Parliamentary rule, the balance between the various powers has 
always shifted. One element, however, has remained constant throughout; even 
though the methods and targets of censorship have changed continually, 
censorship has proved a constant factor in the history of British rule. Towards the 
end of the eighteenth century, it was starting to become clear that the struggle for 
freedom of speech, which was most often exemplified in a free press, was not an 
issue that should be separated out from other political and economic concerns. 
Indeed notions of liberty gaining general acceptance within public discourses was 
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increasing as the political and economic power base of society cracked under the 
weight of progress and reform. As we will see, movements for greater political 
representation had explicit references to free speech within their tracts. Soon the 
struggle for a free press would be enveloped within the wave of change that 
encompassed the nineteenth century and the political struggles therein. Also the 
emergence of Enlightenment thinking impacted greatly on ideas that sought to 
challenge the established order. Rationality and progress in human affairs 
provided new intellectual ammunition to those who had doubts about the existing 
order of things. 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to pick out some of key elements that have 
contributed to the history and philosophy of free speech during the nineteenth 
century. Such an overview has been necessary in order to see the impact of 
history on some of the important elements that reverberate during nineteenth 
century struggles for freedom of speech. Elements that include a belief in rational 
thought as an aid to progress; the emergence of doubt as a catalyst to new ideas 
about the existing order; the rise of toleration as a pragmatic response to a rapidly 
changing world; and we see the flip side - the authorities' suspicion of new ideas 
and their desire to maintain the status quo. So let us now commence, and look at 
the nineteenth century, in the light of some of the themes raised above. We do 
this initially by examining the social and political context of nineteenth century 
arguments for freedom of speech. 
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Summary 
This chapter has served a methodological function in providing an historical 
precursor to the nineteenth century, highlighting the historical character of 
freedom of speech and as such asserting that a historical overview is necessary in 
a work such as this. The chapter traces the emergence of mechanisms of 
censorship from the Stationers' Company to the Star Chamber and culminates in 
the stamp tax. In highlighting contributions from Milton and Lilbume, a raw 
conception of liberty is seen as emerging, which Locke later developed. The 
contributions from Milton and Locke provide philosophical ammunition for 
dissenters and freethinkers after the onset of the Enlightenment with its belief in 
progress and human intellect. Such ideas went on to influence many radicals who 
took inspiration from them during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
chapter concludes by noting the importance of recognising an historical and 
intellectual dynamic when examining nineteenth century arguments for freedom 
of speech. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Social, Economic and Cultural Context 
3.i: introduction 
Given the political upheavals and social tunnoil of the three hundred years 
preceding the nineteenth century, it is not surprising that the struggle for freedom 
of speech, and by extension freedom of the press, followed a similar pattern of 
turbulence during the nineteenth century itself. As has been explored in the 
previous chapter, this turbulence was not unconnected to broader contextual 
factors and historical conditions. It is my intention in this chapter then, to 
highlight in some depth the conditions that shaped and impacted on the various 
articulations of free speech and their mediations during the nineteenth century. 
Such a contextual backdrop of the nineteenth century, one which creates a frame 
of reference from which a closer philosophical and historical analysis of free 
speech can be made is methodologically necessary to this thesis. To use an 
analogy, this chapter is to be the 'primed canvas' on which the detail of the 
substantive chapters on utilitarianism, liberalism and socialism will be painted. 
This background picture will consist of broad strokes of context, coloured with 
some attention to key elements of detail. I argue that to ignore this contextual 
landscape would be to miss much of what it underpinned - in a historical sense, 
the philosophical justifications of free speech to be examined within this thesis. 
Of course the main substantive chapters themselves stand out on their own as 
individual pieces of academic endeavour. I feel, however, that within the context 
of this thesis and the methodological framework that I have employed, some 
consideration of the broader picture is required. 
This chapter will be broadly chronological, following on from the previous 
chapter, which saw the development of notions of freedom of thought, if not 
freedom of speech, develop into what has been termed a 'struggle'. This struggle 
during the nineteenth century was fought out within specific boundaries and 
philosophical parameters, and close attention to these will take place in the 
following chapters. However, in this chapter I raise the issue of free speech being 
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more closely connected to broader social political concerns such as education and 
the extension of the franchise which are tightly bound to ideological assertions in 
the early part of the nineteenth century, ideological assertions that, I argue, sought 
to place the middle class in a position of influence, as they attempted to facilitate 
the conditions which would ensure the unfettered progress of the free market. 
Firstly, I highlight how the burgeoning social, political and economic context of 
the early nineteenth century impacted on issues of censorship through 
governmental statute. I then move on to show how legal constraints were 
enforced and eventually gradually eroded by a combination of market forces and 
political expediency. The chapter itself raises a number of issues and claims that 
will be given greater attention in the substantive chapters, and as such only 
provide a hint of the full force of the argument which is articulated more 
completely in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
3.2: Social. Political and Economic Context 
Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century was a place of great change and 
upheaval. At the end of the eighteenth century Britain was seen at home and 
abroad as a great power. Abroad, that power was established with the defeat of 
Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo in 1815. At home, the power was evident with 
new developments and expansion in agriculture and industry. This power was 
enhanced by the fact that London was seen as the world centre of finance and 
capital, the motor force of burgeoning capitalist expansion. This period saw 
Britain's empire become greater and more stable than any other competing 
country at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the efforts Britain put in to 
maintain this state of affairs reveal how important the empire was to successive 
British governments. The status of Britain as a world power at the beginning of 
the century acts as a barometer by which we can view the importance of social, 
economic and political developments taking shape. We will see that such changes 
acted as a catalyst to the upsurge in radicalism and political activism and revolt 
which sought some of the most drastic changes in the social and political make up 
the country had ever seen, some of which would be a success, some of which 
would fail. 
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These socio-economic changes that were well underway by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century impacted significantly on the demographics of Britain. For 
example, the population grew massively from 12 million at the beginning of the 
century to 31 million in 1885. I This growth in population was reflected in the 
growth of towns and cities, for example: Liverpool had grown from 82,000 in 
1801 to 202,000 in 1831; Leeds from 53,000 to 123,000, with towns like 
Sheffield and Birmingham doubling in size during the same period.2 Such 
demographic changes also impacted on the nature of the population as a better 
educated work force was sought after to work in the factories of these growing 
towns and cities. Thus (and I will explore this further) education of the masses 
was affected greatly by industrialisation. Similarly to the eighteenth century, at 
the start of the nineteenth century, the established church with its connection to a 
rigidly stratified social class system, which also operated as an organ of social 
control was a major player in the education of the masses. With the onset of 
industrialisation however, the connection between the established church and 
education was gradually being eroded. Thus the nineteenth century saw a massive 
increase in the numbers of people entering education, as educational reform 
enabled large sections of the populace to gain literary and numeracy skills. This 
factor should not be ignored, as nineteenth century educational reform should be 
seen as one of the most crucial and pivotal effects on censorship legislation at that 
time. As literary rates increased, so too did the need to keep a check on what was 
being published, as diverse and potentially dangerously corrupting forms of 
literature were now becoming accessible (though mostly illegal) to a greater 
number of people of all classes. As I will demonstrate, in conjunction with 
increased access to education for the population, which was necessary to service 
burgeoning industrial production, the government was aware that education could 
also potentially undermine their position. It became increasingly concerned about 
I D. Beales, From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815 - 1885 (London: Nelson, 1969), p. 15. 
2 L. Woodward, The Age of Reform, England 1815 -1870 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), p. 2. 
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the possibility of agitation and revolt being promulgated by 'oppositional' 
literature. This fear of revolt is affirmed in the proceedings of many cases for 
criminal libel that were initiated prior to the 1832 Reform Act. Such prosecutions 
for criminal libel are an important contextual feature of this period, and I will 
give more detailed attention to these below. 
An analysis of the role of education within the context of this study is also 
important as an analytical device as well as a descriptive one. The role of 
education was perceived as providing a particular social function dependent upon 
the analysis used. For example, a laissez-Jaire justification of the role of 
education, primarily emanating from the economic analysis of the French 
Physiocrats3 and developed by Adam Smith, performed a specific social function 
in socialising of the labour force into accepting the view that mankind's natural 
condition is to live in a state of inequality. Similarly, a socialist perspective on 
education, perceives the role of education differently, as it is more closely linked 
to values of equality and equal distribution of opportunity. Both these analyses, as 
well as that stemming from utilitarianism, will be examined in greater detail 
within the substantive chapters, as the role of education and its particular function 
are important to this analysis of free speech and its theoretical development 
during the nineteenth century. 
Intellectual life also mirrored the changes in Britain's economic and social 
sphere. New ideas, which were influenced in part by the revolutions in America 
(1776) and France (1789) during the previous century, found a new and receptive 
audience. Radicals and dissenters still fought hard against the old regimes of 
church and state and the structures of power that they represented. None was 
more influential than the ideas of Thomas Paine (1736-1809). Paine is an 
important thinker in terms of nineteenth century struggles for freedom of speech. 
3 Quesnay, Mercer de la Riviere, Mirabau and Baudeau. See C. Gide, A History of Economic 
Doctrinesjrom the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day (London: Harrap, 1948). 
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As we shall see, arguments that asserted freedom of speech often went hand in 
hand with arguments that sought to extend the franchise. Paine was seen as an 
extremist in Britain and America but a moderate in Paris,· his works resonate 
through much radical and dissenting literature of the nineteenth century and he 
was highly influential in the political activity of pamphleteers during the 
nineteenth century. 
Paine was born into a Quaker family in Thetford, Norfolk and his education did 
not go beyond a few years at grammar school. Even so Paine's contribution to 
democratic politics is far reaching. At the age of 37 Paine set sail for New 
England with newly formed ideas on politics. His arrival in America was during a 
time of great political upheaval with the Colonists at war with their British rulers. 
It was in the shadow of such turmoil that Paine wrote Common Sense (1776) and 
later after his move to France, the Rights of Man (1791-2) 'being one of the most 
ardent and clear defences of human rights, liberty and equality in any language'.s 
The Age of Reason, in two parts (1794-5), formed the last of Paine's great works. 
Paine distrusted the aristocracy arguing that hereditary systems of government 
'degenerate into ignorance'; the people at large were best placed to run the affairs 
of the people through a system of democratic electoral representation. As Jackson 
notes, Paine saw the justification of government in a Social Contract between the 
people themselves.6 Indeed, 'Paine devoted his life to methods of scattering and 
subdividing power, to ensuring that it was not monopolised by any single pair of 
hands or particular "faction". >7 
4 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1997 
[1962]), p. 54. 
5 J. Fruchtman, Jr., Thomas Paine Apostle of Freedom (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 
1994), p. 225. 
6 J. H. Jackson, 'Tom Paine and the Rights of Man'. In D. Thompson ed., Political Ideas 
(London: Penguin Books, 1990 [1966]), p. 107. 
1 J. Keane, Tom Paine A Political Life. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1996), p. xiv. 
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The fact therefore must be that the individuals themselves, each in 
his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with 
each other to produce a Government: and this is the only mode in 
which Governments had a right to arise, and the only principle in 
which they have a right to exist. 8 
In writing these words, Paine was providing a theoretical account of what had 
happened in America in 1776 and what was happening in France in 1789. In 
defending the Revolutions against hereditary interests in favour of notions of 
natural rights, Paine was providing a politicised fonnula for democracy that was 
both influenced by ancient Athens and by the Enlightenment belief in progress in 
human affairs. 
Not only did Paine encapsulate the spirit of democracy in his words, the way he 
wrote ensured that the common man would be able to understand. The Age of 
Reason as Hobsbawm notes, 'expressed the radical-democratic aspirations of 
small artisans and pauperised craftsmen, [and] is as famous for having written the 
first book to demonstrate in popular language that the Bible is not the word of 
God.'9 It is because of the language of Paine's works that pamphleteers and 
agitators took to him and set about reprinting and disseminating his work much to 
the despair and annoyance of the government. Moreover, the arguments for 
liberty of the press, particularly in relation to democratic accountability were 
powerful ammunition for radicals and dissenters during the first forty years of the 
nineteenth century. Robust and open public debate 'had confinned Paine's view 
that a "free press" was a basic ingredient of republican liberty. '10 Returning to the 
accountability argument set out in Chapter One, the operation of democratic 
systems is possible only within the confines of a free and open press. Paine's 
vision of democracy was one that was both open to all and as such accountable. 
This view, as we shall see, resonated in utilitarian arguments for freedom of the 
8 T. Paine, Rights of Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995 [1791)), p. 122. 
9 Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 221. 
10 Keane, Tom Paine, pp. 463-4. 
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press as in liberal and socialist arguments also. As we have seen, John Wilkes's 
trial for publishing Parliamentary proceedings, mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, has echoes of the accountability argument. Accountability was a 
necessary component of Paine's view of democracy and this sentiment was 
carried through by dissenters and radicals into the nineteenth century. 
Ideas from radicals like Paine were impacting on institutions and practices, some 
of which dated back to the Reformation. These systems of governance were now 
starting to look out of place in this new and fast changing world of the industrial 
age. Cracks and contradictions were beginning to appear in the machinery and 
radicals inspired by Paine and other radical thinkers would seek to expose and 
exploit such fissures and weaknesses. A key example is the movement for 
political reform. 
One of the most prominent historical features of the nineteenth century was the 
unrest and popular disaffection caused by a system of government which was 
widely perceived as corrupt, unrepresentative and a restraint on political liberty 
for the majority of people in Britain. Although at times sporadic and not as 
vociferous as other struggles in Europe, various movements which sought to 
redress the balance in political power often (unsurprisingly) found themselves 
victims of austere legislation, particularly in relation to the production and 
distribution of printed materials, the focus of which was often perceived by the 
authorities as at least controversial, and more often than not as seditious. As we 
have seen with Paine and the accountability argument for freedom of speech, free 
speech and the fight for a free press can be seen within the broader context of the 
struggle for political reform. Indeed, as noted, if freedom of speech was not 
sought after as a right in itself, then it was viewed as a necessary component part 
of democratic reforms sought by radicals and dissenters. When reform did emerge 
in the Acts of 1832, 1867 and 1884, the fight for free speech buttressed the 
various reform movements that gained or won the reform. However, it is not 
enough for this analysis to place arguments for free speech blandly within the 
calls for political reform. As I will demonstrate, particular social functions were 
also served in the movements and arguments that advocated freedom of speech 
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via freedom of the press. Moreover, different reform movements had different 
conceptions of reform: utilitarian praxis for example, saw that Parliamentary 
reform should not be pursued in terms of votes for all, but votes for primarily the 
emergent middle classes, particularly in the case of James Mill. Thus although 
having democratic aspirations, I will demonstrate that the functions of social 
exclusion and even social control were prominent in some arguments for free 
speech and reform. 
In addition to issues relating to education and Parliamentary reform, other 
emerging questions were gaining the attention of the dissenting press. For 
example, the condition of the working class was increasingly a cause for concern 
for working-class movements and liberal reformers alike. II Poor living and 
working conditions were exacerbated by the massive expansion in 
industrialisation, (especially in the industrial towns and cities of the north of 
England). As Donald Read notes in his study of the early nineteenth-century press 
in Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield: 'All the leading North of England 
newspapers of the early nineteenth century [ ... ] had their programmes of 
solutions for the problems of the new society'. 12 Though the newspapers in 
Read's study were generally of middle-class opinion, the emerging social issues 
of the day, particularly with reference to the urban poor, still echoed with some 
measure of critique, even if they did have a tone of superiority echoed in 
condescension, as this extract from the Manchester Times in 1844 demonstrates: 
[ ... ] they are cluttered together with more regard for the saving of 
ground-rent than for the comfort and health of their inhabitants. In 
many districts, the crowding of houses into narrow, dark, ill-drained 
and ill-ventilated alleys and lanes and the cramming of persons into 
these miserable dwellings is frightful to contemplate. 13 
II Although as we will see, these concerns were motivated by distinct ideological drivers. 
12 D. Read, Press and People, 1790-1850 (London: Edward Arnold, 1961), p. 201. 
13 Manchester Guardian, 20th July, 1844, cited Read, Press and People, p. 9. 
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As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, differing philosophical 
perspectives analysed and articulated the condition of the poor, the role and 
function of education and the movement for reform very differently, and with 
differing outcomes. Moreover, these variations in analysis had significant effects 
on the language in which free speech was to be sought after, as the philosophical 
justifications for free speech tallied with broader deep seated (though often raw 
and emerging) ideological formulations and values. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the agitational pamphlet or dissenting 
newspaper was not new to those in authority, and the increasing complexity of a 
burgeoning industrial society coupled with the associated problems and issues 
brought about by such massive social, economic and cultural upheaval and 
restructuring, presented the authorities with a wide range of critics and dissenters. 
Also, with a greater opportunity for the dissemination of critical and dissenting 
ideas through mass-produced printed material, political struggle would enter a 
new phase of expression never seen before. As such, some mention of the 
methods by which the government sought to control such dissent should be made. 
The arsenal of their campaign to stamp out such dissent was manifested in the 
law of criminal libel. 
3.3: The Law: Criminal Libel 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, during times of extreme crisis of 
legitimacy there is usually a concomitant upsurge of new legislation to curb 
dissent which allows for greater numbers of press prosecutions. During the 1770s 
there were at least seventy prosecutions for public libel. After the terror in France 
and the anti-lacobin panic in Britain, there were more prosecutions for libel 
during 1794 - 1795 than there had been in the previous twenty years. 14 From 1819 
to 1821 there were over one hundred and twenty prosecutions on charges of 
14 W. H. Wickwar. The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press 1819 - 1832 (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1928), p. 17. 
97 
seditious and blasphemous libel. 15 The machinery necessary to allow such 
prosecutions needed to be well defined and articulated. The end of the 
prosecuting system, as Bentham called it, became the focus of the struggle for 
freedom of the press. 16 Such a system at the beginning of the century was mainly 
concerned with prosecutions of Criminal Libel. As has been noted more than 
once previous to this chapter, almost all governments, whatever their make up, 
have at various times in their rule been vulnerable to threats from insurrection or 
outright revolution. Most, if not all, governments have sought to impose some 
form of order on society so as to protect their positions of power. In typically 
paternalistic vein, those in power at the start of the nineteenth century thought 
that the so-called order that it sought to impose upon society was just, right and 
proper. 'Those who ruled Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century were 
generally satisfied with the working of the Constitution and the Christianity of the 
day, and they saw no reason why the whole nation should not be united in the 
profession of respect for Christianity and in contentment with the aristocratic 
constitution they had inherited from their fathers.' 17 It is worth noting here, that 
the term 'libel' was interpreted more widely in the nineteenth century than it is 
today. In short, the distinction between a criminal libel and a civil libel was that a 
civil libel was usually brought against someone who had caused a loss of 
character to an individual or group of individuals. However, even though libels 
on institutions could only be subject to criminal prosecutions, libels of individuals 
could be either civil or criminal. If the libel would mean a personal loss of 
character, then civil proceedings would ensue; if however the libel was 'tending 
towards' a breach of the peace, a criminal prosecution would follow. Thus though 
we tend to think of libel nowadays in relation to defamation of character, the 
much broader concept of libel, as demonstrated, was employed to sanction many 
different types of radical or dissenting literature. 
15 Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 17. 
16 Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 18 
17 Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 19. 
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In order to safeguard the peace and maintain the perceived harmony in society, 
literature that was published and disseminated, that was considered by the 
establishment to present a threat to the order of society, was deemed a criminal 
libel. In other words, anything 'published' which was considered to have a 
'malicious intention' of causing a breach of the peace was a misdemeanour in 
common law and could be prosecuted as a 'criminal libel'. A closer inspection of 
the key elements in this brief statement is necessary so as to understand the 
breadth of such legislation and its implications. Firstly 'publication' did not only 
mean the act of publishing but also the act of circulation, which included selling 
or retailing or even allowing what was written to be passed on to another person 
without advertisement. Also, a libel need not be a book or a pamphlet, but could 
take the form of a picture or a model. Secondly, the notion of 'malicious 
intention' was interpreted as a foreseeable tendency, therefore the possible 
unforeseen consequences of any publication could make that publication a 
possible criminal libel, as 'every person must be deemed to intend the 
consequences which would naturally follow from his conduct.' Bizarre as this 
may seem now, even if the libel was not originally of malicious intent, but had 
the effect of causing offence, it was seen as a criminal libel and prosecuted 
accordingly. It was this notion of intent, usually the intent to cause a breach of the 
peace, that was the essence of a criminal libel. Finally, a criminal libel was seen 
as a 'transgression of the standard of public behaviour, and was therefore in some 
measure a breach of the Kings peace' .18 The actual phrase 'breach of the peace' 
also carried with it many connotations. For example, any attempt to embroil the 
monarch in war was unsurprisingly seen as an attempt at breach of the peace. 
Also, intentionally or not, in some circumstances printed matter may provoke a 
riot, whether the riot is in support of the literature, or caused by a reaction against 
the literature, breach of the peace was a possibility and therefore proceedings for 
a criminal libel prosecution could follow. In essence a criminal libel was anything 
18 Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 20. 
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which is likely to cause a breach of the peace. Such wide parameters of definition 
were intentionally flexible enough to pertain to many different circumstances. An 
example of this flexibility can be seen in the fact that every copy of the material 
that was considered libellous was considered a separate offence and therefore 
could merit a separate prosecution, the sum total of which could have very grave 
consequences indeed for any transgressor. 
It is clear that criminal libel is the main focus of attention here; however, it is not 
simply enough to highlight the general meaning of the phrase 'criminal libel'. The 
actual act of a criminal libel could be broken down into four different types: 
defamatory, seditious, blasphemous or obscene. As noted, a defamatory libel 
could be either criminal or civil depending upon the libel's threat to public order, 
(suffice it to say this work for the most part will not focus on defamatory libels 
unless they are of a criminal nature). More important to this work however, are 
the notions of seditious, blasphemous and obscene libel. Seditious libel is 
possibly the most important variable of criminal libel to this study as it pertains to 
social and political struggles that are related to the political philosophies under 
examination. Primarily though, seditious libel meant the open dissatisfaction with 
the Government of the day, 'every libel against the state and the constitution was 
an attack on the system from which proceeded such rights as subjects enjoyed.' 19 
All literature that brought into question the ruling and governance of the country 
was deemed a seditious libel and if convicted the perpetrator of the crime was 
dealt with severely by fines and prison sentences or in extreme cases the death 
penalty. Essentially the law pertaining to seditious libel covered any publication 
which sought to: 
[ ... ] bring hatred or contempt to the person of his Majesty [ ... ] or the 
Government and the constitution of the United Kingdom [ ... ] or 
either houses of Parliament, or to excite his Majesty's subjects to 
19 Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 26. 
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attempt alteration of any matter in Church of State as by law 
established by any other than lawful means [ ... J,20 
The essence then of seditious libel was that the locus of power should be left 
untouched by harsh words or criticism. The so called 'fear of the mob' was as 
always paramount in press legislation, as will be highlighted below, when greater 
attention is given to actual instances of press prosecution. 
In close proximity to seditious libel is blasphemous libel, which should be 
regarded as almost as important as seditious libel, as a large number of the 
important free speech controversies of the nineteenth century were the result of 
prosecutions for blasphemous libel, particularly in the latter part of the century. 
This being the case, some definition of blasphemous libel is necessary. An 
account of blasphemous libel that was generally adhered to at least at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century was given by Chief Justice Raymond in 1729, 
when he states: 
Christianity in general is parcel of the Common Law of England, 
and therefore to be protected by it. Now whatever strikes at the very 
root of the Civil Government; so that to sayan attempt to subvert 
the established religion is not punishable by those laws upon which 
it is established is an absurdity.21 
This dictum was repeated, if not verbatim, then in the same vein during the early 
years of the nineteenth century. It was also this very dictum that was to be later 
challenged from many quarters during the rest of the period, as we will see. As it 
was, during these early years of the nineteenth century, in particular, it was 
commonly thought by those in power, that the 'established' religion was a useful 
and powerful mechanism by which the 'lower orders' could be kept in check 
morally and spiritually. Any threat of a possible overthrow or challenge to 
20 'Public General Statutes and Measures' (60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4 c. 8) An Act for the more 
effectual Prevention and Punishment of Blasphemous and Seditious Libels. December 30th 1819. 
21 'Public General Statutes and Measures' (60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4 c. 8) p. 26. 
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established institutions of the state could be stifled by the moral weight that the 
established church carried. 
In order to complete this picture of criminal libel, the notion of obscene libel 
should be briefly outlined so as to provide a complete account of the boundaries 
of criminal libel. Literature pertaining to sexual matters was not directly seen as a 
threat to public peace. However, pornography was perceived by the establishment 
as primarily contributing to the corruption of the individual character of the lower 
orders; although this was bad in itself, such a corruption of character could further 
pose a potential threat to the moral fabric of the country as a whole. Pornography, 
which sought to influence or induce people into committing 'unnatural' practices, 
was deemed unhealthy for the moral and spiritual culture of the country and as a 
result legislation was necessary so as to curb the spread of such material and 
therefore maintain order in society, whether its influence be behind closed doors 
or not. There were many prosecutions for obscene libel during the nineteenth 
century as a new high moral climate became all pervasive especially for the so-
called 'lower orders'. The following example is an early example of an 
indictment for publishing obscene libels and provides an archetypal view of the 
'menace of pornography', and the perceived gravity of the offence. The 
indictment is of a bookseller charged with selling indecent books: 
That [ ... ], late of [ ... ], etc., bookseller, being a person of a wicked 
and depraved mind and disposition, and most unlawfully, wickedly, 
and impiously devising, contriving, and intending to vitiate and 
corrupt the morals of all the subjects of our said present sovereign 
lord the king, and to debauch, poison and infect the minds of all the 
youth of this kingdom, and to bring them into a state of wickedness, 
lewdness, debauchery, and brutality [ ... ] to the high displeasure of 
Almighty God, to the scandal and reproach of the Christian religion, 
in contempt of our said present sovereign lord the king, and his said 
laws, and to the great offence of all the civil governments [ ... ].22 
22 Chitty's Criminal Law, 1826. Cited in E. T. Atkinson, Obscene Literature in Law and 
Practice (Lowestoft, Library Press: 1937). 
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Such vehement condemnation of transgressors of the law of obscene libel was not 
uncommon, and the passage above demonstrates the point about the perceived 
threat to the fabric of the nation. 
Although I have highlighted separately the differences between the strands of 
criminal libel, it is safe to say that the distinction between the particular 
components in terms of their perceived dangers vary only slightly. The blending 
of political, religious and sexual deviance into one was warranted, as the 
perceived threat to social stability stemmed from literature that questioned the 
social and moral norms and values that buttressed the controlling institutions of 
the day. 
Although the instruments of Government and Church were all powerful in 
generating moral hegemony, Roberts23 notes that English law at this time was 
extremely sensitive to community values and moods. The result of this was the 
lack of continuity in the courts as to what was and was not perceived as criminal 
libel. For the most part juries were guided by judges and lawyers, who in tum 
were guided by legal precedent. It is argued that the thrust of legislation was to 
'protect' the 'unwashed masses' from themselves. However, as the nineteenth 
century progressed, 'the lower orders themselves are judged to be less alienated, 
and therefore more capable of defending themselves against moral subversion. ,24 
However, as will become clear below, the so-called 'lower orders' were only 
'allowed' limited powers of expression as an increasingly paternalistic middle 
class ensured that limited gains for the working classes were offset by massive 
gains for the middle classes. Unsurprisingly, prosecutions for libel were at their 
highest at times when the propertied classes feared the spread of political 
dissatisfaction amongst the un-propertied lower orders, lower orders that were 
23 In 'Blasphemy, Obscenity and the Courts: Contours of Tolerance in Nineteenth Century 
England'. P. Hyland, & N. Sammels, Writing and Censorship in Britain (London: Routledge, 
1992). 
24 Roberts, 'Contours of Tolerance in Nineteenth Century England', p. 146. 
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encouraged to vent their dissatisfaction by radicals and dissenters of the day. As 
we will see below, the measures of criminal libel were enacted many times, with 
varying degrees of success. This said, it is important to consider the legal and 
procedural constraints that the government had in its armoury at this time, and the 
lengths it went to, to ensure that its edicts were adhered to. Legal constraints 
however, did not solely emanate as a reaction against dissent, but as we have seen 
in the previous chapter, were part of broad historical processes. For the purposes 
of this chapter it is now necessary for me to highlight and explore this reaction 
against dissent by examining the 'mind set' that characterised those that generated 
and implemented the censorship laws that proved such an obstacle to dissenters 
and agitators. 
3.4: Age o(Anxiety 
My task now within this contextual survey is to provide an analysis of the 'state 
of mind' of the establishment and its supporters, that ensured the battles for free 
speech would be hard fought. Clearly the wave of momentum and resistance that 
emerged during the nineteenth century did not emanate from actions or processes 
that had no historical or philosophical context. The intellectual climate in Britain 
was, at times, one of cautious optimism about science and progress. However, 
this optimism which had its roots in the Enlightenment, was also met in equal 
measure with great anxiety, especially from the elite and the guardians of the 
state. 'Expanding business, scientific development, the growth of democracy, and 
the decline of Christianity were sources of distress as well as of satisfaction. '25 
This is not an unreasonable assertion given that the institutions and power 
structures that had existed for so long were now being challenged with vigour by 
new ideas and activity. Such anxiety would provide much of the motor force 
behind the resistance to a free press from within the machinery of the state. 
25 W. E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1957), p. 54. 
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One manifestation of such anxiety is seen in press prosecutions for libel 
concerning the Napoleonic wars from 1800-1815, (and later European 
Revolutions) and as an example of this trend, it is to this that I will first tum. As 
noted, anxiety was a strong emotion amongst nineteenth century elites and much 
of the focus of their anxiety lay in the movement for Parliamentary reform. 
Democracy was viewed with great fear as the perceived dangerous ideas of the 
French Revolution increased in popularity. Given the political culture of the time 
- the continuing war with France and the ensuing paranoia that haunts all 
governments in times of conflict, coupled with the population's disillusionment 
with the political system, it was no surprise that most of the prosecutions for 
criminal libel at the beginning of the nineteenth century were centred around two 
key issues: the first concerned the war with France; the second, and one which 
has been mentioned before (as it will again) was political reform. For example, 
(and as we will see) literature such as Cobbett's Political Register, Wooler's 
Black Dwarf as well as Hone's cutting satires and John Cartwright's polemics 
provided the prosecuting authorities with no shortage of activity. 
The war with France provided radicals and dissenters with many opportunities to 
launch attacks on government legislation and policy. This in tum provided the 
authorities with ample reasons for suppressing such attacks as it sought to protect 
its position of authority from dissent. The French Revolution and subsequent 
ideological and material developments impacted greatly on the political 
consciousness of early nineteenth century Britain. This impact should not be 
underestimated. Moreover, the revolutionary fervour in Britain generated by the 
Jacobin uprising soon waned after the 'degeneration' of the revolution by 
Napoleon. However, this did not stop anti-war propaganda from being published 
in Britain, nor did it stop the spirit of the revolution from causing concern among 
those in power. Their fears were not without foundation. Examples of elite 
anxiety were expressed by prosecutions of pro-revolutionary literature; literature 
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that supported French resistance or echoed Jacobin sentiment was prosecuted. For 
example, Jonathan Panther was fined £100 and imprisoned for three months for 
publishing so called pro-French anti-war 'propaganda' in 1804/6 while in 1805 
Thomas Rickman was convicted for publishing Thomas Paine's To The people of 
England which called for people to welcome French invasion.27 Thomas Spence 
also courted prosecution from the authorities over his forthright political beliefs, 
advocating the abolition of private land and the creation of an egalitarian 
society.28 Indeed the views of Spence proved highly influential during the early 
years of the nineteenth century, with the setting up of his 'Spensonian Society' 
which initially mainly comprised survivors of the Jacobin revolutionary 
movement, which had been 'smashed' by the Napoleonic repression of 1798-
1803. As McCalman29 highlights, the setting up of the 'Spensonian Society' and 
later (following Spence's death) the 'Society of Spencean Philanthropists', mark 
the beginnings of a cohesive political force, a force that had echoes of the 
revolutionary spirit of 1798. Such a force is a good example of the burgeoning 
culture of dissent in the early part of the nineteenth century in Britain. 
Even though pro-French and Jacobin literature was fiercely prosecuted, not all 
literature at this time that was subject to censorship endorsed the sentiments of 
the French Revolution. Critics of the government's handling of the war, in terms 
of perceived tactical blunders, were as prone to prosecution as those who fought 
against the war. Clearly Establishment sensitivity to criticism was acute. For 
example, The Morning Post was prosecuted in 1807 for criticising the Whig 
government's bad management of the war with France. In another instance, the 
British Commander in Chief, the Duke of York, also came in for a fair share of 
26 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 143. 
27 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 143. 
28 During the years 1792 and 1795 he had been indicted and sent to prison three times for such 
political libels. 
29 I. McCalman, Radical Underworld, Prophets, Revolutionaries, and Pornographers in 
London, 1795-1840 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
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criticism on the way he was managing the conflict, and over his 'personal 
characteristics'. We see this in the subsequent prosecution of 1. H. Hart and H. 
White, who were charged with a libel writ for 'questioning the Duke's 
competence' and denouncing him as 'a spendthrift, licentious debauchee, and 
double adulterer'. Indeed, the Duke's reputation was further damaged when the 
Attorney General subsequently dropped the case against Hart and White.30 
A more famous (or infamous) set of prosecutions between 1808 and 1810 
implicating the Duke of York involved a Major Denis Hogan who was an 
ambitious army officer. Hogan was to put his case for promotion unsuccessfully 
to the Commander in Chief, the Duke of York. However, in the process of his 
application, it was anonymously suggested that Hogan pay a sum of £600 and his 
promotion would be granted. Outraged by this bribery, Hogan prepared for 
publication a pamphlet detailing the corruption of the highest level within the 
military. The pamphlet was duly advertised in the press. However, when he 
returned home one night, Hogan found an envelope containing £500 and a letter 
saying that if he remained silent he 'would earn the gratitude of the royal family'. 
Angry at this, he returned the money and made the whole story public in a piece 
entitled 'Hogan's Appeal', which was printed in John and Leigh Hunt's radical 
Examiner. The result was a prosecution for libel, which was eventually dropped 
when an ex-mistress of the Duke of York confessed to extorting money from 
gullible army officers who sought promotion. The Duke of York resigned as 
commander in Chief, only to be reinstated in 1811.31 
The ferocity of press prosecutions relating to even the most trivial matters, when 
coupled with echoes of dissent, exemplifies the anxiety of the state in relation to 
the spread of 'dangerous ideas'. Other scandals involving the military during this 
period which involved press prosecutions even concerned the issue of military 
30 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 145. 
31 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, pp. 145-146. 
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flogging. For example in 1810, William Cobbett in his Weekly Political Register 
criticised the practice of flogging and was sentenced to two years imprisonment 
for sedition. Another episode which was centred on the practice of military 
flogging concerned an article by John Scott. His article entitled 'One Thousand 
Lashes' which was published in John Drakard's Stamford News and later in the 
Hunts' Examiner criticised the practice. Fortunately and much to the Attorney 
General's displeasure the prosecution for seditious libel against the Hunts was 
dropped by the jury on a 'technicality'. John Drakard was not so lucky, a court in 
Lincoln found him guilty of seditious libel and he was imprisoned for eighteen 
months.32 
There can be little doubt that the war with France had a lasting intellectual impact 
among the British people, both in terms of buttressing the resolve of those in 
power by fear and anxiety of revolt and revolution, and conversely, sparking the 
imagination of many a romantic reformer. From the government's perspective, 
anything that was associated with the revolution was deemed hostile to the 
'British Constitution'; as not only had Britain won the war of ideas against France 
and its revolutionary legacy, it would also win the moral war. '[O]nly moral 
standards. supported by ''vital religion", were guarantees of social order, national 
greatness, and individual salvation. They were held to be the foundation of both 
morale and of victory. '33 Even though the government's resolve was initially 
boosted by the victory over the old enemy, it did not take long for a spirit of 
change to evolve in certain sections of the masses, in the light of the continuing 
misery and deprivation of the majority of the British people. This did not go 
unnoticed by the ruling elite. Indeed the established order could not hide from the 
fact that calls for a free press and other associated freedoms were resonating 
across Europe amongst liberals and working-class radicals alike. As we will see, 
struggles such as those against the anti-free-trade Com Laws which were first 
32 Thomas, A Long Time Burning, p. 146 
33 A. Briggs, Age of Improvement (London: Longman Group Ltd. 1959), p. 172. 
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introduced in 1804, or the working-class Chartist movement, which was formed 
in 1838 after the dissatisfaction with the 1832 Reform Act, would also resound in 
the minds of the ruling elite. Moreover, if free speech via freedom of the press 
was not implicit in their demands, it was instrumental to their cause. 
Interestingly, this theme was not confined to Britain, as across Europe similar 
struggles were taking place. The impact on governments, as Goldstein notes, 
would be difficult to ignore as 'demands for press freedom were one of the major 
rallying cries [ ... ] throughout the nineteenth century, and played a major role in 
revolutionary upheavals in 1830 in France, Belgium and Germany. '34 As is 
intimated here, the struggle for freedom of speech often went hand in hand with 
other struggles, either implicitly, or instrumentally. 
In addition to the anxiety caused by the threat of revolution, which had not 
dissipated even after the Reform Act of 1832, was the threat to established 
religion. This perceived threat should not be understated, as the power of the 
church within Britain at this time, with its links to the state, was strong. Often 
moral authority was espoused with overt reference to God and this was attacked 
throughout the nineteenth century by rationalist and secularists alike. 'It was then 
assumed in spite of rationalist denials, that any collapse of faith would destroy the 
sanctions of morality; morality gone, society would disintegrate. '35 Threats to 
established religion would mean that the old authorities had to repress not only 
agitational literature that pertained to social and political issues, but also those 
that generated critiques of the moral code. Such attacks on the moral code would 
mean that the 'lower orders' would be morally lost, and even more prone to 
revolution.36 Houghton explains why the working class was more inclined to 
reject established religion and enable atheism to become increasingly acceptable. 
34 R. J. Goldstein, Political Censorship of the Arts and the Press in Nineteenth Century Europe 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 33. 
35 Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, p. 58. 
36 See Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, p. 59. 
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Firstly, he notes that this was rooted in the sceptical nature of radical thought, 
explicit in the work of Paine and the early 'freethinkers'. Secondly, the neglect of 
the new industrial towns and their associated problems by the Church of England 
(only partly offset by the Methodist movement) was not unnoticed; thirdly, the 
general adherence by the Clergy to Tory and aristocratic principles, which of 
course was largely perceived as responsible for the plight of the poor; and 
fourthly, the suffering and deprivation which seemed at odds with the existence 
of a just and merciful God.37 Adding to this anxiety was spiritual trauma that had 
its roots in Puritanism, that engendered a spirit of distress and self denial, and 
found itself at odds with a fast changing world. The idea of altruism, a sentiment 
closely linked to the paternalistic ethos and the puritan ethic of the nineteenth 
century elite, was a prominent component of the moral high ground, particularly 
in Victorian Britain. As Collini notes, 'as one reads beyond the few canonical 
works of political thought from the period, one becomes increasingly aware, not 
just of the distinctive tone and idiom of the Victorian's sense of moral 
seriousness, but, less obviously, a recurring pattern of assumptions about the 
relations between selfishness, altruism, and human motive. ,38 Or as Chesney 
posits, 'morality, an explicit sense of moral purpose, is not simply estimable: it 
(had) become in the broadest cultural sense fashionable, and prudent men with 
their way to make, trim their sails accordingly. '39 
It is correct to assert that the anxiety being felt by the establishment and its 
supporters was not unfounded, the biggest assault against the system of 
government that had lasted nearly four hundred years was being propagated by a 
new powerful middle class. Middle-class radicalism, propelled by laissez-faire 
economic doctrines eventually became incompatible with the political structures, 
as how could economic freedom exist without political freedom, and political 
37 Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, pp. 59-60. 
38 S. Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850-1930 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 62. 
39 K. Chesney, The Victorian Underworld (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 6. 
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freedom for the middle class was political enfranchisement. Although part of the 
contextual picture has been sketched thus far in this chapter, it is necessary for me 
to provide a little more detail with regard to the battle for a free press which 
emerged during this time of great flux and upheaval. 
3.5: Free Speech as Political Expediency? 
Symptomatic of the weakening grip on its position, state prosecutions for 
criminal libel were becoming increasingly less successful towards the end of the 
1820s and the beginnings of the 1830s. The failure of the Duke of Wellington to 
prosecute successfully the Morning Journal in 1829 for libel after the paper's 
assault against him, followed in 1831 by Cobbett's libel acquittal,4O seemed to 
sound the death knell of post publication press prosecutions and sound alarm 
bells in the House of Commons and the Lords. Eventually, cries for reform that 
had so long fallen on deaf ears were heard and could no longer be ignored, and in 
1832 the First Reform Act ensured that the franchise was widened, if only in a 
limited sense. However, the aristocracy and landed interests remained politically 
dominant. Moreover, it was middle-class interests that had won the day as 
working-class enfranchisement dwindled. In 1832 'the vote was extended to more 
of the middle-class, with many of the working-class losing their votes. It was still 
only one in seven adult males who could vote. '41 However limited though the 
extension of the franchise was, it did seem to dampen down disquiet, especially 
amongst the middle classes, in that the extension of the franchise and the 
redistribution of seats in the House of Commons meant that the impetus for 
prosecutions against the press waned as the amount of dissent decreased. This 
point provides a good example of the motivation behind middle-class radicalism 
as their calls for increased political representation wavered as their political 
power increased. It would eventually become no longer expedient to advocate 
40 See Chapter Six. 
41 Pearson & Williams, Political Thought and Public Policy, p. 29 
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total freedom of the press, as this would only encourage the lower orders to 
challenge a system that the middle class was increasingly beginning to feel more 
at ease with. According to Erskine May, along with the franchise 'the freedom of 
the press had been assured, and the journalists had won the 'utmost latitude of 
criticism and invective' in their treatment of public figures and political affairs. ,42 
Although Erskine May's exaltations were for the most part well founded, they 
may have been a little premature, as other obstacles remained in place, thus 
obstructing a totally free press. One such obstacle was the stamp duty, which was 
put into place as early as 1712. This stamp duty 'was intended to discourage 
political opposition by imposing a stamp duty of a penny a sheet on newspapers 
and two shillings a sheet on one copy of each edition of a pamphlet which was 
more than half a sheet' .43 The notion of a tax on publication was unsurprisingly 
seen by some of the established press and smaller scale publications as an 
injustice and a continuation of post publication restrictions on the circulation of 
printed materials. Moreover, it placed restrictions on the laissez-faire ethos of the 
day. However, as Curran44 points out, from the government's viewpoint, the tax 
was perceived as useful in that it served a number of ends. Firstly, a tax on the 
press would ensure that readership would be restricted to the middle classes; also, 
the system of tax would ensure that the ownership of newspapers would be 
largely restricted to the propertied classes. Furthermore, the Chancellor saw it as a 
great source of revenue, and it would take vast amounts of pressure and 
persuasion to make him repeal the tax. 
The stamp tax on the press was an issue that caused much unrest even before the 
breakdown of the post publication press prosecution system and the extension of 
42 Sir Thomas Erskine May, The Constitutional History of England Since the Accession of 
George the Third, (1861), Cited in A. Jones, Powers of the Press (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, Scholar Press, 1996), p.13. 
43 Thomas, Long Time Burning, p. 37. 
44 J. Curran & J. Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, The Press and Broadcasting in Britain 
(London: Routledge, 1999). 
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the franchise. It was assaulted by opposers of the tax from many quarters. One 
key argument against the tax, that emerged and continued with greater force after 
the Refonn Act of 1832, was that it was perceived as a threat to greater 
understanding and knowledge; indeed it was often tenned a 'tax on knowledge'. 
In a speech to the House in 1831, Joseph Hume argued that the petition that he 
was presenting was 'against all laws which prevented the circulation of truth, and 
laid imposts on knowledge'.45 He continued arguing that 'a tax on knowledge or 
the spread of infonnation, was injurious to both individuals and to the community 
at large'. He knew of 'no legitimate way of opposing opinions but by arguments; 
and that opinion that could not be met by argument must be a sound and just 
one.,46 Such a focus on the post publication tax was taken up keenly by 
Bentham's followers such as John Arthur Roebuck, Henry S. Chapman and 
Francis Place, the details of which will be examined in greater depth in the 
following chapter. 
It could be argued at this stage, however, that a slight change of emphasis is 
emerging as to the motivations and justification of agitators who sought the 
complete removal of press restrictions. Instead of a free press to aid and buttress 
democracy, the free press, echoing Richard Carlile's sentiments, is being 
perceived as an end in itself, as a key that will open the door of knowledge. I 
think that it would be naive to assert that free speech via freedom of the press was 
sought after as an end in itself, as an eternal right above others as Cartwright 
proclaimed. Rather it should be seen in the context of struggles for political and 
economic freedom and an ann of social control. Again, I will devote greater 
attention to the particular motivating factors of those that sought a free press 
below. 
45 Hume, Cited Hansard, Vol. 6 (1831), p. 9. 
46 Hume, Cited Hansard, Vol. 6 (1831), p.11. 
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Jones47 points also to a number of arguments that were generated against the so 
called 'tax on knowledge' after the 1832 Reform Act. He notes that much of the 
emancipatory wave that followed the 1832 Reform Act continued naturally from 
earlier agitation, and developed into arguments against the stamp tax. Surely 
Parliamentary reform would be flawed and incomplete were the press not part of 
the formative democratic transformation of society? 'The freedom of the press 
was thus regarded not only as the essential safeguard of all constitutional 
freedoms, but also of the equitable distribution of power at the level of the estate, 
the parish and the home. ,48 'Why exchange an oligarchy of boroughs with an 
oligarchy of journals?' Again, freedom of the press was closely associated with 
political emancipation, and the contradictions of press restrictions in the form of 
duties with the free market were highlighted with vigour. 
In 1836, with the passing of the Acts 6 & 7, William IV reduced the four pence 
tax to one pence. This seemed to appease many agitators, who then eventually 
went on to concentrate their energies on the Chartist movement or the Anti Com 
Law movement. However, the end of the post-publication taxation system also 
impacted on the ability of the working-class press to reach their intended 
readership, as increasing compliance with the law, due to a reduction in the tax 
and harsh new coercive powers to deal with the illegal press, meant that the 
radical papers would now have to raise their prices, thus making them out of 
reach for a great number of their working-class readership. This of course also 
meant that by 1837, the clandestine radical press had disappeared.49 
In 1848 a group of working-class and middle-class repealers which included 
Collet, Hetherington, Holyoake and Watson formed 'The Association for the 
Repeal of Taxes on Knowledge' as they were still unhappy with the one pence 
47 Jones, Powers of the Press, pp. 19-23. 
48 Jones, Powers of the Press, p. 20. 
49 Curran, Power Without Responsibility, pp. 12-13. 
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duty. 50 This group, following earlier years' examples, challenged the authorities to 
a courtroom battle over the so-called tax on knowledge when they produced in 
1853 the Potteries Free Press, an unstamped penny weekly. When prosecutions 
from the stamp office followed, petitions were organised and enough support was 
generated to draw up a bill which sought to abolish the remaining duty. In 1855 
this bill was presented to Parliament which sought to abolish the remaining duty 
on newspapers. Eventually, after much debate, Lord Palmerston declared that he 
had confidence in the people not to allow a degradation in the press and that the 
so called evils which were anticipated would not emerge. At last and after much 
argument, the free market was seen to be by far the most powerful force in the 
area of the press as it allowed for the best to succeed and the worst to fail. The 
stamp tax was repealed in 1855.51 Eric Glasgow commenting on the growth of 
publishing in Victorian England also comments on the growing power of the 
market and its impact on the commercial publishing industry when he notes that 
publishing 'became a distinctive feature of the "free market" economy and the 
triumphant capitalism which had followed the development in England of the 
Industrial Revolution. '52 
After the repeal of the last stamp tax, it was generally safe to assume that the 
liberty of the press was eventually won in legal terms at least. However, there was 
yet another obstacle which stood in the way of a truly free press. That obstacle 
was another tax: the duty on paper. In his address to the Commons in 1858, T. 
Milner Gibson, the president of the 'Newspaper and Periodical Press Association 
for Obtaining the Repeal of the Paper Duty',53 argued that the tax on paper should 
not only be removed as it was a tax on knowledge, but that a duty on paper was 
conflicting with the interests of the marketplace. He also notes that '[t]he paper 
50 See Chapter Five. 
51 See Jones, Powers o/the Press, (1996), pp. 21-24. 
52 E. Glasgow, 'Publishers in Victorian England', Library Review, Vol. 47, No.8, 1998 pp. 
395-400, p. 395. 
53 He was also a key member of 'The Association for the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge'. 
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duty was a most pernicious tax in every point of view in which it could be 
considered. '54 He continues: 
The immediate object of proposing this Motion was to show the 
House the great inconsistency they were guilty of in asking 
Parliament continually to increase the votes for education, while 
they maintained a tax which [ ... ] stood in the way more than 
anything that could be conceived of the diffusion of knowledge 
among the great masses ofthe people. 55 
The notion that an outside body should interfere with the 'natural' processes of 
the market was held up as being socially irresponsible as the health and prosperity 
of society would suffer. The forces of capitalism, the motor of social progress, 
should not be interfered with if the health of the country was to remain good. 
Also the duty on paper, as argued by Milner Gibson, was a direct contribution to 
the amount of poverty, as it had a detrimental affect on the labour investment 
potential of the newspaper press industry. Milner Gibson's campaign was 
subsequently given widespread support, support which unsurprisingly crossed 
class boundaries. As the tide of support became evident across the country it was 
no surprise when in his Budget of 1861, Gladstone finally repealed the stamp 
duty on paper. Finally, after nearly four hundred years of struggle the war against 
formal censorship of the press was won. Thomas56 argues that for the most part, 
the struggle for a truly free press was indeed won. 
3.6: Conclusion 
The concluding remarks of this chapter serve to reassert the importance of a 
contextual insight in a study such as this. This chapter and the preceding one, act 
in a dynamic way, to provide the propulsion through which the substantive 
54 T. Milner Gibson. Hansard Vol. 151 (1858). p. 100 
ss T. Milner Gibson. Hansard Vol. 151 (1858). p. 101. 
56 Thomas. A Long Time Burning. p. 214. 
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sections are to be analysed and explained. Thus I conclude this section by 
rehearsing some arguments that resonate throughout this thesis. 
It is possible to trace the battle against press censorship across many lines of 
engagement. However, I contend that the final battle against press control was 
won on generally economic and political grounds. The force of capital won over 
old power regimes and its accompanying restrictions on emerging notions of 
freedom. Moreover, the middle-class fight for freedom of the press was fought 
also in terms of winning the means to attaining and then maintaining its power 
base over the so called lower orders. It could be argued that massive social 
movements alone and the threat of revolution were solely responsible for the 
gradual shift in the progress towards a free press, but this would negate the force 
of historical processes that were to culminate in the industrial revolution and its 
associated impact on structures of power and power relations. Moreover, I assert 
that the main influence in the movement of the free press was that of the 
development of the free market and the massive tide of social change that went 
with it. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there was impetus for censorship over 
the four hundred years since the birth of commercial printing, and arguably the 
unifying theme amongst all of them was the need to maintain the status quo. 
Whether the fight was within national boundaries or outside them, authorities saw 
it (not unsurprisingly) as crucial that any threat to their power base be halted. One 
sure way of stopping this threat (if only temporarily) was via suppression of the 
written word and more importantly halting the spread of the ideas that these 
words conveyed. Of course the motion of history brings with it many different 
circumstances and, as circumstances change, so too do the lines of engagement. 
But as we have seen, the onset of industrialisation was obviously by far the 
biggest threat to the old power structures which had their birth in feudal times and 
were gradually to be broken down by the march of progress. The force of the free 
market in capital and ideas ensured that eventually press legislation had to be 
curbed and ultimately halted as contradictions were highlighted; control of the 
press by the machinery of the state was seen as a contradiction within the 
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emerging capitalist system itself, and was inconsistent with the very foundations 
of laissez-faire philosophy. In doing so the radical working-class press, which 
asserted itself against middle-class interests were eventually defeated. They were 
defeated in part by the power of capital and the weight of four hundred years of 
struggle. In making this point, it is worth quoting Curran as he notes: 
The decline of the radical press in the second half of the nineteenth 
century must be situated in its wider social context: the defeat of the 
militant working-class movement; the lack of developed 
consciousness that rendered the working-class vulnerable to 
ideological incorporation; and the development or extension of a 
number of agencies of social control mediating consensual values 
which became, to a lesser or greater extent, internalised by the 
majority of the population; A crucial factor, however in the eclipse 
of radical journalism was the industrialisation of the press. 57 
However, it is important to note that ideas did play their part, as well as the 
context in which these ideas prospered, and it has been the function of this 
chapter and the preceding one, to provide the context in which such ideas 
developed and flourished and thus prepare the way for the main substantive part 
of the thesis. 
I have thus far set out to outline the context of the struggle for free speech, to 
provide an overview and to plot the significant events and periods in the 
development of the free press that fall outside the main foci of analysis in this 
thesis. My main task, however, is to explore the philosophical arguments for 
freedom of speech and their impact on the movement towards a free press, and 
the actual processes which sought to bring it about during the nineteenth century. 
I aim to concentrate on the interaction between these philosophical ideas and their 
application during one of the most turbulent periods of social change; ideas that 
mayor may not (as we will see) have helped pave the way for such processes to 
57 J. Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control: An Historical Perspective'. In Boyce, 
G., Curran, J. and Wingate, P., eds. Newspaper History: From the Seventeenth Century to the 
Present Day (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1983), p. 67. 
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take place. Indeed in uncovering the processes and philosophical turns that 
provided much of the intellectual ammunition that lay behind many of the events 
depicted above, it may emerge that the cries of victory from those who sought to 
ensure a free press were somewhat premature; as the battle against censorship 
continues into the twentieth century. Indeed, Sue Curry-Jansen argues that 
Enlightenment claims that it laid censorship to rest are false, and that state and 
church censorship have been replaced by market censorship, or what she terms 
constitutive censorship. This constitutive censorship maintains the power 
relations that censorship prior to the so called victory of free speech sought in 
earnest. It is worth quoting her at length and bearing her comments in mind as we 
now tum to the philosophical justifications of free speech and their application 
during the nineteenth century: 
The term constitutive censorship is used to call attention to a form of 
censorship which Liberal political theory ignores or denies. Contra 
Liberalism, I maintain that in all societies the powerful invoke 
censorship to create, secure, and maintain their control over the 
power to name. This constitutive censorship is a feature of all 
enduring human communities-even those communities which offer 
legislative guarantees of press freedom. 58 
S8 S. Curry-Jansen. Censorship: the Knot that Binds Power Knowledge (New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1991), pp. 7-8. 
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Summary 
Chapter Three provides a contextual insight into the conditions that shaped and 
impacted on the various articulations of freedom of speech during the nineteenth 
century. Again, methodological considerations are paramount as the functions of 
this chapter are to generate an understanding of factors that shaped and impacted 
on the philosophical arguments for freedom of speech and their praxis. The 
chapter highlights the emerging themes such as the franchise and the expansion of 
education that arguments for freedom of speech were starting to be associated 
with and which started to be challenged by formal legal restraints which are also 
revealed in some detail. In highlighting the social and economic development of 
Britain, the chapter suggests that as middle-class ideas entered the ascendancy, 
formal constraints to freedom of speech waned. As such, the middle class, initially 
via paternalistic discourses and power politics, framed the parameters in which 
working-class arguments could be expressed. Thus the notion of formal 
censorship, though challenged and eventually 'killed off by successive attacks 
from the middle class, was replaced by a restrictive market orientated form of 
control, which Curry-Jansen highlights as constitutive censorship. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Utilitarianism: A Paternalists Charter? 
The first question for philosophy is not do you agree with 
utilitarianism's answer? But do you really accept utilitarianism's 
way of asking the question?' 
There is scarcely a writer on moral and political theory who is free 
from every taint of utilitarianism. 2 
The Newspaper should be the book of the poor man. Untaxed, it is 
one of the prime necessities of his life; taxed, it is converted at once 
into a lUxury for the rich.3 
4.1: Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the utilitarian philosophy and praxis of 
freedom of speech, which is exemplified in utilitarian demands for a free and 
unstamped press. I will begin by highlighting the main elements of utilitarian 
theory which provided the philosophical force in the fight against government 
restrictions on the newspaper trade and press freedom during the early part of the 
nineteenth century. I will then go on to examine in detail examples of the main 
arguments that were used by utilitarians to bring an end to the so called 'taxes on 
knowledge', in 'radical' newspapers, journals and pamphlets. From this I argue 
that the praxis of utilitarianism, particularly with regard to arguments for freedom 
of the press has less of a democratic flavour than that found Bentham's original 
political philosophy, Moreover, I argue that the praxis of utilitarianism was 
inherently socially divisive and sought to place an aflluent middle-classes in a 
position of power over, not only the political machinery of the country, but also 
the so-called 'lower orders', Indeed I argue that the praxis of utilitarian 
, Williams in B. Williams, & I. C. C. Smart, Utilitarianism for and Against (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973) p. 78. 
2 I. Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966) p. 1. 
3 H. S. Chapman, 'Mr Spring Rice and the Tax on Knowledge with a Postscript on the French 
King and the Press' in I.A. Roebuck ed. Pamphlets for the People (London, 1835) p. 10. 
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justifications of freedom of the press are an expression of middle-class interests 
which are keenly linked to the political economy of laissez-faire. In order to be 
sure that the aims of the Philosophic Radicals were met, an assertion of a level of 
social control over the working classes was necessary. I demonstrate such 
assertions within utilitarian praxis particularly in relation to arguments for 
freedom of the press, citing the assertion of political economy, an overarching 
adherence to rationalism and the force of the press as moral censor as key 
elements of utilitarian praxis. 
Much of the material for this chapter stems from an examination of the particular 
arguments used in such publications as the Examiner, The Westminster Review, 
and, in particular, a series of pamphlets published by John A. Roebuck MP, 
collectively known as 'Pamphlets for the People', where radical and utilitarian 
arguments for a free press are powerful and resonant. 
Before any analysis of the particular is to be made, however, some understanding 
of the general should be noted. It is therefore my intention to commence my 
examination of utilitarian theory and free speech by providing an overview of the 
elements of utilitarian philosophy which are fundamental to any understanding of 
the struggle for a free press. This examination will begin with an overview of 
Jeremy Bentham and his Principle of Utility. 
4.2: Jeremy Bentham and the Principle of Utility 
Often considered a nineteenth-century thinker, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was 
a child of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and his philosophy displays this 
emphatically in its emphasis on rationalism as the master over natural instinct, as 
will become clear below. However, in order to make sense of Bentham's wider 
contribution to free speech theory and practice, it is necessary to analyse and 
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evaluate the foundations of Bentham's political philosophy and its 
methodological structure. 
The main (but by no means only) focus of Bentham's life was political and legal 
reform.4 In short, Bentham was concerned with the organisation and structure of 
social institutions in the context of formulating a critique of existing (and as he 
saw it) inadequate law; and, to develop the blueprint for a state and its 
institutions, which would operate upon a purely rational basis. 
As far as Bentham was concerned, and true to his Enlightenment credentials, any 
understanding of legal and political systems could only emerge through a total 
rejection of metaphysics and an unrepentant embrace of positivism with its strong 
emphasis on a systematic and scientific analysis of society. A thoroughly logical 
analysis of social structures and practices, coupled with a rationally based 
scrutiny of legal and constitutional codes, was fundamental to the development 
and application of Bentham's political philosophy. It is important to note 
however, that this analysis was not to exist in some 'philosophical ether', but 
provide the grounds for practical application; as Sir Leslie Stephen argued in the 
introduction of his three volume study of utilitarianism:5 'utilitarian doctrines 
were worked out with a constant reference to practical applications' ,6 Thus the 
advocate of utilitarianism was also the practitioner of his beliefs to the best of his 
ability; and in this respect, Bentham was no different. 
It is clear that even early on his career this embrace of logic, coupled with the 
influence of writers such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Montesquieu and Beccaria, 
that Bentham was soon to formulate possibly his most famous contribution to 
political philosophy, notably the 'principle of utility' or the 'greatest happiness 
4 For a contemporary review of the arguments between Jeremy Bentham and Brougham on 
political reform, see Westminster Review, Vol., XI. 1829, p. 447. 
5 L. Stephen. The English Utilitarians (New York: Augusts M. Kelly. 1968 [1900)). 
6 Stephen. The English Utilitarians. p. 1. 
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principle'. Bentham hoped that the fonnulation and application of this principle 
would make him 'the Newton of the Moral world',? and 'provide a philosophy for 
radical refonners. '8 
For Bentham, there was only one criterion for evaluating or even analysing legal 
and constitutional systems: that being the maximisation of happiness of the 
greatest number under that law. Heavily influenced by Thomas Hobbes's 
understanding of natural law and the foundations of its rational ordering, 
Bentham fonnulated a rational system that would seek to provide the moral and 
legislative backbone for legitimate legal and governmental systems. Simply put, 
for Bentham it is only natural for humans to seek that which will provide pleasure 
and avoid that which will induce pain. From this starting point, it is possible to 
view actions as either good in that they promote pleasure or happiness; or bad in 
that they bring about pain or unhappiness. For Bentham, all human actions are 
those which seek to promote pleasure and avoid pain. Bentham makes this point 
emphatically when he argues: 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to detennine what we shall do. [ ... ] They 
govern us all in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort 
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to 
demonstrate and confinn it.9 
This assertion then is the primary statement Bentham makes in his seminal work, 
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation published in 1789. In 
this text Bentham briefly sets out the premise of the utility principle and then in 
greater detail how it should be applied to society in general and law in particular. 
The thrust of the work is in setting out what sort of actions should be prohibited, 
7 Stephen, The English Utilitarians, p. 179. 
8 Stephen, The English Utilitarians, p. 214. 
9 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Methuen, 
1970 [1789]), p.11. 
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and what actions should take place, on the basis of the effects of that behaviour 
on the principle of utility. In addition, Bentham discusses how society can best 
avoid behaviour that will cause bad effects in the first instance. He goes on: 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency to 
which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the 
party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in 
other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every 
action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a 
private individual, but of every measure of government. 10 
Bentham argues that in acting in this manner, according to the principles of 
utility, we are not acting against the natural character of mankind, but the 
opposite. I I For Bentham then, it is clear that the vast majority of people, by the 
'natural constitution of the human frame' defer to the principle of utility in 
everyday life. 
Why does Bentham go to such lengths to outline and promote this principle? The 
answer is simple, Bentham uses his principle not only to outline why we act in 
certain ways, but also how we ought to act in any given situation. Furthermore, 
Bentham is not only concerned with the actions of the individual in the 
communityl2 (i.e., the psychological thrust of the principle, in terms of what 
motivates individuals) but also as a guide to evaluating the correct or morally 
good behaviour, and the judgement of the actions of others and society as a 
whole. The principle could then be applied to actually existing situations and 
formulations of organisation and policy. 
4.3: Bentham and Free Speech 
10 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals, pp. 11-12. 
II See Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals, pp. 13-14. 
12 The term community for Bentham refers to the 'sum total of individuals' in society and not a 
homogenous entity as with other philosophical analyses. 
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The principle of utility was for Bentham the cornerstone of his political 
philosophy; all of his prescriptions for good government and how it should 
operate to serve the people stem from this. Bentham argued that the main 
business of government was to secure the interests, indeed the happiness of 
society at large. Because individuals seek their own interests to promote 
individual happiness, there was potential for a conflict between public and private 
spheres in everyday life. It was the task of good government to hannonise these 
interests and increase the stock of happiness for the majority of society. For 
Bentham, law and government should exist in order to promote the happiness of 
the majority of the community. However, as with all governments, there was a 
risk of corruption, and if government was prone to corruption, and this was to 
surface, it would lead to bad government and bad government led to dishannony, 
and, ergo, a general lack of happiness for the majority of the population. Bad 
government, of course for Bentham, was not the operation of a rational system, 
but of an irrational system of government as it diminished the utility of its 
citizens. Thus, in order to secure good government, it was necessary for Bentham 
to ensure that corruption was at worst kept to a minimum and at best eradicated 
totally from public office. One of the main mechanisms that Bentham saw in 
achieving this aim, was the freedom to publicly censure government. 
As we saw in Chapter One:3-i, in the typologies of free speech section, freedom 
of speech based on the accountability argument, is inherently political in that it 
seeks to keep a check on political authority by holding those in power 
accountable by public scrutiny and censure. The Benthamite or utilitarian defence 
of freedom of speech is framed within the context of security against misrule and 
this claim, as we have seen, was not made on the basis of an assertion of 
fundamental rights, but with an appeal to circumstances that would best maximise 
the utility of the majority. The basis of the case for a free press, was that the 
diffusion of knowledge via an unrestricted press, engendered enlightenment. For 
Bentham and other utilitarians, this was important as enlightenment would act as 
a guard against bad government and misrule. Bentham and his followers 
maintained an endorsement for freedom of the press as this was set within the 
context of security against misrule, and constitutional liberty. It was 
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within these frames of reference that the entire defence of freedom of the press 
was made. In his Preface to A Fragment on Government (1776) Bentham states 
this unequivocally when he writes: 
Under a government of Laws, what is the motto of a good citizen? 
To obey punctually; to censure freely. This much is certain; that a 
system that is never to be censured, will never be improved: that if 
nothing is ever to be found fault with, nothing will be mended: and 
that a resolution to justify everything at any rate, and to disapprove 
of nothing, is a resolution which, pursued in future, must stand as an 
effectual bar to all the additional happiness we can ever hope for; 
pursued hitherto would have robbed us of any share of happiness 
which we enjoy already. 13 
It is clear from the above quotation, that for Bentham, the notion of public 
discussion and a free press is necessarily applied to the realms of government and 
Law. Anything outside this arena was not worthy of his attention. Consequently, 
within these terms, a free press was necessary for Bentham in order to act as a 
security against misrule, misrule that would have detrimental effects on the 
majority of the population. The utility then of free and open discussion which was 
optimised in a free press, was its incentive for and aid to good and responsible 
government. For utilitarians, freedom of the press was instrumental in achieving 
these aims (a matter that will be discussed in greater detail below). Bentham 
notes: 'So far is it from being true that no government can exist consistently with 
the exposure of defects in its administration; no good l4 government can exist 
without such exposure. 'IS 
Other similar work exists in which Bentham cites liberty of the press as a key 
element against misrule. In his letter to the Spanish people entitled: On the 
Liberty of the Press---the approaching Eight Months' sleep of the Cortes---and 
13 J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967 [1776]), paragraphs. 
16 & 17 p. 10. 
14 My emphasis. 
IS Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals. p. 14. 
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the Exclusion of Experience from the succeeding Cortes,16 Bentham continues a 
similar line of attack when he notes that 'of the liberty of the press, operates as a 
check upon the conduct of the ruling few; and in that character constitutes a 
controlling power, indispensably necessary to the maintenance of good 
government.' 17 Clearly, we can see here that Bentham was a democrat and as 
such, saw that good government cannot operate without the scrutiny of a free 
press. Given that members of government were prone to act in their own selfish 
interests as opposed to those of the people, openness in government was essential. 
What consequences then does this critique have for utilitarianism in practice? The 
defence of free speech outlined above, and articulated by the disciples of 
utilitarianism below will help answer this question. I will start to answer this 
question by drawing attention to Bentham's long time friend James Mill. 
4.4: Utilitarianism's Mentor: James Mill and Freedom ofthe Press 
One of Bentham's closest allies, and fiercest advocates of his utilitarian theory 
was James Mill (1773-1836). Not necessarily an original thinker in his own right, 
James Mill was more a conveyor of Benthamite principles, a lieutenant as Sir 
Leslie Stephen describes him. IS His son, John Stuart Mill, noted in his 
Autobiography that it was his father that 'gave the distinguishing character to the 
Benthamic or utilitarian propagandism of that time.'19 James Mill's contribution 
to the cause of utilitarianism was of a more systematic and pronounced character 
than that of Bentham. Mill's Benthamite pupilage shaped and underscored his 
many writings. However, to argue that James Mill was a mere mouthpiece of 
Benthamite philosophy is to misjudge his contribution to utilitarian and liberal 
16 Published in 1820. 
17 J. Bentham, Letter to the Spanish People entitled On the Liberty of the Press---the approaching 
Eight Months' sleep of the Cortes---and the Exclusion of Experience from the succeeding Cortes. 
October, 1820, at http://www.la.utexas.eduilabyrinthibsp/bsp.lO I.html 
18 See Stephen, The English Utilitarians. Vol. II. 
19 J. S. Mill. 'Autobiography', in Collected Works, edited by J. M. Robertson and J. Stillinger. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), Vol. I, p. 105. 
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political thought. Mill's task was not only to provide a more systematic account 
of Bentham's utilitarianism, but also to apply it to particular instances in a more 
coherent and methodical way than Bentham, particularly in the sphere of 
government and law. Mill saw that the pleasure sought by men was not in the 
name of hedonism alone, but that the sort of pleasure afforded by right actions 
was one of virtue. Interestingly, and this point has significance later in this work, 
according to Mill, the key to virtuous conduct and good citizenship is prosperity. 
As Thomas notes, 'it was not enough to leave men brutishly pursuing their own 
desires. They must be shown to view them with a longer view. '20 Thus theory and 
practice were brought together by James Mill who, heavily influenced by Adam 
Smith (1723-1790) and David Ricardo (1772-1823), sought to apply his 
formulation of 'virtuous' utilitarian logic to the popular economic theories of 
Smith and Ricardo, thus providing the key to long term betterment of humanity: 
Political economy was the science which could make (men's) self 
interest enlightened. It could show men how to substitute for 
hedonism the virtues of thrift and self denial, by demonstrating not 
only how the social machine works, but how it could be made to 
work for their own good. It follows that the key to virtuous conduct 
is prosperity. Men might arise out of their state of subjection if they 
could be made to understand its causes.21 
The foundation of James Mill's radicalism lay in the weight he places on 
education and the assertion of market forces, both of which lead him to be highly 
critical of the old orders of power. 
Education was the cornerstone of a 'good society' both morally and rationally. 
Education for the masses would enable them to overcome the servitude and 
ignorance in which they were placed by the aristocracy and the government. It 
would mean that they would be in possession of the knowledge of the causes of 
their misery and respond accordingly by spreading 'reason among their subjects 
20 W. Thomas. The Philosophic Radicals (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1979). p.104. 
21 Thomas. The Philosophic Radicals. p. 104. 
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to grant arrangements more calculated to serve the general good.!22 It was 
logically necessary that the greater number of men be made aware of their 
ignorance and greed, and shown the specific factors which would greatly increase 
their long term happiness; they could not, it was argued, hesitate but to act upon 
their better judgement and rational faculties. 'The problem was how to tum [ ... ] 
institutions from serving the few to serving the many. '23 
The solution to this problem for James Mill was two-pronged. First it was 
necessary to show those that governed society that the great mass of people, if 
educated, would not 'get ideas above their natural status in life' but live according 
to their inherent abilities. For the rulers, the fear was that if provided with the 
means to become educated, the people would rise up and challenge the status 
quo. Conventional wisdom had it that the elite, - the aristocracy, government etc. 
- achieved their status through innate qualities which were passed down to them 
through the generations. What Mill attempted to show, and what was crucial to 
utilitarianism, was that all men have similar capacities for excellence but that 
these were influenced and swayed by environmental and social stimuli. Referring 
to the work of Helvetius, Mill argues that: 
[ ... ] if you take men who bring into the world with them the original 
constituents of their nature, their mental and bodily frame, in that 
ordinary state of goodness which is common to the great body of 
mankind,- leaving out of the account the comparatively small 
number of individuals who come into the world imperfect, and 
manifestly below the ordinary standard,- you may regard the whole 
of this great mass of mankind, as equally susceptible of mental 
excellence; and may trace the causes which made them to differ.24 
22 Thomas. The Philosophic Radicals, p. 120. 
23 Thomas. The Philosophic Radicals, p. 121. 
24 J. Mill, Political Writings, 'Essay on Education' edited by T. Ball. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 159. 
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Thus, James Mill's argument rested on the notion that all men were born, more or 
less, with equal ability and cognition, and to deny them a stake in the governance 
of their affairs is tantamount to corrupt government. 
The second strand of Mill's scheme was to 'educate the many in a knowledge of 
the laws regulating their happiness'25 In other words it was Mill's programme, 
and that of other utilitarians, to develop a system of government which would be 
perceived, understood and contributed to actively and vigorously, so as to ensure 
that corruption was negated and all men could have a say in the affairs of the 
state, thus ensuring that Bentham's principle of utility was being utilised in 
legislative and moral terms. 
In his Essay on Government, Mill's arguments can be summed up as a warning to 
those in government who do not place adequate safeguards in relation to their 
potential to abuses power. In short, the best form of government is a 
representative one, with in-built safeguards such as periodic re-election and the 
regular review of practices and procedures of its members. 
Thomas makes an interesting related point about Mill's views on the aristocracy, 
the government and the 'knowledge' of government. He notes that for Mill the 
main threat to private property did not emanate from the masses as the aristocracy 
feared, but from the greed and avarice of the few. The key issue here, and an 
interesting point as regards Mill's perceptions of the 'majority', and the 
confidence which Mill has in his ideals, was the idea that when the government 
made mistakes, it was as a result of greed and other 'sinister designs'. However, 
when the 'people' or the majority made mistakes, it was as a result of their lack of 
education and ignorance of their own best interests; as will become clear below, 
the value that utilitarians place on education is great. 
25 Th omas, (1979), p. 122. 
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Though James Mill actively sought an application of utilitarian logic to social and 
moral issues, which were blended in with the science of political economy, his 
stance on freedom of the press and freedom of speech are clearly influenced by 
Bentham. Free discussion was necessary for good government. Not only was this 
the case for good government, but it naturally followed that it would be for the 
good of the people also: 
Where the rulers are willing, but do not know how to improve the 
institution of government; everything which leads to knowledge of 
their defects is desirable to both rulers and the people. That which 
certainly leads to such knowledge is, that every man who thinks he 
understands any thing of the subject, should produce his opinions, 
with the evidence on which they are supported, and that every man 
who disapproves of these opinions should state his objections. All 
the knowledge which all the individuals in society possess upon the 
subject is thus brought, as it were, to a common stock or treasury; 
while every thing which has the appearance of being knowledge, but 
is only a counterfeit of knowledge, is assayed and rejected. Every 
subject has the best chance of becoming thoroughly understood, 
when, by the delivery of all opinions, it is presented in all points of 
view; when all the evidence upon both sides is brought forward, and 
all those who are most interested in showing what is weakest in it, 
and the strength of what is wrong, are, by the freedom of the press, 
pennitted, and by the warmth of discussion excited, to devote to it 
the keenest application of their faculties. 26 
4.5: Utilitarianism in Praxis: The Arguments (or a Free Press 
26 Mill, Political Writings, 'Essay on Liberty of the Press', p. 127. 
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Having provided an outline of the general Utilitarian approach, as set out by 
Bentham and James Mill, it is now necessary for me to provide some depth to the 
discussion and put some meat on the bones of the utilitarian discussion of free 
speech. I will do this by examining journals, pamphlets and newspapers that had a 
strong utilitarian bent and analyse the arguments for freedom of speech therein. 
What follows in the analysis are examples of how utilitarian theory confronted 
issues that were relevant to the struggle for a free press during the early part of the 
nineteenth century, particularly from 1820 to 1840 when utilitarian philosophical 
discourse was at its most popular. As will be highlighted below, utilitarian 
justifications for press freedom are closely linked to its consequences, that being 
the delivery of society from corrupt government. This was mainly brought about 
by 'education' of the masses. The following three points raised in proceedings for 
the repeal of the stamp tax in 1835, outline the main elements of the argument: 
1. That the prosperity of every community is dependent upon the 
knowledge diffused amongst its members: that the Newspaper has 
been justly deemed the great instrument of civilisation, but that the 
Stamp Duty tends to destroy the efficiency of that instrument, and to 
perpetuate the evils of moral and political ignorance. 
2. That in the opinion of the present Meeting, if any portion of this 
tax be retained, a very numerous and important class will continue 
to be deprived of that knowledge of passing events, without which 
none can properly discharge the duties of citizens; and that a mere 
reduction of the Stamp Duty is to be depreciated as a half measure, 
which by lightening the burden, would only fix it the more firmly 
upon the shoulders of the People, without realising the benefits that 
would necessarily arise from a total repeal. 
3. That Petitions be presented to both Houses of Parliament, praying 
for the repeal of the whole of the Stamp Duty upon Newspapers, and 
for the abolition, at the earliest possible period, of every other tax 
affecting the Diffusion of Knowledge. 27 
27 Pronouncements reproduced in F. Place, 'The Taxes on Knowledge' 1'n J A Roeb k " uc , 
Pamphlets/orthe People, (London, 1835), p. 8. 
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As noted, one major theme that preoccupied the utilitarian movement at this time 
was the beneficial effect of the diffusion of education and knowledge. This was 
the unhindered expansion and extension of knowledge and/or information useful 
to society at large. Indeed for utilitarians 'to gain wisdom and knowledge has ever 
been held among the primary duties of man. '28 'The object of education is 
twofold; to point out those objects in nature which are most important to be 
known, and those principles in conduct which are most proper to be observed; to 
teach what is useful to know, and what is most conducive to happiness to do: 
hence education is intellectual and moral. ,29 As we can see from the extract from 
the Westminster Review, it was generally argued that if society as a whole became 
better educated and free to access and judge opinions from whatever quarter, the 
net benefit to all of society would be great, both intellectually and morally. Great 
also, in that if the diffusion of knowledge was to go ahead unhindered then a 
movement towards some greater understanding could be achieved. Such a view 
was outlined by Leigh Hunt's Examiner in its defence of utilitarian philosophy: 
We have vindicated utilitarian doctrines from unjust aspersions and 
garbled representation, under a persuasion that they approach more 
nearly to the truth than any other political tenets that we have seen 
put forth, and as they are founded on intelligent principles, and are 
promulgated, we sincerely believe, with the purest intention of 
benefit to mankind.30 
Indeed, this principle was so fundamental to the Examiner, that it was persuaded 
to argue this tenet at every opportunity, as this particular theme emerges 
consistently in its pages between 1820 and 1840. For example, in a report on the 
proceedings ofthe 'Society for the Promoting of Useful Knowledge and Members 
of Parliament,' the Examiner printed the full speech of the Chair of the meeting, 
Dr. Birkbeck. Birkbeck's speech unavowedly argued that the 'surest' way that 
28 Westminster Review, Vol., VII, April, 1827, p. 270. 
29 Westminster Review, Vol., I, Jan., 1824, p. 43. 
30 Examiner, June 28th, 1829. 
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mankind would benefit and prosper was if there was a thorough 'diffusion of 
knowledge' in society: 
If I could doubt for a moment that truth is better than falsehood, or 
knowledge better than ignorance, I should not have acceded to the 
privilege of occupying this distinguished situation on the present 
occasion. I am so perfectly persuaded that man instructed in all his 
relations to his own species, becomes so much better qualified to 
perform the various duties which it is incumbent upon him to 
discharge, that I am persuaded the interests of mankind can in no 
way be better promoted than by contributing extensively and 
effectively to the diffusion ofknowledge.31 
This view was so important to the editors of the Examiner, John and Leigh Hunt, 
that debates followed furiously between advocates of the diffusion of knowledge 
and those against such 'dangerous tendencies'. As far as the Examiner was 
concerned, any hindrance of such a diffusion of knowledge was nothing less than 
a danger to public safety. In one bizarre example, in which evidence was provided 
to back up this view, the Examiner cites an occasion in which there were mass 
riots and outbreaks of civil disobedience occurring primarily due to 'mis-
information' regarding the suspicious deaths of patients in a St Petersburg 
hospita1.32 It noted: 
The people seeing the frightful ravages of a scourge of which they 
had no experience and wanting information of its nature, have 
supposed that the sick were murdered in hospitals and that poisons 
were spread about in the streets; and under these wild impressions 
they have attacked the hospitals, (and assaulted persons provided 
with chemical preparations against infection). These are the excesses 
of ignorance which have aggravated the horrors of pestilence. It is 
clear that in times of public danger, it is of the first importance to 
have the channels of communication open to all classes [ ... ].33 
31 Examiner, Feb. 6th, 1831. 
32 This is a reference to the 'outrages' committed by the people of St. Petersburg concerning 
allegations that doctors. instead of treating the ill, were in fact intentionally contributing to their 
illness and demise. 
33 Examiner, July 31st , 1831. 
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In the example noted above, it is clear that the Examiner is trying to provide 
'proof of the social benefit of a free press, that open and unfettered discussion of 
events pertaining to the public interest should be made available to all. If not, 
then civil society and the fabric of law and order is at risk. What is also of interest 
is the notion that such information should be made available to all and not solely 
the middle class. This notion that all classes, in particular the working classes, 
should be provided with such information is explored in greater detail below. 
Another popular theme in the pages of the Examiner was that the poor state in 
which the working man found himself was in fact a result of a lack of knowledge 
of matters of great importance to society as a whole. This view is highlighted in 
the following quotation, with its reference to the Chartist movement and other 
working-class organisations; the notion was that there was only one reason for 
their miserable plight; that being taxes, taxes on those works that would enlighten 
them and convince them of the proper manner of perceiving and recognising their 
problems and thus enable them to confront the hardships and obstacles that they 
faced: 
We have seen rude labourers - those who are suffering from want of 
a general diffusion of knowledge - ignorant enough to conceive they 
were capable of benefiting themselves and their families, in their 
state of destitution, by destroying the very instruments by which 
fertility may be accelerated, and by which the food which they and 
we in common require may be brought to our homes and to theirs on 
the cheapest terms. They have done this because the schoolmaster 
has not been allowed to penetrate into their humble dwellings on 
account of the taxation which has been placed on education. The tax 
on the press. Mr. Lytton Bulwer moved - 'That since knowledge is 
the source of both of morality and wealth, any tax upon wealth, and 
any tax upon knowledge must necessarily be highly injurious to the 
prosperity and happiness of the people.' Of all knowledge, political 
knowledge was the most important, - it embodied every other 
knowledge - and without it there was comparatively none.34 
34 Examiner, February 61b, 1831. 
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The crux then of the Examiner's argument, and that of other utilitarian 
newspapers and pamphlets, is that such taxes push the cost of newspapers out of 
the price range of those of a modest, low or even no income. As such, the same 
taxes which also prevent some newspapers, journals and pamphlets from coming 
into existence, have as their consequence the effect of obstructing society at large 
from progressing intellectually and morally, and of generating and maintaining 
ignorance in society, which is inherently un-utilitarian. This argument, as 
expected, was challenged from a number of sources, none less than from the 
judiciary, who argued consistently that education did nothing beneficial for the 
lower classes as crime had increased since its albeit limited expansion. One of its 
members who made his view known on this matter was singled out by the 
Examiner in a characteristically authoritative fashion: 
To multiply the chances of information, and increase a tendency of 
reflection, is now, therefore, the only open and direct road to an 
improvement of morals and conduct in the great mass of the people; 
and it calls for far higher reasoning powers than those possessed by 
the waspish Judge [ ... ] to deduce anything from occasional 
exeptions, until he can prove that such exceptions occur not 
proportionably to temptation in every other rank, and that baseness, 
dishonour, and yielding to it, are confined to the labouring classes 
alone.3s 
The extension of education and the resulting diffusion of knowledge would, if 
allowed to flourish, prevent lawlessness and moral disharmony in society. Such a 
tendency would be halted and even reversed if the opposite was the case and 
taxes on knowledge remained. Citing an instance of public disorder in relation to 
violent conduct against millers and bakers over the 'high' price of bread, the 
Examiner goes to great lengths to argue that such violence would not have 
occurred if the masses were informed of such things as market prices and how 
prices were governed by supply and demand: 
35 Examiner, March 2nd, 1828. 
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What means, except through newspapers, have the people in [any] 
country of obtaining a knowledge of the laws which they are bound 
to obey? [ ... ] Does not every new fact communicated to an 
unfurnished mind gain some portion from the dominion of brute 
passion; and every increase of his stock of knowledge render him 
less the mere creature of blind impulse? The spectacle of the 
barbarian who cuts down the tree to gather the fruit, is less 
deplorable than that of a minister who, for the sake of taxing, 
destroys or injures the channels of public information.36 
It thus follows for utilitarians that the extension of knowledge, and end to the 
means which hinder the spread of knowledge, greatly decreases the proportion of 
ignorance amongst the masses. The point is stressed again and again that the 
newspaper taxes have the effect of stifling knowledge and as such, encourage 
ignorance, moral malfeasance, barbarism and brutality in society at large. 
The key assertion that arguments against the so-called taxes on knowledge were 
addressing, were that if given access to all knowledge including that which was 
termed 'evil' knowledge, the great mass of the people would be a great threat to 
civil peace and unfavourable consequences would prevail. This view was 
countered intelligently but with zeal by the utilitarian press, for example the 
following extract from the Westminster Review: 
This is all which education, as we propose and view it, will do and 
can do; and surely it is the road to good, though we do not deny that 
it mayor will produce partial evils; which, if it did not, it would be a 
case exempt from hitherto unfailing law of nature, that no good can 
be produced without a mixture of evil. Thel7 will read bad books -
of course; it would be very extraordinary if they did not: but to 
suppose that they will read no other, that the very end, on our part, is 
to teach, and theirs to learn, wickedness, is a calumny as foolish is it 
unjustifiable.38 
36 Examiner, May 2nd, 1830. 
37 My emphasis. 
38 Westminster Review, Vol., VII, April, 1827, pp. 305-6. A theme also present in this passage 
are the familiar paternalistic overtones of orthodox utilitarian discourse. 
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It is interesting to note that the focus on the negative effects of taxes on 
knowledge did not only impinge on the working man. Also those of more 
prosperous means were also disadvantaged by such taxes: 
The effect of these taxes on newspapers, which thus amounts to 
about 260 per cent is such as to diminish the consumption even 
among the wealthier classes, and render the commodity less 
productive as a source of revenue to the Government.39 
The notion of profit and profit maximisation emerges also in a discussion of the 
monopoly of the established press. In an attack on the 'liberal' press, it is argued 
by J .A. Roebuck that: 
Their sole object [ ... ] is the preservation of a most odious 
monopoly, which protects the wealthy speculator in Newspapers 
against the consequences of a free competition with all that talent to 
which a free Press would open a field.40 
In limiting competition and maintaining a monopoly, mainly for the London 
based newspapers, the stamp taxes were in fact beneficial for a minority of the 
press, but it was argued that the effect that this benefit had for the few was 
outweighed by the disadvantages for the majority of newspapers. Not only was 
this inherently un-utilitarian, but in addition to the established press, any new and 
emerging titles would be stifled by the tax. The Examiner argued that the repeal 
of the stamp would be beneficial not only for the new emerging press but would 
also enhance the sales of the established press by generating a culture of 
enlightenment in which the thirst for knowledge and greater understanding would 
thrive and prosper: 
By a proper reduction and better adjustment of the taxes, (not to 
speak of their [taxes] remission), there can be little doubt that the 
total sale of newspapers would be tripled, and even quadrupled. But 
this increase of sale would enable smaller existing papers to 
39 Examiner, May 2, 1830. 
40 J. A. Roebuck, A Letter to Daniel O'Connell Esq., MP, on Peerage Refonn, in Pamphlets 
for the People (London, 1835), p. 13. 
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compete with the more powerful, and the extension of the field 
would make room for newcomers. The expense of setting up new 
papers would not be materially diminished, but their chances of 
success would be augmented, and many might succeed without 
doing any pecuniary injury to those already established. The latter 
might be stimulated to make new exertions to maintain their 
stations; but, in competition, they would start with all the advantages 
of an established name, long standing, previously acquired skill and 
character. Yet we commonly find, that the fear of losing the 
reputation for ability attendant on success (a reputation generally 
gained by the merest accidents of situation, and the absence of 
deserving competitors) together with the conciseness of the want of 
stamina to sustain complete competition, will prevail against the 
strongest evidence of extensive advantages to be obtained in new 
courses of action. [ ... ] The taxes in question limit the circulation 
and profit of the media for the communication of the knowledge of 
their proceedings [in the House of Commons]; they present the full 
and the powerful competition by which the mode in which the 
accounts of these proceedings would be improved and perfected, and 
their fidelity be secured. The monopoly which the taxes creates 
secures two or three journalists (which, in practice govern the rest) 
the power of deciding what part and how much of the proceedings 
shall be made known to the public; it subjects public men to the 
caprice of an irresponsible tribunal, to which WINDHAM and 
CANNING were compelled to submit.41 
Taxes on knowledge also inhibit the competitive spirit and the resulting 'good 
effects' of competition; the results are as such intrinsically un-utilitarian and the 
circulation of knowledge is stifled. 
As noted in earlier chapters, the reformation of government was closely linked to 
the movement which sought a free unstamped press. We should be reminded that 
the main aim of the utilitarians was to proportionally increase the amount of 
happiness in society, and the main means of this was via an open and 
representative system of government. Thus knowledge, and 10 particular, 
knowledge of the system of government and the origination and operation of its 
Laws was crucial. The spread of knowledge not only referred to the spread and 
41 Examiner. May 16. 1830. 
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access to education in society for all, but more importantly, and echoing 
Bentham, it referred to exposing the system of government to public scrutiny; 
knowledge of the mechanisms, structures, practices and dealings of government. 
Even after the Reform Act of 1832, reform was not seen as complete until the 
stamp tax was repealed. 'The value of reform depends upon the improvement of 
the people; and if that be obstructed, it is clear that ministers have no heart for the 
object they profess. '42 The Westminster Review notes that' [h ]istory is nothing but 
the relation of the sufferings of the poor from the rich; except precisely so far as 
the numerous classes of the community have contrived to keep virtual power in 
their hands, or in other words, to establish free governments. ,43 
One major utilitarian contribution to the opposition of the anti-democratic, anti-
utilitarian stamp tax was provided by J. A. Roebuck MP, most notably in a series 
of journals brought together under the title Pamphlets for the People published in 
1835 and 1836. This series of pamphlets embraced utilitarian philosophy and 
attempted to apply its theorems to the problems of living in a society where 
government operated unjustly and immorally, and placed restrictions upon those 
means by which people could become enlightened and morally sound citizens. 
The main thrust of the pamphlets was to educate and instruct the people in 
matters of moral and political importance. Within this remit, the object of the 
pamphlets was to 'instrnct' people in their relative duties as citizens; 'to point out 
to them the rights that they ought to seek to attain.' It was argued that 'mere' 
possession of power was not sufficient to ensure good government, what was also 
necessary was greater knowledge and sound morality. 'Morality, as applied to the 
conduct of individuals, is reducible to being the rule, the general observation of 
which would provide the greatest happiness amongst those who are to be affected 
by its consequences.,44 Such morality and knowledge in the mass of the people 
42 Examiner, Feb 26, 1832. 
43 Westminster Review, Vol., XI, July, 1829, p. 258. 
44 Westminster Review, Vol., XIII, Jan., 1830, pp. 246-247. 
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would ensure that society would improve, and it was towards this end the 
pamphlets were published. However, in order to ensure the widest possible 
circulation of the material amongst those who could least afford it, Roebuck 
avoided the stamp tax by publishing each pamphlet as a separate piece of work 
rather than as a newspaper or serial 
In his first edition entitled On the Means of Conveying Information to the People, 
Roebuck outlines the principal justification of why the stamp tax was still in 
force. He notes that as well as a means of generating revenue for the government, 
the main reason for the stamp tax was 'for the express purpose of preventing the 
people knowing what is being done by their so-called representatives. '45 Citing 
Cobbett's Two Penny Trash as providing the people with information on the 
'conduct of the then government' Roebuck argues that the government and the 
aristocracy feared the opening up of government to public scrutiny and this was 
the reason that they placed controls on the press. He notes: 
What the government feared was, that the mass of the people, that is, 
the labouring millions, should hear of and understand their 
proceedings. The grand object was to shut out the gaze of the 
multitude - to build up a high and thick wall between themselves 
and the millions.46 
The result was the Six Acts of 1819 which increased the levy on newspapers to 
four pence per copy. The effect of the acts was the destruction of 'the means of 
intelligence to the people' by increasing the price of the publications above the 
means of those people to which it was aimed, thus consigning the poor and 
powerless to 'helpless ignorance'. One of the main tenets of Roebuck's argument, 
and one which again makes the connection between knowledge and public order 
and crime, was that a responsible government should seek to lessen the amount of 
lawlessness and anarchy in society. Moreover, this should not be attained by 
45 J. A. Roebuck, 'On the Means of Conveying Information to the People' in Pamphlets for the 
People (London, 1835), p. 3. 
46 Roebuck, 'On the Means of Conveying Information', p. 3. 
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punishment after the fact; the laws should be made available to the public for 
their scrutiny. It was the government's responsibility to enlighten people as to 
what the law was so that they would know what was, and what was not socially 
acceptable behaviour. The law as it stood was at best unintelligible, even to those 
whose job it was to untangle its intricacies. Clarity in the realm of the law of the 
land was necessary in order that lawlessness decrease. Roebuck notes: 
I assume that it is the first duty of a government to take the most 
effectual means of making the people obey all laws which justly 
protect person, property, and reputation. I also assume that it be the 
duty of government to seek rather for means of prevention, than of 
punishment; that is, it should not so much seek to deter the citizens 
generally from breaking the law through the terror created by 
punishing such as have broken it, as by taking precautions, that no 
one should have the desire to break it. Now one of the most 
effectual, one to the most necessary, means of creating this desire, is 
to teach the people what the law is.41 
However, Roebuck is not only providing justification of a repeal of censorship 
laws, i.e. the stamp tax, he is also providing an analysis of why such a system has 
emerged in the first place. He argues that not only does the government make the 
laws unintelligible to those who have 'not spent a lifetime studying it' and created 
a monopoly in its promulgation, but over time, the law and its related enactments 
become 'buried' and hidden amongst statutes and more statutes which are 
designed to protect the rich, but at the same time are unintelligible to the common 
man. Thus the working man is ignorant of that which will protect him from 
prosecution. Even when attempts were made to make the law clear to the less 
educated, these were deemed illega1.48 Thus the working man was in a position 
that he could not escape from, as if the laws of the land were not clearly laid out 
for him to recognise his folly, how could he hope to make correct decisions about 
41 Roebuck, 'On the Means of Conveying Information', p. 4. 
48 Francis Place attempted to publish a small and inexpensive abridgement of the 'Combination 
Laws'. However, when he attempted to publish the tract he was told that such a publication 
would be illegal and subject to prosecution. 
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his conduct? Ignorance and dependency are states to which the working man was 
doomed because the methods to bring an end to such ignorance were beyond his 
means. 
4.6: Utilitarianism and Good Government 
Although highly critical of the laws and their application, utilitarians such as 
Francis Place and John Roebuck did not just direct their energies towards a 
critique of the system but also outlined in great detail what the essential features 
of a good, that is, morally sound and just government are: 
A good government, I take to be that which - I, insures to every man 
against oppression, whether foreign or domestic, his personal safety, 
his property, and his reputation; and - 2, which sagaciously employs 
the resources and powers of the whole people to perform such 
necessary labours as cannot so well be done by individual exertion.49 
However, this alone is insufficient if one is to attempt to formulate principles on 
which the actual practice of government should take place. Some detail should be 
provided, and Roebuck attempts just this in his pamphlets. The key for Roebuck 
again is knowledge, knowledge of that which will enable the people to govern 
well and morally and the knowledge which will enable them to 'judge accurately' 
the intellectual and moral worth of those whom they select to represent them: 
I seek to make [the common man] an instructed and careful witness 
of the legislators proceedings: to give him, in the last resort, a 
control over the legislators conduct, and, by instructing, rendering 
him capable of truly appreciating it - approving where the legislator 
is right - blaming where he is wrong. so 
In writing on the subject of government, it was the intention of Roebuck and his 
contributors that those who read the pamphlets gain an understanding of what 
ought to be the nature and form of their own government. By highlighting the 
49 Roebuck, 'On the Means of Conveying Information', p. 7. 
50 Roebuck, 'On the Means of Conveying Information', p. 9. 
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follies and corrupt actions of government and pointing out the correct course of 
action it would become clear that those who read the material would have an 
understanding of a bad system of government and also what it should be replaced 
by: 
It is not by simply telling a multitude, that they ought to be endowed 
with powers which the law now denies them [ ... ] the steadfast spirit 
is the instructed one: he will patiently pursue his end who clearly 
appreciates its worth - whose enthusiasm springs from knowledge 
thoroughly grounded, not from a passing and fitful and evanescent 
idea.51 
The notion of praxis, political action or activity arising out of the theory, is a 
strong current within the utilitarian creed. As I stated at the beginning of this 
chapter, for utilitarians it was not enough to philosophise and theorise grand 
themes and plans, philosophy should be put into practice as far as was possible. 
Part of this practical activity, as I have demonstrated above, was actively 
engaging in political and moral debate thus rendering the participant more able to 
judge, as well as adding to the stock of his political and moral knowledge. 
4.7: Utilitarianism as a Vehicle (Or Social Control 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to analyse the nineteenth century utilitarian 
arguments for freedom of speech, which was exemplified for them in an 
unrestricted free press. However, to finish my analysis here would be to fall into 
the trap of so many other writers on utilitarianism and freedom of the press, 
namely to avoid confronting some of the strong elitist and paternalist tendencies 
that were inherent within utilitarianism. I argue here, that for the most part, 
utilitarian arguments for freedom of the press were intricately connected to an 
agenda of social control of the lower orders in order to safeguard the middle-class 
political and economic ascendancy. This critique will examine three particular 
elements of the utilitarian praxis of freedom of speech, all of which demonstrate, 
51 Roebuck, 'On the Means of Conveying Information', p. 10. 
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at best elitist, at worst authoritarian attempts at social engineering. Firstly I 
examine the connection between freedom of the press, education and the new 
science of political economy, arguing that the free press movement, using 
education and Enlightenment as a disguise, attempted to socialise the working 
classes into passive acceptance of laissez-faire economics. Secondly, I point to 
how this was done, mainly by focussing on the assertion of utilitarianism as a 
rational system which would counter the 'baser' irrational instincts of the lower 
orders. I argue that Rationalism and its particular place within utilitarian praxis is 
used as a vehicle for social order by undermining the irrational aspects of human 
activity especially those of the working classes. Finally, I look at how a utilitarian 
inspired 'free press' sought to maintain social order by acting as moral censor. 
i. Political Economy 
If there is a sign of the times upon which more than any other we 
should be justified in investing our hopes of the future progression 
of the human race in the career and improvement, that sign 
undoubtedly is, the demand which is now maintaining itself on the 
part of the public for instruction in the science of political 
economy.S2 
As we have seen, taxes on knowledge and their censorial effects were, as far as 
the utilitarians were concerned, responsible for such things as the creation and 
maintenance of poverty through a notion of enforced ignorance; if the masses 
were educated in relation to the reason for their suffering, their suffering would 
cease. Poverty, destitution, social disharmony were not directly perceived as a 
product of vast differences in material conditions between the minority of 
wealthy, and the vast majority of the poor. As I have highlighted, inadequate 
living and working conditions, according to the utilitarians, were due to lack of 
education, and lack of access to 'useful knowledge'. It is clear that utilitarians 
saw that a free press could promote public enlightenment in the sphere of politics 
S2 Westminster Review, Vol., IV, July, 1825, p. 88. 
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and civil society/3 they also considered that censorship was prone to other 'dis-
utilitarian' consequences. For example, in countries that had no freedom of the 
press, violence and revolt were more than a possibility. In Britain, public displays 
of anger and outrage were 'blamed' on lack of education for the working man, 
brought about by the taxes on knowledge: 
Ministers are willing, nay desirous, to prevent the access to 
knowledge, which can alone permanently extinguish the evil 
passions generated by ignorance, and lead to events even more 
deplorable. Lamentable, indeed, is it to see such men refuse to do 
that which can be so easily done to preserve the peace of the 
country, and save from ultimate destruction, even their own 
property. Lamentable is it to be compelled to observe the obstinacy 
with which they cling the use of brute force to compel obedience to 
bad laws, when, by repealing those laws, the force of knowledge 
would alone be necessary [ ... ].54 
This analysis was not made in terms of advancing the material conditions of the 
early nineteenth century poor, but to imbue them with a notion of virtue - to be 
virtuous citizens in an active civil society. Education then for utilitarians is the 
main mechanism by which 'evil passions' could be extinguished. Note also that 
the protection of property by adhering to 'good law' is also a concern for 
utilitarians, as is also evident in the above quotation. 
As noted in Chapter Two, the link between the struggle for a free press can be 
traced in the transition from feudal systems of social organisation, i.e. from rural 
feudal forms to urban industrial systems of social order centred around the free 
market, the rise of capital and the transition of social forms of organisation that 
would ensure the smooth running of capital. This feature of the struggle for 
freedom of the press can be observed also in the utilitarian case for a free and 
unstamped press. For example, the Westminster Review is keen to make the 
connection between the press and capital when it writes: 'The Newspaper press in 
53 This theme is resonant in mainstream utilitarian and liberal thought during this period. 
S4 J. A. Roebuck, 'Taxes on Knowledge' in Pamphlets for the People (London, 1835), p. 7. 
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this country, [is] one of these extraordinary combinations by which capital 
activity and intellect, have produced wonderful results. ,55 Also commenting on 
James Mill's Elements of Political Economy, the Westminster Review exalts the 
new science of political economy with reference to government legislation on free 
trade. 'To stimulate to the utmost improvements in the means of production, no 
encouragement beyond that of securing, to every individual the fruits of his 
industry and ingenuity is requested at the hands of the legislature. '56 
Closely linked to the pronouncement of utilitarian values were notions of free 
enterprise and the unrestricted growth of capital. The economic theories of the 
late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century were perceived as the rational 
means of conducting economic affairs and this was reflected in utilitarian claims 
for a free press. As we have seen, particularly in their influence on James Mill, 
'the classical economists, especially the three most famous of them, Adam Smith, 
Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo, were all utilitarians. ,57 Indeed 'the division 
of labour and the free market produce the greatest amount of happiness 
compatible with [the then] existing system of property.'58 As a precursor to later 
utilitarian arguments, Adam Smith himself writes - 'It is the necessary, though 
very slow and gradual consequences of a certain propensity in human nature 
which has the view of extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and 
exchange one thing for another. '59 Bentham also in his Defence of Usury 
published in 1787 expounded the virtues of laissez-faire, indeed Steintrager 
argues that 'Bentham knew he was going beyond Adam Smith in making the case 
for laissez-faire. '60 
S5 Westminster Review, Vol., X, Jan., 1829, p. 216. 
56 Westminster Review, Vol., II, Oct., 1824, p. 304. See also an article on the abolition of the 
Corn Law, Westminster Review, Vol., VI, 1826, pp. 373-404. 
57 Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians, p. 111. 
58 Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians, p. 113. 
59 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London: Dent, 1910), p. 12. 
60 J. Steintrager, Bentham (London: George Allen Unwin, 1977), p. 63. 
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Utilitarianism's emphasis on education can be traced to ideological assertions 
also. Vaughan and Scotchford-Archer highlight the distinctive nature of 
educational goals based around class interests. They note the close association 
between economic growth and educational development arguing that: 
Utilitarian philosophy allied to classical economics epitomised and 
sought to legitimate the ambitions of the emergent middle-class. 
[ ... ] In this context, the approach of the middle-class to education 
was double edged, since control over the instruction of workers was 
a major motive for its own assertion. Ideally, it sought to replace the 
amateur tradition of the secondary and higher education by useful 
instruction and to replace religious by economic indoctrination in 
the elementary schooling of the working-class. In the first instance 
emphasis on a broader curriculum, more relevant to the needs of 
industrialisation, served to support the claim that the middle-class 
was the most useful section of society. In the second, desires to 
communicate classical economics to workers reflected a conception 
that an understanding of its laws would protect property from attacks 
against it.61 
It has been demonstrated that one of the key impulses of the utilitarian defence of 
free speech lay in its commitment to the war of the unstamped. It is clear that one 
of the key motivations that such a 'war' was waged, was so that it would open up 
the newspaper market to competition and therefore apply in vogue economic 
theories to the arena of public debate in the lucrative newspaper industry. This 
could not have come about on its own but had to be part of the wider fight for the 
reform of government and the struggle for representative democracy. The case for 
democracy could not be made without a free press. As we have seen in Chapter 
Two which focussed on the historical nature of the struggle for a free press, such 
a 'battle' was inherently part of wider social and political movements which were 
related to the end of one form of social formation, feudalism, and the beginning 
of another - industrial capitalism. Associated to this was the gradual end of 
landed rule towards a primitive form of paternalistic democracy inspired by the 
61 M. Vaughan and M. Scotchford-Archer, Social Conflict and Educational Change in England 
and France, 1789-1848 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 77. 
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Philosophic Radicals. And as we have seen, 'Bentham [and his followers] 
considered the unrestricted circulation of public infonnation to be an 
indispensable link between the rulers and the ruled in a political society, binding 
them together in a secure relationship based upon the conjunction of duty and 
interest on each side. '62 However, this link was one based not on mutual interest 
of the poor, but what could be termed wider commercial interests that sought a 
measure of social control over the poor, particularly for advocates of the new 
political economy such as James Mill and David Ricardo. 
In addition to the defence of the free market, a strong current of paternalism ran 
throughout utilitarian discourse, fundamentally undermining their proclaimed 
democratic aims. It has often been considered by scholars that the practical 
outcome of utilitarianism lends itself heavily to a form of paternalistic elitism. 
This form of elitism is particularly expressed in the so called democratic ideals of 
utilitarians like James Mill. As Bramsted and Melhuish note, James Mill took the 
view that 'certain exclusions from the franchise might be made without damage 
to good government. '63 They continue that the 'only thing which made it possible 
for him to countenance a wide popular franchise was his declared belief that the 
opinions and votes for the bulk of the electors would be guided by the educated 
middle-classes. He assigned this section of the community a paternalistic 
responsibility for influencing and directing the minds of the people [ ... ]'.64 James 
Mill is explicit in his assertion that the middle classes, or middle rank could set 
examples for the so-called lower orders of society. Thus the middle classes 
assume the role of leadership over the working classes: 
There can be no doubt that the middle rank, which gives to science, 
to art, and to legislation itself, their most distinguished ornaments, 
62 D. G. Long. Bentham on Liberty, Jeremy Bentham's Idea of Liberty and its Relation to his 
Utilitarianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1977). p. 201. 
63 E. K. Bramsted, and K. J. Melhuish, eds.. Western Liberalism, A History in Documents, 
from Locke to Croce (London: Longman Group, 1978). p. 23 
64 Bramsted and Melhuish. Western Liberalism. p. 23. 
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the chief source of all that has exalted and refined human nature, is 
that portion of the community of which, if the basis of 
Representation were ever so far extended, the opinion would 
ultimately decide. Of the people beneath them, a vast majority 
would be sure to be guided by their advice and example.6s 
Mill continues: 
What signifies the occasional turbulence of a manufacturing district, 
peculiarly unhappy from a very great deficiency of a middle rank, as 
there the population almost wholly consists of rich manufacturers 
and poor workmen; with whose minds no pains are taken by 
anybody; with whose afflictions there is no virtuous family of the 
middle rank to sympathise; whose children have no good example of 
such a family to see and admire; and who are placed in the highly 
unfavourable situation of fluctuating between very high wages in 
one year, and very low wages in another?66 
Arblaster notes that James Mill in particular 'gave explicit expression to the 
widely held belief that the middle-class was peculiarly fitted to provide leadership 
and government for the whole of society. ,67 This sentiment is echoed elsewhere -
'on the one side they faced the establishment numerically small, which they 
sought to persuade, or rather shame into rational behaviour by sheer weight of the 
argument. On the other side was what they looked on as an essentially passive 
body of the uninstructed, waiting like clumps of wet clay to be moulded by the 
potter's fingers. ,68 
'Nowhere in the long list of his expression of support for freedom of the press or 
public discussion does Bentham contradict, endanger, or qualify his commitment 
to control the frame of reference within which public debate is carried on -
control by means of indirect legislation, scientific ethics, and a thoroughly 
6S Mill, Political Writings. 'Essay on Government'. p. 41. 
66 Mill, Political Writings. Essay on 'Government'. p. 42. 
67 A. Arblaster. The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc. 
1984). p. 264. 
68 Thomas. A Long Time Burning. p. 159. 
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programmed education system. '69 This notion of leadership, or more precisely, 
authoritative guide, is in a similar vein to Plato's philosopher kings. This was 
clearly visible in terms of education, that being the enlightened knowledge of the 
few dispersed amongst the greater number for wider public consumption. Thus 
we see that, rather than education for the masses providing fulfilment and 
enlightenment for all, education can be seen as a form of authoritative guidance 
provided by an elite few in the name of rationalism and utility, and adding weight 
to the economic imperative of the free market, this sentiment being especially 
prevalent in the work of James Mill. 
It is not political economy that creates inequality, but lack of education, as James 
Mill points out when he states that 'all the difference which exists, or can ever be 
made to exist, between one class of men, and another, is wholly owing to 
education. ,70 He continues 
But large numbers or bodies of men are raised to a high degree of 
mental excellence; and might, without doubt, be raised to still 
higher. Other large bodies, or whole nations, have been found in so 
very Iowa mental state, as to be little above the brutes. All this vast 
distance is undeniably the effect of education.71 
It is important to note, however, that to represent utilitarian praxis as an exact 
representation of utilitarian philosophic doctrine, is to overlook key differences in 
both. Although roughly allied, the philosophy and praxis of utilitarianism diverge 
at crucial points. For example, the democratic spirit of Bentham's position should 
not be confused with the praxis of utilitarianism from activists such as James 
Mill, John Roebuck and Francis Place. Bentham's commitment to democracy, 
openness in government and greater representation is, as we can observe above, 
actually undermined by the historical application of utilitarian principles from 
many leading figures of the Philosophic Radicals. The paternalism of James Mill 
69 Bramsted and Melhuish, Western Liberalism, p. 199. 
70 Mill, Political Writings, 'Essay on Education', p. 161. 
71 Mill, Political Writings, 'Essay on Education', p. 161. 
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and company should be seen in a slightly different light to the democratic 
aspirations of Bentham. This sentiment should also be borne in mind in terms of 
the discussion of freedom of speech. Paramount for Bentham is his ideal of 
democratic representation facilitated by freedom of speech and the accountability 
argument. 72 Such an ideal is slave to the utility argument in that Bentham viewed 
utility best being served by an open representative democracy. This said, the 
history of the praxis of the utilitarian justification of freedom of speech is tainted 
with anti-democratic paternalism and an overarching commitment to laissez-faire 
by Bentham's followers, and as such we can see that Bentham's logic of 
utilitarianism was different from its historical actuality. The utility of socialising 
the working-classes into passive acceptance of laissez-faire is clear, there was 
much to gain both economically and politically in such a process. 
I have sought in this section, to make apparent the anti-democratic, indeed almost 
authoritarian spirit of the praxis of utilitarianism, emphasising the paternalist 
element and the connected socially divisive economic dimension of 
utilitarianism's praxis which is particularly resonant in the work of James Mill. 
However, it is not sufficient to isolate the assertion and socialisation of laissez-
faire economics as the only mechanism by which utilitarians sought to establish a 
strong political power base. The role of rationalism itself also plays an important 
part in indoctrinating the working-class and providing further ammunition for 
utilitarianism. 
ii. Rationalism as a Political Force 
As I have shown, the fundamental defence of utilitarian ethics and codes stems 
from an unabashed adherence to rationalism, as rational principles should be 
employed at all time and in all circumstances. The following quote from the 
Westminster Review emphasises this in its critique of the then existing modes of 
72 See Chapter One. 
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education, as the paper outlines its belief in the application of rationalism in 
education: 
Both in the selection of subjects to be taught, and in the mode of 
teaching then, which has been perpetuated then, even to the present 
day, there is exemplified a most extraordinary ignorance of the very 
elements of rational instruction.73 
However, particularly in the sphere of education and in relation to what 
constitutes knowledge, this unswerving adherence to rationalism is not of course 
unproblematic. The utilitarian approach to learning was didactic in form. That is -
rational knowledge is transferred or transmitted by means of educational media, 
be they an orthodox system of mass education, small group instruction, or 
through a free press. However, if one considers that learning might consist of 
more than the application of rational principles and objective analysis; and be 
subjective, reflective, expressive etc. then to adhere to a purely strict logically 
inspired educational process would exclude all those uniquely human traits that 
also contribute to greater understanding. For utilitarians, 'mankind's natural 
desires' should be slave to reason, these natural desires should be brought under 
control at all costs. This weight put on an almost super rational state of being, 
even if such as state was/is attainable by an adherence to utilitarian logic, works 
against its own utility in providing a sound basis for organising society in that to 
assert pure reason as the sole measure for all human actions, utilitarians are 
negating distinctive features of human existence: those being the capacity for 
emotion, irrationality, subjectivity and passion to name just some, all of which do 
not immediately stem from a rational outlook but which can also contribute to 
states of well being. Any attempt to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number must recognise that happiness can consist of such things as emotion, 
subjectivity and other non-rational states of being. John Stuart Mill eventually 
recognised this in his essay on utilitarianism when he identified the notion of 
73 Westminster Review. Vol.. I. Jan .• 1824. p. 46. 
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higher and lower pleasures. For the Philosophic Radicals, however, such a notion 
was ridiculous. 
However, in its adherence to strict logical systems we also have another more 
than convenient method of asserting utilitarian power over the 'lower orders'. 
Being slave to their irrational and so-called baser instincts, the 'lower orders' 
according to the utilitarians were prone to act in ways which were detrimental to 
their best interests. Again we see an assertion that in order to overcome their 
miserable plight, they should be infused with a super-rational outlook. If this was 
not possible however, which it usually was not, guidance from those who knew 
best was always at hand. Again, this is a convenient way of affirming the middle 
and educated classes power over the working classes. Interestingly, this tendency 
of pate malis tic rationalism is recognised in the pages of the Edinburgh Review: 
We have long been of the opinion that the utilitarians have owed all 
their influence to the mere delusion - that, while professing to have 
submitted their minds to an intellectual discipline of peculiar 
severity, to have discarded all sentimentality, and to have acquired 
consummate skill in the art of reasoning, they are decidedly inferior 
to the mass of educated men in the very qualities in which they 
conceive themselves to exceP4 
Thus not only do we have an almost anti-human approach to politics and society, 
in that it negates a large part of what constitutes human activity, namely emotion 
and subjectivity etc. we also have another mechanism of asserting power over the 
so-called lower orders.75 The irrational should be discarded and brought into line 
with the rational, and who is better suited to facilitate this process than those who 
are versed in the super-rational language and philosophy of utilitarianism. Though 
not unconnected to the discussion above on education and the assertion of the free 
74 Edinburgh Review, 'On the Utilitarian Theory of Government, and the Greatest Happiness 
Principle,' L, Oct. 1829, p. 99. 
75 Here I refer again to the argument of the previous section (4:7, i). 
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market, we can see rationalism itself is asserted as a particular method of social 
control which provides a means to a level of social engineering. 
iii, The 'Free Press' as Moral Censor 
Finally we now tum to the role of utilitarian praxis operating as moral censor. In 
order to do this we must first remind ourselves of the ontological basis of the 
utilitarian argument. The notion of a free press and the idea of free speech for 
utilitarians, was not to be sought after as a freedom in itself, as utilitarians saw no 
intrinsic value in freedom for freedom's sake, to be fought for and gained as a 
fundamental human right. There is no consideration of free speech outside the 
boundaries of the issues of law and morality. The utilitarians saw 'freedoms', 
including freedom of the press, as goods only in relation to their usefulness or the 
effect they have on the 'correct' or 'rational' operation of a political system. As 
we have seen, for utilitarians, the freedom of the press was necessary as a tool or 
weapon against corrupt and insincere governments, not as a value in itself. As 
Long, in his discussion of Bentham, explains '[o]nly within the boundaries 
established by his science of human nature would it be considered expedient to 
stimulate public discussion and debate. ,76 
Given that all aspects of personal and public life should be considered in relation 
to their propensity to advance utility, and given that those acts which do not 
provide for general utility should be avoided, it is therefore conceivable that if it 
was considered that freedom of the press, (or any other freedom) detracted from 
the principle of utility and produced dis-utilitarian consequences, it should be 
avoided. If censorship contributed to the general good of society, then indeed 
censorship would be advocated by utilitarianism. If it was beneficial for the 
community to have restrictions on free and open discussion, the utilitarians would 
have no hesitation in enforcing such restrictions in their legal code. 
76 Long. Bentham on Liberty, p. 198. 
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In this way utilitarian justifications for free speech are turned on their head and a 
justification for censorship is provided which is logically consistent with 
utilitarianism. The utilitarian defence of freedom of speech therefore, is not a 
defence of particular rights; it is necessarily attached to actions which promote or 
enhance the general good and could be reversed if the case was made in terms of 
utility. 
This being said, the fact remains that: 
1. Bentham was a democrat. 
2. The reason he was a democrat was due to the fact that he saw 
representative democracy as the best means of achieving the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. 
3. He saw that those in power were best checked through open discussion 
and public debate. 
4. Such accountability is only possible via a free press. 
How can we square the circle? As we have seen, particularly for James Mill, 
utility maximisation can emerge in a situation in which the educated classes 
provide leadership for the lower classes. It is not impossible that such leadership 
may see fit to discourage, censor, or prohibit various forms of 'knowledge' that 
might have the effect of challenging its position. Thus particularly for Mill, 
whose brand of paternalism has less democratic leanings than that of Bentham, 
some form of censorship may be expedient in order to 'protect the lower orders 
from themselves'. Indeed it may be in certain circumstances that in order to 
maximise utility, certain constraints may be placed on individuals which could 
amount to censorship. 
If one were to imagine for example, a situation where a form of democratic 
paternalism existed and there were no restrictions on the press, and the status quo 
was threatened in some way by a small minority, it is not beyond the realms of 
possibility that some form of moral censorship could be advocated to 'protect' the 
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interests of the majority of the people. Thus censorship via the press could be 
seen as having utilitarian consequences and would be perfectly justifiable within 
these tenns. The fact that Utilitarians were committed democrats could be placed 
under some pressure by the fact that they were generally more committed to the 
maximisation of utility. As such, certain fonns of censorship, partiCUlarly moral 
censorship, are pennissible within utilitarianism if such censorship aids greater 
utility. I suggest that this idea can be demonstrated by applying Bentham's vision 
of the Panopticon to wider civil society where control over civil society is 
asserted via a strict moral code that is derivative from strict utilitarian ethics. In 
order to see clearly how the force of utilitarianism can seek to impose some sense 
of moral order, a brief discussion of the mechanism is necessary. 
The Panopticon is a structure that is constructed in such a way that its inhabitants 
- madmen, vagabonds, criminals, workers or school children - are continuously 
aware that their actions are under surveillance by those in authority, thus 
regulating their behaviour appropriately to avoid punishment or retribution. As 
Foucault notes, 'visibility is a trap'.77 All actions of those confined within this 
structure are thus controlled according to the wishes of the guardians of the 
Panopticon because they are clearly observable. Two key features need to be 
present if the Panopticon is to succeed, firstly, authority and power should be 
visible, so that the inmate is aware of possible retribution; and secondly this 
power should be unverifiable, so that the inmate is never totally sure that they are 
being watched. This is achieved within the institution by a central tower contrived 
to ensure that guardians can see everything without being seen, and importantly, 
the inmates of the Panopticon are aware of this. To be sure for utilitarians, 'the 
Panopticon, is a marvellous machine which, whatever use one may put to it, 
produces homogeneous effects of power. ,78 But how does this 'machine' tum the 
utilitarian defence of a free press into a vehicle of censorship? If one transports 
77 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. the Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 
p.200. 
78 Foucault. Discipline and Punish, p. 202. 
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the principles of the Panopticon to wider society then the mechanisms of control 
become evident. Again, it is worth quoting Foucault: 
This Panopticon, subtly arranged, so that an observer may observe, 
at a glance, so many different individuals, also enables everyone to 
come and observe any of the observers. The seeing machine was 
once a sort of dark room into which individuals spied; it has become 
a transparent building in which the exercise of power may be 
supervised by society as a whole. 79 
Thus, power is generalised and the watchers become the watched, each regulating 
each others behaviour within a rigid moral framework. One's behaviour in 'open' 
civil society is self-regulated or self-censored, as social agents are ever aware that 
whilst they are the surveyors of other's actions, they are at the same time open to 
scrutiny of others. Thus a form of covert censorship exists within a social entity, 
justified by the moral weight of utilitarianism's epistemology. 
However, what has a discussion about the Panopticon, which of course is a 
system of penal control, to do with a discussion about censorship within wider 
society? Are they not two totally separate entities? Surely the description of the 
workings of the Panopticon are to be applied to the penal system alone, and not to 
society at large? However, if one looks more closely at particularly James Mill's 
discussion of freedom of the press and his discussion of offences which should be 
open to prosecution, we find a discussion of self censorship strikingly similar to 
that imposed within the Panopticon. 
It is worth exploring this in some detail. In his discussion of libel law James Mill 
initially argues that laws that pertain to regulate the press are 'imperfect' as they 
actually sanction the means of mediation as well as the actual perpetrator of a 
'libel'. The law he continues is no good at ascertaining the truth, and as such, the 
law is 'imperfect'. Where a libel has been committed, the test of the libel should 
79 FoucaUlt, Discipline and Punish, p. 207. 
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be placed at the bar of truth and if some offence has indeed taken place, then 
reparation should occur. 
The true expedient, therefore, is to render the machinery of the laws 
so perfect that the penalties which they denounce may always be 
sure of execution; and then hardly any thing beyond compensation 
to the individual, and the abstraction of any additional gain which 
might have been made by the propagation of slander, would be 
necessary to repress all offences against the reputation of others, to 
which the motive was constituted by pecuniary gain.80 
Within utilitarian logic, this seems perfectly reasonable. However, in the same 
article, Mill talks about the press in such as way that it becomes not a mere 
mechanism of mediation, but a vehicle of censorial social control which ensures 
adherence to a specific moral code. 
Mill is clear that the press can be the mechanism of social control by asserting 
notions of private censorship. He notes that if a man has committed an act or acts 
that are not illegal, but are acts which 'members of society disapprove and 
dislike' ,81 then 'the prospect of the immediate and public exposure of all acts of 
this description, would be a most effectual expedient to prevent their being 
committed. ,82 He goes on 
Men would obtain the habit of abstaining from them, and would feel 
it as little painful to abstain, as at present it is to any well educated 
person to keep from theft, or those acts which constitute the ill 
manners of the vulgar. 83 
Furthennore: 
The motive almost every man would derive from the knowledge that 
he had the eyes upon him of all those, the good opinion it was his 
interest to preserve; that no immoral act of his would escape their 
80 Mill. Political Writings, 'Essay on Liberty of the Press'. p. 104. 
81 Mill. Political Writings. 'Essay on Liberty of the Press'. p. 106. 
82 Mill. Political Writings. 'Essay on Liberty of the Press', p. 106. 
83 Mill, Political Writings. 'Essay on Liberty of the Press', p. 106. 
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observation, and a proportionate share of their hatred and 
contempt. 84 
We can now see Foucault's systematised model for social control within the very 
mechanisms of the press. His assertion that human autonomy is jeopardised is 
real, in that the press acts as the moral guardian adhering to a strict utilitarian 
moral framework. It is clear that what James Mill has in mind here, is a version of 
the Panopticon applied to wider civil society, with the public gaze, facilitated by 
the press acting as the gaoler and prison warden. Not only do we have James Mill 
expressly advancing a notion of the Panopticon in the guise of the press to be 
applied to wider society, we also have him asserting a specific type of morality, a 
morality that is tied incontrovertibly to utilitarian consequences. 
Every body believes and proclaims, that the universal practice of the 
moral virtues would ensure the highest measure of human 
happiness; no one doubts that the misery which, to so deplorable a 
degree, over spreads the globe, while men injure men, and instead of 
helping and benefiting, supplant, defraud, mislead, pillage, and 
oppress, one another, would thus be nearly exterminated, and 
something better than the dreams of the golden age would be 
realised on the earth. Toward the attainment of this most desirable 
state of things, nothing in the world is capable of contributing so 
much as the full exercise of truth upon all immoral actions, - all 
actions, the practice of which is calculated to lessen the amount of 
human happiness. According to this view, the justice of which it is 
impossible to dispute, the evil incurred by forbidding the declaration 
of truth upon all immoral actions is incalculable. 85 
Here then we can observe that a utilitarian free press can at the same time be a 
censorial press, coercing, however subtly, the moral framework of society and 
imposing upon society, the rules of the game. This is how, for utilitarian praxis, 
an assertion of freedom of the press is at the same time an assertion of moral 
censorship. In the same way that the press is used to censure government within 
the context of the accountability argument, individuals too are held accountable 
84 Mill, Political Writings, 'Essay on Liberty of the Press', p. 107. 
85 Mill, Political Writings, 'Essay on Liberty of the Press', p. 109. 
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against the moral force of utilitarianism. As Jansen notes - 'such a system acts as 
a model for centralised control which could circumvent open (visible) conflicts 
between the masses and moral agents. '86 
4.8: Conclusion 
It has been my intention in this chapter to examine the utilitarian philosophy and 
praxis of free speech during the nineteenth century. I have provided examples of 
utilitarian justifications of a free and unstamped press and gone on to examine the 
nature of these within the context of changing historical circumstances of the 
nineteenth century. The main utilitarian arguments for freedom of the press can 
be assigned to the accountability argument identified in Chapter One, those being 
that those in power in democratic institutions should be held accountable in their 
operation of public duties. A partial component of such accountability is provided 
via a free press. I have also identified the role of education within the utilitarian 
justification of freedom of the press, providing examples of utilitarian literature 
that sought to justify freedom of the press because of its necessary contribution to 
educational welfare and its connection to the welfare of society as a whole. 
However, I have gone on to identify utilitarian praxis of freedom of the press as 
one that is inherently socially divisive and which sought to assert a middle-class 
agenda which is represented in an assertion of laissez-faire political economy. 
Moreover, the praxis of freedom of the press is identified as a praxis that is 
intimately connected to an agenda of social control, especially of the so called 
lower orders via an emphasis on moral and political paternalism. Such 
paternalism was manifested within the context of discussions about political 
economy, education and moral censorship. From this analysis, it is clear that the 
philosophical justification of freedom of the press and its actual praxis is located 
86 S. Curry Jansen, Censorship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 22. 
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within the ongoing assertion of laissez-faire during the early part of the 
nineteenth century. 
Although Bentham sought to promote democracy as the best means of achieving 
utility within society, Bentham's disciples articulated utilitarianism in such a way 
as to undennine the democratic spirit of Bentham's vision. By undennining 
Bentham in this way, we can see that the praxis of utilitarianism, specifically with 
regard to freedom of the press is keenly paternalistic and ascribes a sense of 
moral obligation that sought to constrain rather than liberate the whole of society. 
Thus we can see the restrictive force of utilitarianism, not only philosophically 
but practically. The bounds of rationalism, the force of moral obligation and the 
weight of economic doctrine ultimately forges the praxis of utilitarianism into a 
force of authoritarianism that fundamentally undennines any truly democratic 
spirit that utilitarianism may once have had by asserting the moral and political 
weight of utilitarianism. If one was to dissent from such sentiments the 'free' 
press acting almost as the social Panopticon would expose such irrationality and 
subversion. What we have then is a utilitarian praxis of freedom of speech that is 
inherently undemocratic, elitist and socially divisive, with particularly the 
working classes bearing the brunt of the utilitarian dogma. As Jansen notes the 
spirit of rationalism within utilitarianism constrains rather than liberates those 
whom it argues will benefit most: 
[ ... ] minds changed, cultivated, or colonised to facilitate the 
purposes, priorities, and plans of distant elites are not free minds. 
Panopticon control systems do not satisfactorily resolve the 
contradictions of freedom and control. They betray the egalitarian 
promise of the Enlightenment and place arbitrary constraints on 
human autonomy. They render the controller, warden or censor 
invisible and thereby permit himlher to operate outside the rules of 
participatory democracy. Moreover, they endow the sense of 
censorship with a "phantom objectivity" which makes it extremely 
resistant to criticism.87 
87 Curry Jansen. Censorship, p.24. 
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Summary 
This chapter examines the utilitarian arguments for freedom of speech and their 
praxis during the nineteenth century. The context of this can be seen as being part 
of wider shifts in emphasis from landed rule to a form of paternalistic democracy 
and the assertion of the market system. I have gone on to provide examples of 
utilitarian defences of a free and unstamped press and to examine the nature of 
these defences. The criticisms of the utilitarian defence of free speech are made, 
primarily in the context of the theme of this thesis, that being that the struggle for 
free speech during the nineteenth century and its varied philosophical constructs, 
are the result primarily of changes in social and material conditions brought about 
by the changing nature of political economy and the necessary elements of such 
an economy are partially asserted and articulated via utilitarianism. Such elements 
are the vindication of laissez-faire political economy, the socialisation of 
economic doctrines within the context of specific moral and social education and 
the maintenance of such a system by adherence to a strict moral code enforced 
partially by the press themselves. I show that though initially utilitarianism, via 
Bentham, provides a relatively straightforward justification of freedom of the 
press to support the operation of democratic institutions, utilitarianism's praxis of 
freedom of the press manages to undermine any democratic aspirations because 
of its commitment to a particularly divisive form of social engineering and 
paternalist elitism. The praxis of freedom of the press for utilitarians is 
necessarily at odds with its initial aspirations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Liberalism: Free Speech, Liberty, Equality and the Middle-
Class Ascendancy 
5.1,' Introduction 
In 1836 the reduction of the stamp tax from 4d to 1 d signalled the end of 
restrictive press legislation. It seemed that the press was now set free, as the old 
restrictions on the powers of the press gradually came into conflict with the new 
and emergent political, economic and social changes taking place within society. 
Utilitarian arguments had increasingly gained general acceptance within the 
political landscape and the force of the free market started to erode restraints on 
the press. 
Moreover, probably the most well known defence of freedom of speech emerged 
after the battle for freedom of the press was already more or less won. Such a 
defence emerged out of the development of utilitarianism, and mixed with liberal 
political thought. Indeed, so ingrained is the idea of freedom of speech within 
liberalism that in terms of the historical and philosophical development of 
freedom of speech, there can be little doubt that the development of liberalism 
and the variants of this political, economic and philosophical theory, provide the 
most well defined, if not most commonly articulated defences of free speech. To 
this day, the most common defence of freedom of speech in Western society has 
its roots in the philosophical development and articulation of freedom of speech 
which emerged from the liberal thought that came to prominence during the 
middle and latter stages ofthe nineteenth century. 
Many of the issues that contributed to the debates around freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press in the earlier parts of the nineteenth century were no longer 
relevant from the middle of the century onwards; the repeal of the stamp tax and 
the widening of the franchise all meant that the landscape of political activism 
was rapidly changing. Moreover, with the advent of mass printing and the gradual 
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opening up of commercial markets, within a framework of free enterprise, the 
press was largely deemed to be free. As official censorship declined sharply with 
the increasing mass production of newspapers it became no longer expedient to 
pursue seditious literature, and on the whole prosecutions for sedition declined 
sharply. I So much so that many foreign radicals could only have their work 
widely distributed within Britain, as censorship of the press across Europe did not 
cease until the closing of the nineteenth century.2 
As Donald Thomas notes: 'by the latter half of the nineteenth century, the dispute 
was no longer between those who regarded liberty of the press as the only 
safeguard against tyranny or corrupt government, it was a dispute between 
believers in an absolute or utopian freedom of expression and those who saw 
freedom of expression as a political compromise.'3 The focus of attention now 
was increasingly on the threat posed by unenlightened public opinion to 
individual liberty and freedom of expression. For radicals such as John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873) in particular, this threat was perceived as acute. 
The focus of this chapter then will be on the various liberal justifications for free 
speech as examined in key philosophical and political tracts and on these 
arguments' articulation in the practice of politics mainly represented in numerous 
liberal press organs during the nineteenth century. The chapter will be structured 
as follows: it will begin by providing a broad explication of liberalism; some of 
its key philosophical parameters as well as their historical development will be 
I See Lucy Brown's Victorian News and Newspapers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). Brown 
charts the development of the commercial press in the nineteenth century with particular 
reference to how the newspaper was distributed, presented, received as well as the development 
of technology and its impact on the mass production of newspapers. She notes that 'during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the newspaper became established as part of the normal 
furniture of the life for all classes.' p. 273. 
2 See R. J. Goldstein, Political Censorship of the Arts and the Press in Nineteenth Century 
Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). 
3 D. Thomas, A Long Time Burning: The History of Literary Censorship in England (London: 
Routledge Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 214. 
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examined. From this I will move on to explore more closely liberalism's political 
philosophy of freedom of speech. In doing this, I will start by examining John 
Stuart Mill's earlier newspaper writings on freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression; this will be followed by a discussion of Mill's On Liberty, and in 
particular Chapter Two of this work. Following a discussion of Mill's ideas, the 
chapter then moves on to explore the implications of Mill's arguments in the light 
of his other works. By examining Mill's views on political economy and his 
discussions on equality, I suggest that Mill's desire for liberty, as expressed in On 
Liberty, may be somewhat undermined. 
Moving away from Mill, the chapter will then explore ideas behind 'The 
Association for the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge' a key middle-class 
movement which had its roots in working-class agitation, but was taken over by 
liberal elites, and which sought a complete end to all press legislation. A 
discussion of the ideas of some of the Association's supporters including leading 
liberals, Richard Cobden and John Bright will follow. The chapter will conclude 
by suggesting that the liberal praxis of freedom of speech, which was manifested 
in arguments for a free press in newspapers, pamphlets and journals, only offers 
us a 'thin' justification and cannot be identified out of context of the broader 
ideological battle between an ascendant middle-class, the aristocracy and the 
working-classes. Indeed I suggest that the mainstream liberal argument singularly 
is subsumed into a broader battle for free trade and middle-class dominance. 
5.2: One Liberalism or Many? 
In providing an exploration and analysis of liberal arguments for freedom of 
speech and their praxis, I am at once confronted with a number of problems. As 
Williams and Pearson note: 'Unlike utilitarianism, liberalism during the 
nineteenth century owed its strength not so much to a unified commitment to a 
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single idea as to the blending of a number of traditions and a whole range of 
values.'4 Also, Alan Sykes in his The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism 1776-
1988, notes that defining liberalism presents us with great difficulties. Borrowing 
from Lloyd George, Sykes suggests that liberalism as a concept is 'like picking up 
mercury with a fork, not only does it divide easily; it tends to evaporate over 
time.'5 Thus as we will see in the next chapter on socialism and freedom of 
speech, we are confronted with some awkward definitional problems in 
attempting to explore the liberal praxis of free speech, as the very nature of liberal 
political theory has no fixed base and indeed, presents us with 'varieties of 
liberalism'. Moreover, the scope, breadth and depth of liberal thought is wide and 
far reaching, it influenced many political activists during the nineteenth century. 
This definitional difficulty may not, however, be as problematic as first 
suggested. At least in philosophical terms, as freedom of speech is, as noted, most 
commonly associated with the political philosophy of liberalism, at the very least 
we should be able to glean some core or fundamental values that have impacted 
on liberalism's praxis of freedom of speech. 
Liberalism as a movement and as a political philosophy has its roots in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As I have discussed in Chapter Two, 
struggles for freedom of speech (or more accurately struggles for the toleration of 
certain opinions) went hand in hand with struggles against tyranny and oppression 
from church and state. As Bramsted and Melhuish note 'liberalism emphasised 
the rights and the potential of the individual facing the forces of tradition and of 
the old Establishment.' 'The individual and his property were regarded as 
sacrosanct so long as they did not conflict with existing laws.,6 For those who 
provided a precursor to liberalism and those who developed liberalism within the 
4 R. Pearson, & Williams G. L. Political Thought and Public Policy in the Nineteenth Century 
(London: Longman, 1982), p. 42. 
S A. Sykes, The Rise and Fall of British liberalism 1776-1988 (London: Longman, 1997), p. 1. 
6 E. K. Bramsted, & K. 1. Melhuish, Western Liberalism (New York: Longman, 1978), p. 3. 
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context of the nineteenth century, the individual was the focus point of all 
activity, social, political and economic. The individual is 'primary'. 'Freedom 
must be promoted, and social, economic and political arrangements must be 
judged in terms of their effect on the liberty of individuals.'7 In practice, this 
meant limited government intervention especially in economic affairs, the market 
should be left to itself. The only time that government should involve itself in the 
market is when there is a threat, either internal or external, to the free operation of 
market forces. In the social sphere in general, the government should not interfere 
with the activities of private individuals and the only reason government might 
have cause to enter into the affairs and dealings of private individuals, is when 
such affairs harm or threaten the liberty of others. 
Arblaster notes that 'the metaphysical and ontological core of liberalism is 
individualism. It is from this premise that the familiar commitments to freedom, 
tolerance and individual rights are derived.'8 Such a conception of liberty 
recognises that the individual should be left free from constraints so as to allow 
the 'natural' characteristics of man to flourish. John Gray9 notes that there are 
three strands of justifications of liberalism, all of which in different ways 
underpin the belief that the individual is primary. The first strand is based on a 
doctrine of natural rights; those rights that are fundamentally ascribed to human 
beings and that 'are morally superior to any social institution or contractual 
arrangement' . 10 The second strand, which draws on Kantian deontology, asserts 
that rational human beings, as agents, are ends in themselves as individual 
authors of their own values and it is down to them alone to determine their fate. 
Thirdly, there is the notion adopted by John Stuart Mill (and which has roots in 
7 G. L. Williams, Political Theory in Retrospect (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), p. 147. 
8 A. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1984), p. 15. 
91. Gray, Uberalism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986). 
10 Gray, Uberalism, p. 46. 
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his utilitarian upbringing), that there is a necessary link between happiness and 
freedom II. As such the natural consequences of a free life add to the maximisation 
of utility. As Gray asserts '[b]y enriching the classical utilitarian conception of 
happiness with Aristotelian and Humboldtian elements, Mill softened the tension 
between the moral individualism of the liberal outlook and the collectivist 
implications of the classical utilitarian goal of general welfare.'12 For Mill in this 
sense, individuality is necessary for human well being. Some of these issues will 
be explored in greater depth in the course of this chapter. However, having 
provided a brief taste of liberal political philosophy, the best course of action now 
is to move on to a more specific discussion of the liberal philosophy of freedom 
of speech, and where better to start than John Stuart Mill's political philosophy of 
free speech. 
5.3.' Preludes to On Liberty 
In focusing on J. S. Mill's arguments for freedom of speech it will be helpful to 
look at aspects of his work that were developed prior to the publication of On 
Liberty in 1859. Thus, I feel that it is useful to draw on some of Mill's work that 
can be seen as preludes or prefaces13 to On Liberty. Long before the publication of 
On Liberty, John Stuart Mill had been vigorously engaged in writing for 
newspapers and journals on topics as wide ranging as religious persecution, 
freedom of expression, the principle of utility and the value of education. 
Following the footsteps of his father, Mill the younger regularly wrote for the 
Westminster Review and the Morning Chronicle from 1822. This section will 
examine some of his earlier work as represented in these radical vehicles. 
II Mill moved away from the narrow Benthamite view of happiness and embraced happiness as 
a combination of higher and lower pleasures. 
12 Gray, Liberalism, p. 53. 
13 I have borrowed this phrase from the title of a collection of Mill's early newspaper writings 
edited by Bernard Wishy entitled Pre/aces to Liberty, Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill 
(Boston: Beacon Hill, Beacon Press, 1959). 
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It should be noted that the flavour of Mill's writing in his formative intellectual 
years was overwhelmingly utilitarian, and as such, the temptation to include the 
early writings of the younger Mill in the previous chapter was strong. However, I 
feel that it is necessary to include at least a flavour of Mill's early utilitarian 
writings in this part of the thesis, primarily because it is Mill's link with 
utilitarianism that many critics argue undermine Mill's views in On Liberty. Also, 
I have included examples of his early work to capture a sense of movement in 
Mill's thought from his raw utilitarianism of the 1820s and 1830s to a more 
complex utilitarianism that is evident in Mill's later works. 
Mill's newspaper writings spanned more than fifty years, from his early radical 
pronouncements and critiques in the Traveller, when he was just sixteen years 
old, to his last newspaper article published (after his death) in the Examiner in 
July, 1873. His words appeared in over twenty seven newspapers in which Mill 
wrote widely on politics, economics, law and philosophy, contributing 'practical 
and theoretical advice' .14 Mill also wrote regularly on French politics in the 
1830s, in the Examiner, and on the condition of Ireland in the Morning Chronicle 
during the mid 1840s. Focussing on these newspaper writings will highlight the 
importance that Mill placed on a free press as we see examples of his arguments 
in practice. 
Although as Robson points out, the newspaper was not Mill's main medium, he 
knew all too well the value of newspapers as their impact was immediate and 
widespread. IS Very early on in Mill's writing career he took an interest in press 
legislation and advanced the notion that prosecutions against the press were 
indefensible. In 1823 Mill wrote three letters to the Morning Chronicle 
concerning the toleration of free discussion in response to Richard Carlile's 
14 A. P. Robson. editors introduction in John Stuart Mill. Collected Works. Vol. XXII (London: 
University of Toronto Press. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. xix. 
IS Robson, Collected Works, Vol. XXII, p. xix. 
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prosecution for blasphemous libel. The letters, signed Wickliff, were Mill's first 
public attack on press prosecutions and in these letters it is clear that Mill has 
been heavily influenced by his utilitarian upbringing, as may of the themes 
already noted in the utilitarian justifications for freedom of the press resonate 
here. Most strikingly, Mill highlights the familiar notion that the 'exclusion of 
discussion' has consequences which hinder utility, as the search for truth would 
be obscured: 
I shall first observe, that as it is generally allowed that free 
discussion contributes to the propagation of truth, and as this 
assertion is never controverted on the great majority of subjects, it is 
incumbent on those who declare against toleration to point out some 
reason which prevents the general rule from being applicable to this 
particular case; to shew that free discussion, which on almost every 
other subject is confessedly advantageous to truth, in this particular 
case unfortunately contributes to the progress of error. 16 
Thus (unsurprisingly) we can observe the strong utilitarian disposition within the 
above quote; Mill is very aware that the search for truth is necessary for the 
maximisation of utility and this series of letters is well in keeping with the 
utilitarian stance against press prosecutions of the day, even though as Wishy 
notes, 'the Benthamites had no great taste for Carlile personally [ ... J they did care 
about freedom of the press'l1. Just from these early examples, we can see that 
Mill's commitment to the search for the truth is clear. Moreover, there is evidence 
here that the origins of one of the arguments later to be developed in On Libertyl8, 
is being formulated and worked through i.e. the notion that freedom of discussion 
promotes truth. 
16 J. S. Mill, 'Morning Chronicle', 281h Jan. 1823. In John Stuart Mill, Collected Works, 
Newspaper Writings, Vols. XXII-XXV, edited by A. P. Robson and J. M. Robson (London: 
University of Toronto Press, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), Vol. XXII, p. 10. 
17 Wishy, Prefaces to Liberty, p. 39. 
18 And to be explored in greater depth later in this chapter. 
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Another example of the younger Mill's early activity which hints at arguments 
later to surface in On Liberty concerns a review of an 'anonymous' pamphlee9 
which attacked the corrupt and irrational Libel Laws, a pamphlet entitled the 
Constitutional Association. Practice of the Courts. - Trial by Jury in Libel Cases 
(1824). In his review, Mill extols the virtues of the pamphlet and suggests that it 
'should be read by everyone who desires to know the extent of the boasted liberty 
of the press, which we are taught to believe, is the birthright of Englishmen. '20 
Also within the article, Mill highlights the role of the Judge, Jury selector and 
Jury in deciding the outcome of a libel case, arguing that because the Jury are not 
experts in the law they are often directed in their deliberations by the Judge. The 
result for Mill is that the Libel Laws are in effect made by the Judge. More 
importantly, however, Mill suggests a conflict of interest, as normally the Jury 
could if it wished ignore the Judges direction and 'set aside' his opinion. 
However, he points out that in Libel cases this rarely happens as the courts nearly 
always employ a 'packed Special Jury' and as such are necessarily selected from 
a 'small number of persons' who are already known to the Jury selector. Mill 
highlights the relationship between the Jury selector and the Judge arguing that 
juries are selected for their compliance to the directions of the Judge: 
We assert, that, if a public officer is placed in a situation where his 
employers will expect him to serve them at the expense of the public 
- where he must content them or forfeit his subsistence, evil cannot 
fail to ensue.21 
Mill does not blame specific individuals for this conflict of interests, it is the 
system of Law itself that is inefficient and so individual interests are served rather 
than the public interest by Jury packing in Libel cases. What Mill is attempting to 
19 The pamphlet was written by Francis Place and Mill would have been well aware of the 
authorship of the pamphlet 
20 J. S. Mill, 'Place's On the Law of Libel', Morning Chronicle, Jan. lsi, 1824. See, Collected 
Works, Vol. XXII, p. 91. 
21 Mill, 'Place's On the Law of Libel', Collected Works, Vol. XXII. p. 93. 
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show here is that the public interest is neglected for particular gain. Again, we see 
a utilitarian analysis which cites the narrow interests of the few being served by 
the process of Law which, because of the make up of such as system, necessarily 
leads, in Mill's own words, to 'evil'. For Mill here, the interests of the many are 
sacrificed for the interests ofthe few. 
As noted, Mill was also engaged in writing on the affairs of France and on 
occasion wrote about French press legislation. In an article entitled 'The French 
Law Against the Press', Mill criticises a recent restrictive press decree passed in 
France. Mill notes that the decree is 'one of the most monstrous outrages on the 
idea of freedom of discussion ever committed by the legislature of a country 
pretending to be free. >22 Moreover, Mill highlights the hypocrisy of political 
parties which, whilst not in power advocate freedom of the press, but as soon as 
they attain power, reject it - '[h]ow long shall we continue to see the freedom of 
opinion, which all parties profess while they are on the oppressed side, thrown off 
by them as soon as they are in the majority?'23 Interestingly the article not only 
criticises (as one would expect) government restrictions on the press and political 
hypocrisy, but seemingly against all other previous inclinations, almost provides 
what can be described as a justification of violent insurrection; or at least an 
excuse for those who might wish to rise up and violently challenge government. 
He argues: 
A government cannot be blamed for defending itself against 
insurrection. But it deserves the severest blame if to prevent 
insurrection it prevents the promulgation of opinion. If it does so, it 
actually justifies insurrection in those to whom it denies the use of 
peaceful means to make their opinions prevail. [ ... ] Who can blame 
persons who are deeply convinced of the truth and importance of 
their opinions, for asserting them by force, when that is the only 
22 J. S. Mill, 'The French Law Against the Press', In Spectator, August 191il, 1848, p. 800., 
Collected Works, Vol. XXV, p. 1116. 
23 Mill, 'The French Law Against the Press', Collected Works, Vol. XXV, p. 1117. 
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means left them of obtaining even a hearing? When their mouths are 
gagged, can they be reproached for using their anns?24 
Mill seems then to be arguing that if a government inhibits 'the promulgation of 
opinion' and in doing so, by definition, thus prevents any 'peaceful means' open 
to the public to convey their opinions, then the public is perfectly entitled to 
engage in physical force to make their point. However, the statement runs 
contrary to his later pronouncements in On Liberty, as Mill famously states, 'the 
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their member is self protection. '25 
Thus we have a contradiction. On the one hand Mill is arguing that violent 
insurrection is defensible if the government withholds the right to freedom of 
expression, and on the other hand, Mill notes that the only reason that violence 
can be used is for self protection. Mill continues: 
[ ... ] by what right can the Assembly now reprobate any future 
attempt, either by Monarchists or Socialists, to rise in anns against 
the Government? It denies them free discussion. It says they shall 
not be suffered to bearing their opinions to the touchstone of the 
public reason and conscience.26 
Such a statement could not be put down to the immature writings of a young man, 
as Mill was forty two when he wrote this. However, Mill could be excused a 
certain amount of leeway here, as the article on the French press restrictions was 
written eleven years before On Liberty. Moreover, a moral justification of 
violence could well fit into utilitarian philosophy, as the emphasis is on 
maximisation of utility of the majority, ~d as such overrides particularist 
interests of the minority. However, as Williams notes, Mill sympathised 'to a 
greater or lesser extent' with 'revolutions' and 'revolts' across the globe, 
24 Mill, 'The French Law Against the Press', Collected Works, Vol. XXV, p. 1118. 
25 J. S. Mill, 'On Liberty', Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, p. 223. 
26 Mill, 'The French Law Against the Press'. Collected Works. Vol. XXV. p. 118. 
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particularly during the 1830s and 1 840s. 27 Indeed he notes that Mill in his day was 
not seen as the 'old fashioned moderate', or the traditional liberal, as he is often 
credited today. For Williams (echoing Rees's reflections on Mill28), argues that 
Mill was perceived by his contemporaries largely as a dangerous radical who 
rejected much of the English Victorian mentality, inspired instead by French and 
German radical thought. Mill's perspective is to be seen as typically un-English, 
with his rejection of custom and tradition, and his embrace of radical change. 
Seen in this broader contextual light, Mill's defence of violent insurrection can be 
viewed not so much as a contradiction; rather, it could be viewed as a component 
of praxis that emerges in the work of a progressive - albeit to some dangerous -
radical. 
In a similar vein to his utilitarian forebears, Mill cites the stamp taxes as a key 
vehicle by which the government impeded the spread of useful knowledge. Mill 
even criticised the role of the Post Office for its part in enforcing the taxes on 
knowledge. In an article entitled 'Conduct of the Ministry with Respect to the 
Post-Office Department, and the Payment of Officers by Fees', Mill attacks the 
levy on newspapers gained by the clerks of the Post Office from the franking of 
newspapers. Mill, in more typically liberal vein, then goes on to describe the 
practice and links it to the evils of monopolisation, and monopolisation of 
newspapers in particular. Mill argues that such taxation is for the benefit of 
preserving a monopoly of the press and runs contrary to widespread interests 
which are best served by the market: 
It is this, the anti-popular instinct together, which makes them 
uphold the taxes on newspapers and political publications. Who are 
their advisers in this? The daily newspapers! Monopolists, the 
market which they now engross exclusively. Ministers little know 
27 G. L. Williams, 'J. S. Mill: Then and Now'. Politics, Vol. 15, No.3, (1985), pp. 183-189, 
p. 184. 
28 See Rees, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), especially 
Chapter III. 
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the store of public hatred which they are laying up for themselves by 
this, and their defence of the com laws, and one or two things more, 
which the mass of the working people feel to their heart's core, and 
which a Ministry, unexceptional in every other respect, could not 
possibly persevere in for three or four years without becoming as 
odious as the Castlereagh Ministry in its worst times.29 
Mill here in the 1830s is presenting a slightly different argument, and one that is 
later taken up in the 1850s by Richard Cobden, which intimates at government 
complicity with the established newspaper press in maintaining a monopoly of 
the newspaper market in return for generous reporting. The market itself would 
allow for the circulation of ideas, free from government intervention and interest 
which is symptomatic of corruption and greed. Thus rather than an assertion of 
truth, we have an attack on monopolies and on government taxation. An 
argument that hints at the assertion of individual liberty above all else. 
Another theme which emerges early in Mill's writings on the press, and one taken 
up at greater length in On Liberty (but as we will see, much more critically), is a 
consideration of the role and value of public opinion. Moreover, it is the value of 
public opinion which Mill sees as indispensable to the struggle for freedom of the 
press: 
He will learn from this pamphlet, that the rulers of this country 
possess as great a power of suppressing obnoxious publications by 
fine and imprisonment as they can desire: that the comparative free 
discussion which we enjoy exists only by convenience, and would 
not exist at all, were it not forced upon the government by an 
enlightened public opinion.30 
Ten years later, Mill again intimates the potential role of public opinion in 
advancing freedom of discussion in France, inferring that public opinion needs to 
29 J. S. Mill, 'Conduct of the Ministry with Respect to the Post-Office Department, and the 
Payment of Officers by Fees'. Examiner, Nov. 10th, 1833, 706-7. Collected Works, Vol. XXIII, 
p.645. 
30 J. S. Mill, 'Place's On the Law of Libel', Morning Chronicle, January 1", 1824, p. 2. 
Collected Works, Vol. XXII, p. 91. 
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be 'sufficiently advanced' before any progress can be made. Commenting on the 
progression of a law not dissimilar to the Six Acts, Mill notes that: 
There is no doubt that it [the law] will pass; for public opinion is not 
yet sufficiently advanced among the French, to maintain any 
struggle on behalf of freedom of discussion for its own sake, when 
they take no personal or party interest in those who are victims of its 
infringement. 31 
Clearly such endorsements of the potential of public opinion may be perceived as 
running contrary to Mill's later concerns of public opinion stifling individuality 
and diversity as noted in On Liberty. However, in both of the examples cited 
above, Mill is clear that it is an enlightened or an advanced public opinion that is 
necessary to offset corruption and create an open society. It is the raised 
consciousness of the public that will ensure advancement in society within the 
context of Mill's ideal political community and not the public opinion of 
contemporary France, (and Victorian England) with its narrow interests and low 
horizons. 
In order to raise these horizons, Mill was sure that education was the key. In 
another passage on the importance of education we can see more clearly a crucial 
feature of utilitarian philosophy that Mill embraced, one that echoes quite 
resonantly some of the key sentiments of the previous chapter and one that stayed 
with Mill throughout his life. Specifically, we might expect justifications for 
education that enhance the search for truth and the discovery of that which might 
enhance knowledge and inhibit ignorance. A free press, of course, was essential 
to this: 
Another question, which it does not suit those who make the 
ignorance of the people a plea for enslaving them to put it, is, why 
are they ignorant? because to this question there can be only one 
31 J. S. Mill, 'French News', Examiner, February ~, 1834, pp. 88-9. Collected Works. Vol. 
XXIII, p. 683. 
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answer, namely, that if they are ignorant, it is precisely because that 
discussion, which alone can remove ignorance, has been withheld 
from them. And although their masters may find it convenient to 
speak of their ignorance as incurable, we take the liberty of 
demurring to this conclusion, until the proper remedy shall have 
been tried. This remedy is, instruction: and of instruction, discussion 
is the most potent instrument. Discussion, therefore, has a necessary 
tendency to remedy its own evils.32 
Thus we see above examples, some raw and immature, of Mill's early 
considerations on liberty of the press. Evident are strong utilitarian overtones that 
stress accountability and openness, but also an assertion of the value of truth as a 
public good. Moreover, in the earlier writings, we see Mill starting to generate a 
sense of the value of individual liberty and the virtues of unfettered expression. 
These themes and others are more fully explored below in my discussion of On 
Liberty. 
5.4: The 'Classic Defence': On LiberW3 
We can see then, that in the early passages examined above, Mill has many 
sympathies with the utilitarian analysis, although in some of the passages noted, it 
is evident that Mill is starting to shift in his analysis towards a mode of thinking 
that surfaces more starkly in On Liberty, and later still in Utilitarianism (1861).34 
Mill was charged (and still is to this day) with not dealing with some of those 
'shaky foundations', as the tensions between a rights based theory present in On 
32 J. S. Mill, 'An article on The Law of Libel' and 'On the Law of Libel; with Strictures on the 
self-styled Constitutional Association', Westminster Review, April, 1825; Collected Works, Vol. 
XXI, p. II. 
33 The title of 'classic defence' of free speech has been given to Mill's argument in On Liberty 
by Alan Haworth in his book Free Speech (London: Routledge, 1998). I will return to some of 
Haworth's remarks on On Liberty later in this section. 
34 I am not asserting here the 'two Mill's' thesis, (see below) only that Mill's utilitarianism 
developed a more complex, more empathetic and less prescriptive tone in later works. 
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Liberty and the consequentialism of utilitarianism as a moral theory are seen by 
some as irreconcilable.3s 
What has come to be known as the classic liberal position on freedom of speech 
was developed by John Stuart Mill in his book On Liberty (1859). There have of 
course been many commentaries, critiques and re-evaluations of this classic text 
and it is not my intention here to add to them in any great detaip6 However, given 
that the period under investigation provided Mill's often abstract arguments with 
some real substance, I will, for the purposes of clarity, provide a brief outline of 
the main arguments that are developed by Mill in this work, and some of the 
criticisms that have been made against his arguments during his time and more 
recently. 
On Liberty was written in a context of great social and political change. Powers 
of the press were emerging as a result of the repeal of the stamp tax, and new 
franchise arrangements of 1832 meant that the political landscape and the 
structures on which this landscape was built were starting to change. With this 
change came a shift, albeit a minor one, in the power base of society. The rule of 
law was no longer the result of a closed Parliament, but was now to be defined as 
a result of an albeit limited, participatory democracy. For some, and for Mill in 
particular, this new democracy should not be embraced without some notes of 
caution. Most notably, as official censorship declined, the potential of another 
form of censorship, this time emerging from public opinion, grew stronger; a note 
3S For a discussion of this area of Mill studies see J. F. Stephen, Liberty Equality and Fraternity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967 [1873]); G. Himmelfarb, On Liberty and 
Liberalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974); J. Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Defence (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); G. L. Williams, 'J. S. Mill on the Greeks', Po/is, Vol. 4, 
No.2 (1982) pp. 1-17; J. C. Rees, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), and G. L. Williams, 'The Greek Origins of J. S. Mill's Happiness' Utilitas, Vol. 8, No. 
1 (1996), pp. 5-14. 
36 Since the publication of On Liberty in 1859 there have been many re-evaluations, critiques 
and commentaries to On Uberty; some of which have been included in this brief survey, others, 
for reasons of space and appropriateness have not. 
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of caution was needed against such a threat. Such a note came from On Liberty. 
A.W. Levi37 notes that the intention of On Liberty is to 'examine the nature and 
limits of the power which society can legitimately exercise over the 
individual. ... ,)8 Mill not only asserted freedom from governmental interference 
but also from 'social' tyranny in the fonn of the weight of public opinion which 
was now more likely, due to the new representative system of government. From 
this premise, Mill asserts a commitment to liberty of thought and discussion 
which emanates from an obligation to individuality and its concomitant 
commitment to human flourishing. In On Liberty, Mill's defence of freedom of 
speech, or more accurately freedom of thought and discussion,39 takes the fonn of 
a number of interrelated arguments and it is worth drawing attention to these here. 
At the end of Chapter Two of On Liberty Mill summarises them so: 
Firstly, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for 
aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our 
own infallibility. Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, 
it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and 
since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or 
never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions 
that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. 
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole 
truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and 
earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held 
in a manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension of feeling of its 
rational grounds. And not only this, but fourthly, the meaning of the 
doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and 
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma 
becoming a mere fonnal profession, inefficacious for good, but 
31 In 'The Value of Freedom: Mill's Liberty (1859-1959)' in P. Radcliffe, Limits of Liberty, 
Studies of Mill's On Liberty. (Belmont: California, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966). 
38 Levi, 'The Value of Freedom', p. 7. 
39 In Free Speech Alan Haworth asserts that freedom of speech is in short, an 'umbrella term' 
for a number of distinct freedoms. Freedom of thought and discussion are but one, freedom of 
the press another; as is freedom to participate in political meetings and rallies. I feel that this 
umbrella term is sufficient and do not intend to engage in semantics on this topic; needless to 
say in my introductory notes I provided a defence of my use of terminology and see no reason 
to dissent from this. 
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cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real 
heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.4O 
The first overriding premise - and one which is grounded in his early socialisation 
to the principles of Positivist rationalism - is that the search for truth should not 
be impeded as this can only harm the progress of mankind. Moreover, to silence 
any opinion is to assume that the silenced opinion is wrong, thus assuming 
infallibility. Mill notes: 
[ ... ] The opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may 
possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its 
truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide 
the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from 
the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because 
they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the 
same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an 
assumption of infallibility.41 
Mill thus posits that any person's opinions, unless they are open to refutation, 
necessarily claim an assertion of certainty in all cases and at all times. For Mill, 
this runs contrary to his Positivist training which emphasised the testing and re-
testing of hypotheses and assumptions. As we can see, Mill is not reticent about 
his belief in such a process: 
As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are not longer 
disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-
being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and 
gravity of truths which have reached the point of being 
uncontested.42 
Mill then moves on to note that even if the opinion that is silenced is false, to gag 
it is to deny that there may be some part of the opinion which is true or contains 
some truth. In gagging this we are jeopardising any future inquiry. Only if 
40 Mill, 'On Liberty', Collected Works, Vol., XVIII, p. 258. 
4. Mill, 'On Liberty', Collected Works, Vol., XVIII, p. 229. 
42 Mill, 'On Liberty', Collected Works, Vol., XVIII, p. 250. 
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untruths are allowed to be aired can we affinn any movement towards the truth, 
as it is untrue opinions' 'collision' with true opinions that make the move towards 
greater understanding possible. 'The discovery of truth is facilitated by the 
"collision"43 of opinions which takes place when ideas are discussed.' As Mill 
famously states: 
[ ... ] the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, 
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing 
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those 
who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived the opportunity 
of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as 
great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of 
truth, produced by its collision with error.44 
Thus once an approximation of the truth is achieved, the continued testing of this 
assertion and the ongoing search for truth is still necessary in order to test and 
ensure the validity of the approximation; in a sense an almost organic 'living 
truth' is sought after, through ongoing assault from the opinion's dissenters. 
This dynamic sense of progressive truth is emphasised when Mill brings in the 
constraining notion of prejudice and how prejudice can impact negatively on the 
vitality of truth. Mill here asserts that even if we are sure that a truth is just that, 
and uncontrovertibly so, unless we contest it with regularity, people will lose the 
essence of the truth, and it will become an unsubstantiated prejudice: 
[ ... ] when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at 
first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief 
presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the 
belief except the fonnularies, or to give it a dull torpid assent, as if 
accepting it on. trust dispensed with the necessity of realising it in 
consciousness, or testing it by personal experience; until it almost 
43 A. Haworth, Free Speech (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 4. 
44 Mill, 'On Liberty', Colltcted Works, Vol., XVIII, p. 229. 
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ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human 
being.4s 
From this position we can see that Mill views prejudice as a potential threat to the 
search for truth in that the vitality of a true opinion is lost as it ceases to be 
engaged by mental industry. The final primary point that that Mill makes in 
Chapter Two follows on from the last, and relates to the status of an untested 
opinion, in that if it is not rigorously contested it will be received with some 
suspicion by rational agents, and worse, it will become nothing more than a dead 
dogma. 
In sum, what Mill has in mind here is that constraints which hinder the ongoing 
movement of knowledge should be removed so as to ensure that the free 
circulation of thought and discussion allows a movement towards an 
approximation of the truth which can only benefit mankind. Such restraints might 
be institutional, as in restrictions on the press; but Mill is more concerned with 
those constraints which stem from the tide of public opinion and which might 
quash individuality and the development of the full capacities of individuals as 
diverse beings. What Mill is concerned with here is that diversity should be 
encouraged through the lack of formal and informal social constraints. If only 
limited constraints remained - those which protected individual liberty - then not 
only would an approximation or movement towards truth be possible, but 
mankind would flourish as each individual would live to their full potential, 
unhindered by government or unenlightened public opinion. 
Clearly, this view emanates from a PositivistlEnlightenment view that the search 
for the truth is necessary for human fulfilment, furthermore, the truth or some 
approximation of it is attainable by unconstrained human intellect and mental 
industry. It should be clear from the discussion above that one of the key 
4S Mill, 'On Liberty', Collected Works, Vol., XVIII, p. 248. 
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components of Mill's argument is the idea that freedom of speech is prioritised 
over other sorts of activity because of its propensity to activate a movement 
towards the truth, or at least an apprehension of the truth. 
At this point, I refer again to the points made in Chapter One in my discussion of 
the typologies of free speech arguments. In Mill, we can see here an assertion of a 
version of the truth argument in that the open discussion of ideas leads to closer 
approximation to or 'livelier impression' of the truth. However, placing truth 
above all other social values as Mill seems to do has been questioned, for 
example by Frederick Schauer.46 Schauer argues that a search for some 
approximation of the truth is not necessarily superior to any other social interest;47 
even if we are confronted with the truth and falsehood side by side, it does not 
necessarily follow that falsehood would be rejected. In other words why should 
the notion of objective 'truth' be placed upon such a high mantle, as many people 
would fiercely reject what positivists would term 'objective facts' in favour of 
particular belief systems or cultural norms? Moreover, is it good theoretical 
practice to assume that rationality should always triumph over irrationality? 
Phenomenologists would say not. However, again we must contextualise Mill and 
reassert the relevance of his Positivist/Enlightenment upbringing. Even if Mill did 
not believe in absolute truths in the Platonic sense, he did regard truth as a higher 
social value. As we saw with the Philosophic Radicals in the previous Chapter, 
the value of truth both in terms of its social significance and as a means to 
achieving greater understanding is overwhelming. For Mill, as the Utilitarians 
before him, the truth would provide the answer to questions pertaining to the 
problems of society. What Mill believed was that if people had unfettered access 
to all opinions, and if people were allowed to rehearse and debate such opinions, 
46 F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982). 
47 Schauer, Free Speech. p. 23. 
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rational outcomes would follow; rational outcomes which would benefit all 
society. 
In tenns of political praxis then, how should we interpret Mill's arguments? The 
press, if left unfettered, would contribute to the increasing rationality of the 
people, and as the people became more rational, they would be able to reach a 
rational consensus about the organisation of politics and society. In doing so they 
would be in a position to dispel the ignorance and prejudice that governments had 
hitherto depended on to maintain their power base. Thus as we saw in Chapter 
Four, the increase in the sum of rationality would benefit society as a whole. 
Again, we can see elements of this argument in Paine's Rights of Man, but Mill's 
argument has more of an applicatory sophistication than that of Paine, in that Mill 
is asserting the value of a particular type of activity which in his mind promotes 
an increased sum of rationality in the people which implicitly aids the search for 
truth. Such activity is apparent in Chapter Two of On Liberty. 'The argument 
from truth is very much a child of the Enlightenment, and of the optimistic view 
of the rationality and perfectibility of humanity it embodied. '48 
However, a key question for Mill, particularly in relation to arguments for 
freedom of the press is: is it the same (as it has to be for Mill) to say that the 
activities of freedom of discussion and opinion amount to the same sort of 
activities as a free press? Mill would have us believe that indeed they do; freedom 
of the press and freedom of thought and discussion are for Mill the same sort of 
activities that provide a movement towards the truth. However, Haworth argues 
that this particular feature of Mill's argument is difficult to sustain in general as it 
is based on what he terms the 'seminar model' of speech in which 'the chances of 
finding the truth are enhanced when it is possible to constantly pit ideas, one 
against the other in an arena of debate',49 an arena not dissimilar from a seminar 
48 Schauer. Free Speech. p. 26. 
49 Haworth. Free Speech. p. 27. 
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situation. He notes that this quite particularistic arena for discussion falls outside 
the bounds of a large number of instances of speech activity and can only really 
apply within a particular conception of speech activity; i.e. not unlike those of a 
seminar. Thus in terms of Haworth's analysis, he is not wrong to suggest that the 
seminar model is indeed particularistic and confined to a quite distinct set of 
activities. 
However, what Haworth fails to acknowledge sufficiently enough, is the context 
from which the so-called seminar model stems: that being the arena of the free 
press. 50 The press in Mill's day provides a living example of what Haworth terms 
the seminar model, as ideas and arguments were pitted against each other in the 
pages of many radical newspapers and pamphlets. As we have seen, Mill himself 
vigorously contributed to the press and it is no accident that this was the case as 
he saw the arena of the press as, to adapt Haworth's phrase - a mass seminar, in 
which ideas and thoughts could be expressed openly and contested within the 
context of the free exchange of ideas. 
Another way of conceptualising Mill's principle, which again is linked to the free 
exchange of ideas, is the free market place of ideas metaphor. 5 I Such a metaphor 
asserts that as in the free market in which there is a free exchange of goods and 
services, and from this free exchange the best product or service emerges as a 
result of market demand; accordingly in the free exchange of ideas and opinions, 
the truth emerges in a similar way. However, Gordons2 notes that the marketplace 
metaphor does not accurately represent Mill's views on freedom of speech in On 
Liberty; indeed she points out that Mill never actually used the term; noting that 
50 Haworth does make a passing reference to journalistic activity, but not sufficient to sway him 
from his premise. 
51 See Schauer, Free Speech, pp. 15-17; also, R. P. Wolf, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1968). 
S2 In J. Gordon, 'Mill and the "Marketplace of Ideas"'. Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 23, 
No.2 Summer, (1997) pp. 235-249. 
191 
when Mill talks of ensuring that all opinions are not to be stifled by public 
opinion, he is 'going beyond any mere passive tolerance of ideas contrary to 
received opinion. '53 She argues that rather than a mere allowance of opinion, there 
is an active encouragement by Mill for minority opinions to be aired.54 Moreover, 
Mill puts the 'highest value on the speech of those who are the least numerous 
and/or who have the least power in society at any given time. '55 This, she argues, 
does not fit into the market metaphor and even though she does not argue that a 
'market mechanism' would not suppress opinion and actively allow the free 
expression of ideas, this model of free speech, even if it did allow all viewpoints 
and opinions to be heard, is not representative of Mill's position. She argues that 
because Mill's position goes further than merely allowing the free expression of 
all ideas: 'we are compelled to give special consideration to certain of those ideas 
that are voiced by the minority. ' 56 
Gordon correctly asserts that Mill does not develop On Liberty to answer key 
questions such as: what does it mean in practical terms to countenance and 
encourage minority opinions? Through what mechanism ought we bring it about 
that the minority opinion is countenanced and encouraged? And should such a 
mechanism be governmental? She rightly has reservations about the 
'marketplace' metaphor. However, it is my contention that she overplays the 
extent to which the language of the market has been 'corrupted' by our 
contemporary understanding of the market, although (and as she notes) Mill 
would reject many of the consequences of our free market system, it is not the 
contemporary market system, that Mill's marketplace of ideas is associated with; 
it is the nineteenth century emerging free market, which was based on the ideas 
that Mill supported actively throughout his life. Moreover, the free market in 
53 Gordon, 'Mill and the "Marketplace of Ideas"'. p. 239. 
54 Again. the issue of the value of diversity emerges. 
55 Gordon. 'Mill and the "Marketplace of Ideas"', p. 240. 
56 Gordon, 'Mill and the "Marketplace of Ideas"'. p. 240. 
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tenns of the battle of ideas within the free press is something that Mill actively 
engaged in and encouraged. Of course Mill was sure to support and ensure that all 
ideas, even those of minorities, be heard, just as within a free market, there is 
active encouragement of innovation in the development of 'products', 'goods' 
and 'services'. All products and services are developed initially in a small number 
at their inception, only after their launch into the market place are they judged and 
succeed or fail on their merit, as is the same with ideas and opinions. I am not 
arguing that Gordon is wrong to highlight inadequacies in this metaphor, but 
fundamentally, Gordon attempts to make Mill less of an apologist for the free 
market than he ultimately is. The market place of ideas metaphor may be 
inappropriate but it is not inconsistent with Mill's belief in the value of the free 
exchange of goods and services. In again referring to the typologies outlined in 
Chapter One, we see that Mill's main argument is one that asserts truth, and the 
ongoing search for truth as primary. However, it should be also evident from the 
discussion above that in order to attain truth, complete liberty is necessary. Mill's 
stress on the value of individual liberty is of course fundamental to his arguments 
in On Liberty. Without freedom, the search for truth would be impossible. Thus 
in addition to the truth argument, we also have in equal measure the liberty 
argument, and it is this I will tum to in the next section. 
Having outlined some of the main elements of Mill's arguments as found in 
Chapter Two of On Liberty, and placed them within the context of the truth 
argument, it is now necessary for me to look at how Mill's arguments stand up 
within the broader context of his work. I suggest that though Mill's arguments do 
offer a compelling justification for liberty of thought and action, and of course 
speech, it is within the context of the praxis of such arguments and within the 
framework of Mill's other works that Mill's arguments for freedom of speech are 
undennined. Indeed, I argue that the operational validity, i.e. the actual playing 
out of Mill's arguments is jeopardised by his more powerful commitment to 
political and economic liberalism, a commitment that has serious implications for 
any philosophical justification of freedom of speech. In order to justify this 
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assertion, it is necessary for me to look a little more closely on Mill's views on 
equality. 
5.5: Mill. Liberty and Equality 
It is my argument that the notion of equality is an important component within an 
exploration of the praxis of freedom of speech. As we have seen in Chapter Four, 
the utilitarian assertion of a free press was primarily intended to galvanise the 
middle-class ascendancy and socialise the working-classes into the acceptance of 
the inequality brought about by market forces. Thus the utilitarian praxis of 
freedom of speech is itself particularistic to specific interests and therefore cannot 
stand up in practice as an unproblematic justification for freedom of speech. For 
utilitarians, the praxis of their arguments for freedom of speech undermines any 
truly democratic aspirations that Bentham might originally have had. 
For Mill too, it is necessary to examine the implications of his work, not only 
within the social and political context of his day, but also within the context of his 
other works. For example, how do Mill's arguments in On Liberty sit with the 
social and political system of his time, and more importantly, how do Mill's other 
political beliefs rest with his arguments in On Liberty? In this section I intend to 
highlight some of the difficulties Mill had with the concept of equality, mainly 
reflected initially in his distrust of certain aspects of socialist thought. Greater 
tensions emerge when one attempts to reconcile the notion of liberty, partiCUlarly 
in relation to the socio-economic system which Mill defended, with some of the 
egalitarian sentiments which emerged later in Mill's life. Indeed I highlight the 
inherent assertion of inequality as a crucial component of Mill's political 
philosophy, and which ultimately creates tensions with Mill's justification of 
freedom of speech and fundamentally its political praxis. 
I suggest that Mill's view of non free-market or socialist systems is underpinned 
by his individualist view of liberty. Moreover, it is this narrow individualist view 
of liberty, that in part lies at the heart of Mill's support for the free market. I argue 
that this is where Mill's arguments for liberty founder, as it is the free market 
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economic system itselfthat undennines Mill's arguments for liberty and freedom. 
The problem is highlighted by this simple question to which I shall return: simply 
put, how can people be free to express themselves to their full potential, i.e. to be 
truly free, if they are not truly free because of the economic constraints placed on 
them that are the result ofthe free market? 
Although historically Mill has been labelled a 'liberal', he often noted that 
socialism, if it were achieved by peaceful means, would be a desirable end and 
indeed its supporters 'may eventually establish their claims to preference over the 
existing order of things,.s7 However, in terms of Mill's justification of free 
speech, he is finnly posited as a liberal and not a socialist and it is necessary here 
to see why this was the case. 
Mill, even before writing On Liberty, was aware of the potential dangers of 
collectivism. The following newspaper extract displays Mill's awareness of the 
pitfalls of socialist or communist systems.58 Mill argues that within socialism 
there is 'a great weight of confonnity', and it is lack of freedom from 'other 
peoples opinions' and 'bondage which I am afraid of in co-operative 
communities.' He continues: 
I fear that the yoke of confonnity would be made heavier instead of 
lighter; that people would be compelled to live as it pleased others, 
not as it pleased themselves; that their life would be placed under 
rules, the same for all, prescribed by the majority; and that there 
would be no escape, no independence of action left to anyone, since 
all must be members of one or another community. It is this which, 
as is contended in Political Economy, would make life monotonous; 
not freedom from want, which is a good in every sense of the word, 
and which might be ensured to all those who are born, without 
57 J. S. Mill, 'Chapters on Socialism', in Collected Works Vol. V (London: University of 
Toronto Press, 1967 [1879]), p. 748. 
58 In this article, Mill criticises George Jacob Holyoake's attack on Mill's Principles of Political 
Economy, in which, Holyoake charges Mill with propagating 'sharp pangs of hunger' in the 
poor. 
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obliging them to merge their separate as well as their working 
existence in a community. No order of society can be in my 
estimation desirable unless grounded on a maxim, that no man or 
woman is accountable to others for any conduct by which others are 
not injured or damaged.59 
Thus we have Mill asserting that the focus of his Political Economy was a 
warning against conformity to a common system and not a justification of poverty 
and hunger.60 Clearly Mill is concerned that 'socialistic' forms of organisation 
would stifle individuality liberty and diversity. However, Mill later acknowledged 
in his Chapters on Socialism that 'the various schemes for managing the 
productive resources of the country by public instead of private agency have a 
case for a trial.. . .'61 Mill was clear though that revolutionary socialism 'would 
have no effect but disastrous failure,62 The best means of achieving such a state 
was by gradual means because reformist socialism: 
has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation 
progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried 
first on a select population and extended to others as their education 
and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things 
would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself 
capable of being also a means ofreconstruction.63 
Mill was sympathetic to aspects of socialism, but he qualified this by noting that 
it was a system that could only be realised initially 'by the elite of mankind, and 
[they] have yet to prove their power of training mankind at large to the state of 
improvement which they propose. ,64 For Mill, examples of existing socialism 
were perceived as useful experiments in social organisation, in a similar vein with 
which Mill advocated all types of experimentation as positive aspects of diversity. 
S9 J. S. Mill, 'Constraints of Communism', Leader, Aug. 3,d, 1850, p. 447, Collected Works, 
Vol. XXV, pp. 1179-80. 
60 Of course these concerns were to be raised again in On Liberty. 
61 Mill, 'Chapters on Socialism' , p. 748. 
62 Mill, 'Chapters on Socialism', p. 749. 
63 Mill, 'Chapters on Socialism', p. 737. 
64 Mill, 'Chapters on Socialism', p. 748. 
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Thus socialist experiments should be encouraged, just like all types of 
experiments in living which have the desired effects on individuals. However, 
when describing the socialist critique of political economy, Mill notes that their 
analysis is produced by their 'ignorance of economic facts, and of the causes by 
which the economic phenomena of society as it is, are actually determined. '65 
Thus for Mill, socialistic economic analyses which form a key component of their 
overall critique are based upon incorrect assertions about the nature and process 
of capitalist economic theory and practice. 
It seems then there are some tensions between Mill's concerns about the potential 
threat to individual liberty from 'socialistic' political arrangements, and an 
advocacy of socialism as a possible ideal social system. This point has been 
developed further by Raimond Ottow who argues that Mill 'bridges the camps of 
liberals and leftists,66 and that elements of his political philosophy have appealing 
components to both left and right aspects of the political spectrum. Ottow notes 
that although in his Autobiography Mill calls himself a socialist, he was aware 
that he had to appeal to different elements of his contemporary audience. Ottow 
argues that Mill called himself a socialist because of so-called 'meta-reasons', 
writing 'with a double audience on view: on the one hand he demands that the 
leading strata of capitalist society see and react to the necessity for reform, and on 
the other hand, he demands that the leaders of the working-class movement 
moderate and tone down the expectations of a revolution soon to come. '67 
However, as we have seen, Mill was far more unsure of collectivism than Ottow 
implies and some further investigation is necessary. 
65 Mill, 'Chapters on Socialism' , p. 727. 
66 R. Ouow, 'Why J.S. Mill Called Himself a Socialist', History of European Ideas. Vol. 17, 
No.4 (1993), pp. 479-483, p. 479. 
670UOW, 'Why J.S. Mill Called Himself a Socialist', p. 480. 
197 
Amy Gutmann argues that the egalitarian tendencies within Mill's theories are 
strong, with an explicit commitment to participatory equality.68 She goes on to 
link Mill's commitment to rationally motivated happiness with his assertion that 
if the appropriate form of education is provided to everyone, all will be able to 
experience the range of higher pleasures equally. In Mill's day however, and as 
she points out, 'not everyone is qualified to equally rank all the pleasures; '69 but 
Gutmann asserts that if given equal 'social inheritance' and upbringing, the range 
of pleasures available, would be available to all mankind, as everyone would be 
able to pursue their own interests equally. Gutmann asserts that everyone will be 
equal in the sense that all have the range of capacities which will enable them to 
appreciate higher pleasures. What Gutmann is asserting then, is that Mill had an 
implicit egalitarian view of human nature which saw that everyone had equal 
potential capacities. It was only because of inequalities in education and 
socialisation that such differences in aspirations and abilities existed and if such 
inequalities were somehow removed, equality would prevail. 
However, Gutmann fails to adequately acknowledge the tensions between Mill's 
commitment to a level of participatory democracy and the inequalities generated 
by the market system which he supported.70 Although Mill did consider that an 
'ideal' form of society might be attainable which looked to some degree like 
socialism, Mill's commitment to the market system as an expression of individual 
liberty, and the inequalities it generated is clear. To a large degree, Mill viewed 
some of the aspirations of socialism as being attainable within the liberal market 
system: 
In truth, when competition is perfectly free on both sides, its 
tendency is not especially either to raise or to lower the price of 
68 A. Gutmann, Liberal Equality (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 48. 
69 Gutmann, Liberal Equality, p. 49. 
70 She concedes a time-bound advocacy of capitalist market economy, (p. 49) but this seems not 
to have any serious implications for her analysis. 
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articles, but to equalise it; to level inequalities of remuneration, and 
to reduce all to a general average, a result which, in so far as realised 
[ ... ] is, on Socialistic principles, desirable. 71 
It seems then in principle that Mill viewed socialistic systems that generated 
equality as desirable in the far distant future. However, Mill was unshakeable in 
his belief that some of the benefits of socialism could be generated within the 
market system with relatively little effort. This belief highlights the tensions 
noted by Ottow above, but also demonstrates Mill's lack of insight into the 
divisive nature of the market system. It seems that the contradictions were not 
evident to Mill. Macpherson echoes this view when he contends that Mill did not 
see that the suffering of the working classes was a necessary consequence of the 
market system, but a monopoly of ownership by the ruling class. Moreover, he 
notes that Mill did not see that unfreedom was a necessary result of capitalist 
institutions at all.72 He argues that Mill 'found himself helpless, unable to 
reconcile his notion of values with the political economy [ ... ] he still believed 
in.73 He notes that although Mill was: 
outstanding as an economist, [he] did not grasp the essence of the 
capitalist market economy. It was his failure to do so that enabled 
him to reject the market morality. The founding father of liberal-
democratic theory, we are compelled to say, was able to rise above 
the market morality only because he did not understand the market 
society.74 
Duncan is even more doubtful about Mill's aspirations when he asserts that Mill's 
commitment to higher and lower pleasures necessarily leads Mill to a form of 
'democratic Platonism' in which all are equal but some are more equal than 
others. It is worth quoting him at length when he argues that Mill: 
71 Mill, Chapters on Socialism, p. 251. 
72 C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 
p.99. 
73 Macpherson, Democratic Theory, pp. 174-5. 
74 Macpherson, Democratic Theory, p. 175. 
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envisaged a fruitful and productive relationship, in conditions of 
intellectual freedom, between the morally and intellectually 
advanced members of the community, and the ordinary people. 
Everybody could not develop to the same degree, exercise the same 
powers and undertake the same responsibilities, but each should be 
encouraged and aided to develop to the pitch of which he was 
capable. Mill's doubts about the rectitude of and integrity of even 
wise leaders were combined with a desire to improve all men, and 
the result was an untidy and unsuccessful compromise which can 
best be labelled democratic - or even bourgeois democratic-
Platonism. Mill did more than put a democratic fa~ade over 
capitalistic inequality, but he cannot be characterised as 
unequivocally democratic even according to his own lights. He was 
a democrat of whom it could be said that he genuinely wanted 
democracy but failed to see the large social changes which would be 
needed if it was to become reality.7s 
In my view, Duncan's points, if a little harsh, do raise some important issues in 
relation to the tensions within Mill's political ideal and his view of how these 
may be attained, and more importantly what sort of compromises may be needed 
by the market system, particularly in relation to the 'Platonist' tendencies which 
are evident at times in Mill's work. Indeed even during Mill's life similar 
tensions were highlighted by some of Mill's contemporaries, as Rees notes in his 
John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.76 In this work we see that Rees provides some 
detail of the 'hostile criticism' that Mill received from his contemporaries, one of 
the main components of which was that he was charged with placing too great a 
weight on his conception of individualism, at the expense of a greater 
understanding of the 'social whole'. It is this notion of the social whole, and the 
impact of free market capitalism, and its link to individual freedom, on the social 
whole, that Mill seems to ignore in his work On Liberty. 
75 G, Duncan, Marx and Mill, Two Views of Social Conflict and Social Harmony (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 259. 
76 J. Rees, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 
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What, however, does the above discussion of Mill's views on equality and 
socialism have to do with freedom of speech? The answer should be clear - in 
examining the praxis of Mill's arguments it has been necessary to briefly explore 
Mill's other thoughts on issues that impact on his arguments in On Liberty. We 
have seen that Mill's distrust of collectivism, because of its threat to individual 
liberty, and his commitment to free market capitalism raises serious problems for 
Mill and his arguments in On Liberty. In asserting the primacy of individual 
liberty above all else, he is jeopardising any actual commitment to real freedom 
of speech by undermining the notion of equality. It seems that Mill is blind to the 
problems of reconciling individual liberty with the consequences of the related 
market system. This problem then impacts on the praxis of his arguments for 
freedom of speech; I return to the question posed earlier: how can people be free 
to express themselves to their full potential, if they are not truly free because of 
the economic constraints placed on them that are the result of the free market? 
Unfortunately for Mill, he does not even recognise this question. As I suggest 
later in this work, a clear conception of equality has to be a necessary component 
of any meaningful argument for freedom of speech. If it can be shown that a 
strong operational commitment to equality is a necessary component of freedom 
of speech, and if Mill cannot meet the demands of a stark commitment to 
equality, as I have suggested, some doubt about Mill's arguments for freedom of 
speech are raised. 
Finally, and to recap, referring again to the typologies of freedom of speech 
arguments, Mill's arguments for freedom of speech are derivative of two types of 
argument highlighted in Chapter One. Firstly it is evident in On Liberty that the 
search for truth is a key component of human flourishing. Secondly, and closely 
related to this, the exercise of individual liberty is posited as the best possible 
mechanism for the attainment of truth, hence, the liberty argument is employed. 
Thus the liberty argument and the truth argument are brought together. My 
comments on the praxis of these arguments as employed by Mill are intended to 
provide analytical scrutiny to the praxis of these arguments. Having raised some 
questions about the operational practicality of Mill's arguments in On Liberty it is 
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now necessary to shift my emphasis towards what could be termed more 
generally liberal justifications for free speech and their praxis. In doing this, I will 
tum to those themes that were centred around augmenting and cementing the 
middle-class ascendancy. One of the chief organs of this was 'The Association for 
the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge'. 
5.6: The Middle-Class Ascendancy 
Having discussed Mill's contribution to the philosophy and praxis of free speech, 
it is worth now considering other contributions from the liberal tradition during 
the nineteenth century. I assert in this and the following section that the 
mainstream middle-class liberal argument for freedom of speech has its roots 
primarily in the liberty argument which is essentially evident in the assertion of 
economic liberty. Moreover, I suggest that such arguments are to be seen as 
practical necessities in the broader battles for social, political and economic 
power during the nineteenth century. In asserting this, I highlight the way in 
which the middle-class argument for freedom of the press acted to disenfranchise 
the already fragile working-class movements, and cement their own position 
ideologically and politically in the ascendancy.77 I will demonstrate this by 
highlighting the role of The Association for the Repeal of Taxes on Knowledge, 
and the practice and arguments of some of its key activists - John Bright and 
Richard Cobden. 
The Association for the Repeal of Taxes Against Knowledge was established in 
1848 and largely grew out of the failure of a working-class Chartist spin-off 
group called the Newspaper Stamp Abolition Committee. The Association's 
members included its founder and secretary, Collet D. Collet; John Bright; T. 
77 I am aided here in my analysis by drawing on the work of G. Boyce, J. Curran and P. 
Wingate eds. Newspaper History: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day (California, 
Sage Publications, 1978), and J. Curran and J. Seaton, Power Without Responsibility. the Press 
and Broadcasting in Britain (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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Milner-Gibson; George Jacob Holyoake; Joseph Hume; Richard Cobden and 
Francis Place. The aim of the movement was to end taxes on knowledge and in 
doing so 'improve' the literature for the working classes. The Association's main 
argument was that working-class people would improve their lot by self 
improvement by buying 'intelligent' and 'moral' newspapers if they were cheap 
enough. Not only would a cheap press provide useful information for the 
working-classes, it would also awaken their appetite for knowledge and stimulate 
them to read further. The main organ of the Association was the Potteries Free 
Press, an unstamped penny weekly owned by Collet D. Collet. In the very first 
edition of the Potteries Free Press, Collet sets out its principles and aims, the 
foremost of which was to highlight the fact that 'the issue of Parliamentary 
Reform takes precedence of all others in point of interests. since it lies at the root 
of the vast majority of the grievances complained about by the working-classes of 
this country. '78 In addition to the extension of the franchise the Potteries Free 
Press sought also to highlight the inequitable system of taxation that both middle 
classes and working classes had to endure: 
With respect to taxation we are entirely in favour of the gradual 
substitution of direct for indirect taxation. We desire to have all the 
taxes removed from all the necessities of life, whether physical or 
intellectual, and in lieu thereof, a graduated Income and Property 
Tax; a mode of raising the revenue on the nation which we are 
convinced would be readily acquiesced in by the majority of all 
thinking minds in the country. 79 
However, another of the main aims of the Potteries Free Press was to highlight 
the irrationality of the stamp taxation system and it did this earnestly, mainly by 
antagonising and goading the Stamp Office. In an open letter to the 'Honourable 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue' Collet notes the similarities of the 
78 The Potteries' Free Press and Weekly Narrative of Current Events. Saturday, February 12· 
1853. 
79 The Potteries' Free Press, Saturday, February 12m 1853. 
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Potteries Free Press with such (unstamped and un-prosecuted) organs such as 
Hansard, Punch, the Builder and the Racing Times all of which were not stamped 
and carried similar information (even though they did so separately). The letter 
challenges the authorities to prosecute the Potteries Free Press on these lines. 
Just below the title header of the Potteries Free Press is the phrase: 'Published in 
conformity with the practices of the Stamp Office, which permits records of 
current events, and comments thereon, to be published without Stamp, in the 
"Athenreum," "Builder" "Punch" "Racing Times," &c.' Such overt mocking of 
the Stamp Office was a recurrent theme of this publication; as we see in a later 
edition, Collet highlights the lack of attention given to the Free Press: 
• 
It is noteworthy that the publication of an unstamped weekly journal, 
in which are given records of current events and comments thereon, 
should have been permitted by government to live this long. We 
certainly did not expect this lenient treatment from the authorities of 
the Stamp Office, and we must confess a slight feeling of 
disappointment that the lynx eyed guardians of our Inland Revenue 
have not deigned, as yet, to take notice of our proceedings. [ ... ] 
Silence however, reigns at headquarters and we are allowed to go on 
in happy ignorance as to whether the Potteries Free Press is 
conforming to or disobeying the law of the land. so 
Collet continues: 
A successful prosecution of the Potteries Free Press would be as 
embarrassing to Government as an unsuccessful one, and it is 
thought, perhaps, more prudent to be let alone that which cannot be 
stirred without unpleasant consequences. The maintenance of this 
paper until a jury in a court of law shall have pronounced it to be 
either legal or illegal, is essential to the success of our cause. The 
battle we are fighting is not one for personal interests; it is a battle 
for public advantage, a patriotic struggle to emancipate the English 
press from fetters, which by diminishing its sphere of usefulness, 
cramp the industry and hinder the education of the people.sl 
80 The Potteries' Free Press, Saturday, March 5th, 1853. 
81 The Potteries' Free Press, Saturday, March 5th, 1853. 
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Although Collet was at pains to highlight the fact that the Potteries Free Press 
was not an organ of the Association for the Repeal of Taxes on Knowledge, it is 
clear from the language used above that Collet set out to highlight the hypocrisy 
and relative unworkability of the stamp tax. It is unclear why Collet denied any 
connection with the Association, but it is possible that a wider circulation was 
attainable without overt connection to the group. 
Collet in his History of the Taxes on Knowledge sets out the main aims and 
achievements of the Association in which he played a large part and which, he 
notes, still had the flickering embers of Chartism within its ranks: 
From the People's Charter Union we had come out as a separate 
committee, not surrendering personally our Chartist views, but 
putting the repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge as the sole basis of 
our movement. We had thus suppressed any idea that by joining us 
any man was giving up his own opinions on the suffrage of the 
Church Establishment, on National Education, or even on Free 
Trade in Com.82 
Although many members of the Association did have sympathies with Chartism's 
demands, and some (as Collet demonstrates) even called themselves Chartists, the 
overall flavour of the Association had an overwhelmingly middle-class 
paternalistic tone. Moreover, the essential middle-class character of the 
Association became more prominent throughout the 1850s, as links with 
working-class organisations diminished and 'its links with the radical working-
class movement [grew] tenuous during the period of 1850-9'.83 Indeed Collet's 
statement highlighted above took its inspiration, not from remnants of Chartist 
agitation, but from the pro free-market Anti-Com Law League.84 Thus the flavour 
82 C. D. Collet, History of the Taxes on Know/edge (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1899), p. 134. 
83 J, Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control: An Historical Perspective', in Boyce 
et. al., Newspaper History, p. 57. 
84 See Collet's admission that 'We cannot pretend that it was an original policy of our own. It 
was that of the Anti-Corn Law League [ ... ].' Collet, History of the Taxes on Knowledge, p. 
135. 
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of the Association for the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge was, if not at its 
inception then soon after, distinctly middle-class. 
As such, the sentiments of the association were greatly sympathetic to the 
mechanisms of the market, and the move towards an end to the monopolisation of 
the established press always expressed a tone of authority and forthrightness. 
Such a tone of authority is well represented (albeit innocently and idealistically) 
in Collet's recollections when he notes that the movement, after its development 
out of the Newspaper Stamp Abolition Committee, was now comprised of 'an 
upper circle of public men', and who were 'persons of some position'.8s 
As Curran notes, the 'principal attraction of the repeal campaign was, of course, 
the realisation that, if press taxation was cut and newspaper prices halved, there 
would be an enormous expansion in the popular press', 86 which would put an end 
to the monopoly on the daily newspaper press held most notably by the Times. 
More importantly though, Curran describes the activities of the association as a 
key driver in the gradual disenfranchisement of working-class interests. As the 
middle-class campaign gained ground and thus more power and influence, the 
repeal movement grew ever more distant from working-class associations. As the 
locus of power was taken out of the hands of working-class movements for press 
reform, the middle-class argument gradually gained general acceptance, thus 
disempowering large sections of working-class agitation which sought an end to 
press restrictions. In a more recent work, Curran and Seaton87 note that the 
weakening of controls, and the eventual reform of the press, highlight the 
ascendancy and inereasing power base that middle-class elite entrepreneurs were 
8S Collet, History of the Taxes on Knowledge, p. 137. 
86 Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control', p. 57. 
87 J. Curran, & J. Seaton, Power WithoUl Responsibility. The Press and Broadcasting in Britain 
(New York, Routledge, 1997). 
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developing. Not only did the end of the 'taxes on knowledge' mark the end of 
official censorship legislation, it also marked the end of the radical press: 
Both the extent and pennanence of the eclipse of the radical press as 
the dominant force in national popular journalism was due to 
structural changes in the press industry. The industrialisation of the 
press, with its accompanying rise in publishing costs, led to the 
progressive transfer of ownership and control of the press from the 
working-class to wealthy businessmen [ ... ].88 
Furthermore, the middle-class ascendancy provided the dynamics that would 
ensure that working-class interests would be subsumed into the rhetoric of 
middle-class debate, and it also ensured that any working-class resistance or non-
compliance would be associated with recent failures of working-class 
organisational activity, such as that of the 'Peoples Charter Union' during the 
early 1850s. The middle-class papers: 
offered a very different view of the world from that of the early 
radical press they supplanted. Papers like the Northern Star had 
amplified class conflicts in the local community. [ ... ] In contrast, 
the new local commercial press tended to block out conflict, 
minimise differences, and encourage positive identification with the 
local community and its middle-class readership.89 
The theoretical stance of the Association of the Repeal of the Taxes on 
Knowledge was largely a development of the utilitarian stance discussed in depth 
in the previous chapter, with a number of key differences. Firstly, the later liberal 
refonn movement no longer had to structure its arguments on overtly paternalistic 
lines, as the force of enculturation and assimilation into capitalistic values was 
much stronger in 1850 than it was in the 1820s or 1830s. Arguments that once 
espoused freedom of the press to provide the working man with a means to better 
himself were replaced by arguments that took comfort in the failure of organised 
88 Curran & Seaton, Power Without Responsibility. p. 41. 
89 Curran & Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, p. 58. 
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labour, most notably the Peoples Charter Union and other Chartist organisations. 
As such the language and tone of freedom of speech changed significantly, with 
almost an assured confidence, as Collet indicates when he describes the 
membership of the new Association as men of 'the upper circle' and 'persons of 
some position. '90 Secondly, abstract philosophical pronouncements that focussed 
on utility maximisation present in previous utilitarian arguments for freedom of 
the press, had to be 'diluted' so that 'ordinary working men' could benefit from 
its message.91 Such abstract complexities were no longer a part of the mainstream 
liberal argument, as the 'search for knowledge' was now engrained within the 
radical political culture of the day. It was simple enough to argue that the taxes on 
knowledge were a hindrance to progress, progress which was manifested in terms 
of the opening up of markets which would have beneficial effects on the 
conditions of the working man. What is clear, is that the justification for freedom 
of the press was not made on grounds that had their basis in notions of freedom of 
expression as a necessary component of a conception of 'the good life', but were 
more closely linked to the aspirations of a middle-class elite striving for the 
opening up of markets and the generation of profits whilst at the same time 
exercising subtle mechanisms of social control over the so-called lower orders. 
The liberty argument, fixed to economic liberalism, was the central theoretical 
component of the middle-class ascendancy. 
Given that there was an overwhelming desire to end monopolisation and strict 
press controls because of market considerations and profit maximisation, one 
could miss the often implicit political philosophy of free speech that emerged 
within liberal circles at this time. Even though I assert that market considerations 
were paramount, I feel that this interpretation alone, although powerful, would 
fail to illuminate the intricacies that did exist in the middle-class liberal 
90 Collet, History of the Taxes on Knowledge, p. 137. 
91 J. A. Roebuck's Pamphlets for the People would be a good example of this. 
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justifications for freedom of the press. I do not dissent from the view that wider 
contextual conditions and drivers were an important component in shaping the 
defence of free speech, but some insight into theory still needs to be made. To do 
this, I will tum to the work of leading Victorian liberals, Richard Cobden and 
John Bright. 
Richard Cobden (1804-1865) was part of the radical liberal flavour of politics 
that emerged during the middle years of the nineteenth century. Cobden was an 
MP and had a strong commitment to the free market, expressed particularly in his 
active participation within the Anti Com Law League - fighting against the 'iron 
hoof of monopoly'; and also in attacking aristocratic privilege and corruption. 
Cobden was also a Quaker and as such had high moral standards, evidence of 
which often reverberated in his speeches, letters and articles. In his unpublished 
PhD thesis, Farrar argues that Cobden deserves more attention from scholars than 
he has thus far been given, as he argues that Cobden made great contributions to 
the social, economic and political landscape of Britain during the nineteenth 
century.92 Farrar goes on to highlight the way that Cobden's politics was centred 
around key themes, themes that included the notion that social progress was 
dependent on 'the interaction of economic, religious and educational factors. ,93 
Thus a mixture of religious and economic concerns helped shape Cobden's view 
of politics and social life. 
As noted, Cobden was active in the Anti-Com Law league which sought an end 
to taxation on grain and other harvested crops; and as an agitational organisation, 
it was important that as much information and publicity be generated about the 
Anti-Com Law movement as possible. Yet the Anti-Com Law League itself was 
hampered by press legislation prior to the abolition of stamp taxes. Publications 
92 P. N. Farrar, Richard Cobden: Educationalist, Economist and Statesman (University of 
Sheffield, 1987). 
93 Farrar, Richard Cobden, p. iv. 
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such as the Anti-Corn Law Circular and the Anti-Bread Tax Circular were taxed 
as usual; but these papers generally avoided commenting directly on the stamp 
taxes, as they did not want to divert attention away from their main aims. 
Although this was a consideration, another reason that such publications avoided 
commenting on the taxes was because they knew that the established press were 
indeed sympathetic to the stamp taxes as they ensured that the 'cheap' press could 
not flourish and potentially threaten their revenues. However, a good number of 
the established press were sympathetic to the views of the Anti-Com Law 
movement and as a result, such organs did not want to alienate themselves from 
it. As such, any direct mention of the stamp tax in the Anti-Com law press could 
potentially alienate it from the established press. Even the more sympathetic 
Cobden scholars. note that Cobden himself was reluctant to comment directly on 
the stamp taxes initially, because he wanted to ensure that he did not displease the 
established press by making such calls. 94 
Cobden shared this conception of politics and morality in his public life, 
contributing to pertinent debates in the Commons and at public meetings and in 
the press. As with many liberals in mid-Victorian England, Cobden was 
sympathetic to the notion that a free press was beneficial to the masses, and after 
pressure from a number of like-minded individuals, joined the Newspaper Stamp 
Abolition Committee in 1849, which, as we have seen, later developed into The 
Association for the Repeal of Taxes on Knowledge in 1851. As noted, a key 
theme of the Association was the promotion of education for the working-classes 
and an oft quoted statement from Cobden echoes the intrinsic value that he and 
the association put on the newspaper press as an organ of self betterment for the 
working man; - 'a penny newspaper press would do more to educate the millions 
94 In addition to Farrar noted above, other sympathetic contributions include: D. Read, Cobden 
and Bright, A Victorian Political Partnership (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1967); N. C. 
Edsall, Richard Cobden: Independent Radical (London: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
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than all the schoolmasters in the land. '95 Newspapers in particular were a 
compelling means of providing moral guidance and useful information. This 
letter to the Manchester Times provides a good example of Cobden's reasoning: 
I regard the influence of public opinion, as exercised through the 
press, as the distinguished feature in modem civilisation, and which 
by its progress or degradation must determine the period of 
existence of civilisation itself. The engine of good or evil can exist 
only by the breath of the public to award wisely its suffrages 
amongst the contending candidates of the periodical press.96 
News 'should be stated as concisely as is constant with clearness, and should be 
so arranged as to communicate the greatest amount of information with the least 
demand on the time and labour of the reader. '97 Thus we have a view of the press 
that provides a specific social function in that if allowed to circulate freely and 
unhindered from constraint, it would provide society with a progressive social 
dynamic. Moreover, it is the competing perspectives of the press that will be 
judged or rejected by the public, and as such, a paper will succeed or fail 
according to the market. The free market of ideas metaphor has already been 
highlighted above, and its articulation by members of the middle-class press 
reform movement such as Cobden, reinforce the power of such arguments within 
the context of seeking an end to press restrictions. 
However, it would be an oversimplification if this 'free market of ideas' 
metaphor were not placed under any further critical scrutiny in this context. Such 
an analysis would underestimate the role that key activists had in helping to 
define the largely middle-class free press agenda, in particular in terms of the 
ideological weight they had in the middle-class movement to reform that press. 
Like a large number of activists in the Association for the Repeal of the Taxes 
95 Cobden, Cited D. Read, Cobden and Bright, if Victorian Political Partnership, p. 186. 
96 Cobden, cited Farrar, Richard Cobden, p. 404. 
97 Manchester Examiner, Saturday, January 10th, 1846. 
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Against Knowledge, Cobden was an MP, and played a significant role in the 
pressure for the repeal of the stamp taxes within Parliament not only to advance 
the free market, but also to ensure that the working classes would have the 
'appropriate sources of education for their betterment'. In other words, Cobden's 
position continued the role of the middle-class press, by ensuring that any 
working-class agitation could be pacified and subsumed into the burgeoning 
market ideology. This was clear from the language that was used in some of the 
publications that emanated from this middle-class movement to repeal the stamp 
taxes; the language of social control was strong and sometimes explicit. Titles 
such as The Popular Educator, The Working Man's Friend and Family Instructor 
and the Freeholder, all proclaimed the virtue of high moral attitudes with an 
emphasis on free trade. The Popular Educator for example, from week to week 
provided 'instruction' on matters relating to history, botany, astronomy and of 
course political economy. The aim was to reach as many poor and working-class 
people as was possible in a cheap weekly. Such publications were obvious about 
their intentions and their role: 
There are numerous instances in every hamlet in England, of 
dwarfed intellects and disappointed aspirations, in consequence of 
the want of means to procure even elementary works on common 
subjects in this age of cheap literature; and there are thousands of 
you throughout the land whom a simple and concise digest of the 
facts and hearing of leading subjects would have converted into 
diligent and earnest votaries of knowledge, but whom confused 
plenty has disgusted and sent away empty.98 
In the pages of such weeklies, the emphasis was on education, which would serve 
to minimise conflict between master and worker, as this excerpt from The 
Working Man's Friend and Family Instructor highlights: 
If artisans and others feel that their pay is not just or equitable, they 
have an undoubted right to lay their grievances before their masters. 
98 The Popular Educator, April 13th, 1852. 
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[ ... ] but this should always be done in a friendly, peaceable, and 
respectful manner. [ ... ] Agreement, kindly feeling towards each 
other, and a sense of reciprocal dependence should always prevail.99 
Cobden was sure of the value of a popular press and saw the need for such a 
paper which did not pander to the lowest common denominator, as many other of 
the dailies did. Thus, after the abolition of the stamp tax in 1855, Cobden with the 
financial backing of Joseph Sturge, published the London based Morning Star 
and the Evening Star. The papers proclaimed that they 'will pander to no popular 
passions. At all times the Morning and Evening Star will endeavour to enforce 
the sound teachings of political economy and to apply the right principles to the 
Science of Government'. 100 The content of the Morning Star was a mixture of 
foreign news and market news with advertisements on the front page. The focus 
was clearly on 'educating' the working classes in the business and the interests of 
the middle class, with news of economic interest and political news. Interestingly, 
the language used mixes the interests of the middle classes with those of the 
working classes, as if representative of them both, but still echoing middle-class 
sentiment. The following excerpt on taxation is a good example: 
There is no subject of domestic policy which calls more attention of 
our statesmen and the Legislature than that of taxation. [ ... ] The 
incidence of taxation, as a whole, is also inequitably and 
oppressively laid on the shoulders of the classes who live by labour, 
while the proprietors of the kingdom escape their fair share of the 
burden. As a contribution to popular enlightenment on this 
important matter we propose to put a few facts and arguments 
together, our main object being to assist in compelling a 
reconstruction of the entire system on a sound and equitable 
principle. [ ... ] In examining these duties, we have confined 
ourselves to the proof of the simple fact, that they fall almost 
entirely on the working and middle-classes, and scarcely reach the 
possessors of the vast property of the kingdom. 101 
99 The Working Man's Friend and Family Instructor, Saturday, February 161b, 1850. 
100 Farrar, Richard Cobden, p. 416. 
101 The Morning Star, January 61b, 1857. 
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Unfortunately for Cobden and Sturge, the sale of the Morning and Evening Star 
was limited, with the new one penny Daily Telegraph securing the majority of the 
cheap press market. It seems that the papers' close association with Richard 
Cobden, a Quaker, and his well known and generally unpopular anti-Crimean war 
views proved too much for the reading public and the paper never really made 
much of an impact on the London press market. 
Interestingly Farrar cites 'recent work'102 which argues that the various middle-
class movements which called for a repeal of the stamp tax were committed to 
socialisation of the working class into the existing capitalist order. Farrar notes 
that this was not the case as Cobden and the Morning and Evening Star were 
actively disowned by the middle-class press and as such could not have been part 
of this 'conspiracy'. He notes that 'the promoters of the Morning Star held that 
the middle and working-classes both needed liberation, and that their economic 
interests rightly understood, were identical. '103 However, Farrar is missing the 
point here, in that although the largely middle-class movement to repeal the 
stamp taxes did not always agree with each other on specific issues, the 
functionality of encouraging acceptance of the market system is a clear example 
of socialisation of the working classes into the market system. Moreover, organs 
such as the Morning and Evening Star viewed working-class organisations as a 
potential threat to middle-class aspirations. They criticised the activities of 
Chartists and Mechanics Institutes, and the rejection of Trades Unions by Cobden 
(at least those which 'sought interference into matters properly concerning 
management') echoes a strong pro-market tone that organs such as the Morning 
Star promoted. If one looks at the specific recommendations that Cobden made 
for the Morning Star on matters regarding layout and content of the paper, one 
can see that the authoritative paternalistic tone is well in evidence. Cobden notes 
102 Farrar, Richard Cobden, p. 418-419, citing Curran et ai, Power Without Responsibility. 
103 Farrar, Richard Cobden, p. 418-419. 
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that 'Moralising and reasoning of an abstract nature must be avoided. The views 
of the paper should be instilled through the clear discussion of specific issues and 
incidents.' The readers 'must be taught without their knowing it'. As such the 
presentation of articles was intended to be different from the established middle-
class press. 104 
Even after the final repeal of taxation on the press (the duty on paper) in 1861, 
Cobden was aware of other threats to freedom of the press. The first was the 
monopolisation of the press by papers such as The Times. Cobden argued that 
such a monopoly was not in the interests of the public as only one set of opinions 
could be heard by the public. This was against his view of the press acting as an 
organ of vigorous public opinion and debate. This of course echoes Mill's worries 
concerning the threat of public opinion in stifling individuality. Cobden is aware 
here that a monopolisation of opinion in the press acts in the same vein as Mill's 
notion of the weight of public opinion in stifling individual development: 
The London daily press has been hitherto a MONOPOLY, and, like 
all monopolies, it has profited at the expense of the public. When, 
by the exertions of a small band of persevering politicians, the Total 
Repeal of the Stamp Duty was secured in 1855, it might have hoped 
that the monopoly established twenty years previously would have 
been broken up. [However], under this monopoly the public are 
expressly prohibited from obtaining the advantage of competition. 
[ ... ] The result, therefore, comes to this- that the "high priced" 
papers are in a combination to limit, by means of price, the spread of 
intelligence and the diffusion of knowledge. In this, indeed, they 
well serve the purposes of those to whose ends they are subservient-
for the less the enlightenment of the masses, the smaller, according 
to the notions of most of our rulers, the difficulty of guiding and 
governing the people. It is with this regard that the proprietors of the 
Morning and Evening Star, - men who have at heart the diffusion of 
healthy knowledge, the progress of reform, and the establishment of 
good government, - have determined that the public shall have the 
104 Farrar, Richard Cobden, p.426. 
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advantage of a First Class Daily Newspaper, free from party and the 
combination of high price. lOS 
Another threat to freedom of the press was perceived to emanate from an 'un-
healthy' relationship between Parliament and the press. Famously, Cobden argued 
that The Times had too close a connection to those in power. Indeed, he argued 
even as early as 1853 that newspaper editorial policy was under the influence of 
certain members of Parliament. He would have liked the Morning Star to 
overshadow the authority of The Times but it remained an 'institution of the 
Realm' .106 'The public could not justly weigh the opinions of a paper unless it 
knew what connections it had.' 107 
A close friend and ally of Cobden was John Bright, (1811-1889) who was also 
involved in the Association for the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge as he too 
was of the opinion that the taxes on knowledge condemned the poor to a life of 
misery and subservience. Bright was a notable orator and travelled the country 
giving speeches and addressing public meetings on the day's most pressing 
issues. One issue that Bright spoke on repeatedly was on the repeal of the 
newspaper taxes. Bright like Cobden often courted criticism from the established 
press, in particular The Times, for demanding an end to the newspaper taxes and 
as such, bringing an end to the monopoly that The Times in particular had 
enjoyed. Bright also had a hand in publishing a number of political organs, many 
of which had their base in the north of England (Bright was MP for Durham in 
1843 and then Manchester in 1847). One notable example was the Manchester 
Examiner. Like Cobden's London based Morning and Evening Star, the 
Manchester Examiner was specifically aimed at the working classes and as such 
courted a working-class readership in the hope of raising its sights. However, this 
lOS The Morning Star, Monday, March 1'r", 1856. 
lOS Farrar, Richard Cobden, p. 427. 
107 Cobden cited Farrar, Richard Cobden, p. 428. 
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was always done with overtones of middle-class sentiment, particularly when 
emphasising the benefits of laissez-faire political economy: 
The Free Trade movement [ ... ] is a movement altogether of, from 
and by the people, for a popular object - an effort of the industrious 
classes, as such, irrespective of party and sectarian distinctions, to 
wield the powers of opinion and franchise for an end of their own 
choosing. This movement has given the industrious classes a new 
sense of their rank and standing in the state. It has taught trade, self 
respect and self reliance - shewn it at once its honourableness and 
its power given public status to its most eminent and most 
enlightened men, - and called forth a spirit of sympathy and co-
operation among all engaged in the pursuit of industry. It is a 
movement that has added incalculably to the prestige of truth and 
knowledge, as the governing power of the country. Never was 
''useful knowledge" so rapidly diffused among a people, as during 
the past seven years: and never was popular intelligence brought into 
so close and immediate contact with politics and legislation. For the 
first time in history, the multitude have been made practically 
aquainted with the facts and laws affecting their physical and· 
economical condition. For the first time in history, economical truth, 
reinforced by alliance with moral right, and advocated with all the 
energy of religious earnestness, has become the life and soul of a 
popular political movement. 108 
We can see then that Cobden, Bright and Collet are pertinent examples of those 
embracing a liberal ideology which sought to embed the virtues of fashionable 
economic theories into the population. As with the Philosophic Radicals decades 
earlier, the function of arguments for freedom of the press from these liberal 
activists serve to engender general acceptance of the prevailing social order. 
Through the education of the masses into an acceptance of in vogue economic 
doctrines, coupled with high moral virtues contained in the pages of the liberal 
press, the emphasis on individual moral responsibility started to emerge as the 
focal point of their analysis. Rather than any doctrinaire adherence to specific 
108 Manchester Examiner, Saturday, January 10th, 1846 
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scientific rules, as had been the case with the utilitarians, the individual rather 
than the greatest happiness of the greatest number was paramount. 
It has been the intention of this section to highlight the mainstream liberal praxis 
of freedom of speech which was articulated in calls for an end to the stamp 
duties. I have demonstrated that arguments for freedom of the press, that are 
framed within the context of the liberty argument for freedom of speech, have 
been grafted on to the battle to suppress working-class agitation, and ensure 
middle-class dominance. Thus we have what I term a 'thin' political philosophy 
of freedom of speech which is immersed in the wider concern to 'ensure that the 
press provided institutional support for the social order.'l09 The enculturation of 
working classes into the acceptance of middle-class opinion which 
operationalised a level of social control, was derived from an affirmation of 
individual responsibility and compliance to specific moral codes. The emphasis 
on 'self-education' for the working classes as a means to break free from the 
chains of ignorance, was transposed by the liberal press into education for 
, individual self-fulfilment and advancement.' 110 
The argument for freedom of the press, as Curran notes 'was never actuated 
primarily by a libertarian commitment to freedom and diversity of expression';111 
though fundamentally liberal, they were contrived to restrict liberty of the masses 
by placing the middle class in the ascendancy. He continues: 
All that had changed was a growing commitment to positive 
indoctrination of the lower orders through a cheap press, and a 
growing conviction that free trade and normative controls were 
morally preferable and more efficient control system than direct 
controls administered by the state. Underlying this shift was the 
growing power and confidence of the Victorian middle:'class, which 
dominated the legal campaign for the repeal of press taxes and 
109 Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control', p. 61. 
110 Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control', p. 72. 
III Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control', p. 61. 
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recognised in the expanding press a powerful agency for the 
advancement of their interests [ ... ].112 
Thus the liberty argument was incorporated into an ideological battle for political 
and economic power and as such a tool for social control. The assertion of the 
free market, and its linkage to the betterment of the working classes, helped 
propel the thin liberty argument for freedom of speech into the front line of the 
ideological battle between a mass working-class and a middle-class elite. 
5. 7: Conclusion 
As noted in the initial section of this chapter, there is no definitive liberal praxis 
offreedom of speech to be identified. The more refined analysis provided by John 
Stuart Mill is in stark contrast to the less sophisticated and more overtly 
politically motivated 'thin' arguments provided by mainstream liberals such as 
Cobden and Bright. It is important to make this distinction between the two sets 
of arguments as the arguments for freedom of speech (and therefore freedom of 
the press) although emanating from core beliefs that stem from the Enlightenment 
- the progress of knowledge and the assertion of liberty etc. - differ in significant 
ways. For example, the arguments provided by Mill offer a unique analysis of the 
virtues of individuality and diversity in a dynamic flourishing society. The 
arguments from liberals such as Cobden and Bright and other leading liberals of 
the day, stress the benefits of social compliance to middle-class values and 
leadership, something that as we have seen, was articulated years before by James 
Mill. Conformity to specific ways of living was something that J. S. Mill 
campaigned against all his life, the virtues of experimentation and eccentricity 
echo throughout On Liberty, whereas such ideas would have been seen as 
dangerous and irresponsible by middle-class elites seeking working-class 
conformity. Hence 'liberal' justifications for freedom of speech during the 
112 Curran, 'The Press as an Agency of Social Control', p. 61. 
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nineteenth century are to be seen as almost polemical. On the one hand we have 
Mill defending individual expression from the weight of conformity, on the other 
we have liberals striving to make the masses conform to belief systems which 
would ensure that liberty and freedom for the people at large was never attained. 
Aided by the Association for the Repeal of Taxes on Knowledge, the examples of 
the mainstream liberal press provided above highlight the liberal press's 
vindication of free trade and an assertion of the role of the press as an educational 
tool for the lower orders. These arguments should not been seen out of context of 
the middle-class interests which they sought vigorously to promote. Thus I assert 
that the mainstream liberal praxis of freedom of speech, unlike Mill's arguments, 
were centred around enculturation and control, rather than any specific 
commitment to freedom or liberty. The arguments used to promote freedom of 
the press, have to be seen within the context of a middle-class rise to economic 
and political dominance rather than arguments for freedom of speech in their own 
right. Hence the assertion of a 'thin' praxis of freedom of speech argument is as 
suggested one that should be seen as actually inhibiting the liberty of the masses, 
in that poverty, injustice and misery were maintained even when liberal 
arguments for press 'freedom' won through by the victory of the market. 
Finally and returning to Mill, in terms of the philosophy of freedom of speech. 
Mill's arguments of course offer us a powerful defence of freedom of speech and 
I have set out the components of these arguments above to demonstrate just this. 
However, as I have suggested, Mill's arguments in On Liberty lose some of their 
potency when seen in the context of his other works. especially when one 
considers his advocacy of laissez faire political economy and his general distrust 
of co-operative social systems. This assertion. however, should not condemn 
Mill's arguments to being perceived as a more sophisticated version of the 
mainstream liberal argument. It is important to note that Mill's conception of 
liberty went far beyond those pronouncements of free trade that were practised 
ad-nauseum by the liberal press. Mill's shortcomings were that he did not fully 
appreciate the illiberal tendencies of the market system he supported. 
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Furthennore, he failed adequately to recognise the importance of equality as a 
necessary component of a truly free society; it will remain to be seen in the 
following chapter what exactly the concept of equality offers to are-articulated 
fonn of Mill's arguments as I explore the socialist praxis of freedom of speech in 
the nineteenth century. 
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Summary 
The development of a Millian justification of freedom of speech has been 
highlighted with reference to early newspaper articles and an analysis of On 
Liberty. Some of the controversies surrounding Mill's argument have been 
highlighted and the means by which such controversies may be overcome, have 
been suggested. A tension between Mill's philosophy and the concept of equality 
has been raised which may have implications for even a sophisticated 'liberal' 
defence of freedom of speech such as Mill's. However, Mill's work should be set 
apart from the mainstream liberal discussion of freedom of speech which was 
grounded in concerns about the potential threat of organised working-class labour 
to the market system. As with utilitarianism, the burgeoning market and the need 
to control large sections of the populace were prime motivations in the middle-
class liberal argument. However, this justification of freedom of speech should be 
set apart from utilitarian justifications as the contextual landscape had changed to 
a large degree by the middle years of the nineteenth century. No longer was overt 
paternalism a theme within the praxis of free speech, now a more inclusive 
language of shared interests and the assertion of individuality was used. 
Individuals such as Cobden and Bright should be seen as exemplars of middle-
class assertiveness as too should the role and function of the Association for the 
Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Socialism: Free Speech Reasserted 
Of course absolute Freedom of Opinion includes the right to the 
unfettered expression of opinion by means of both voice and pen. 
Neither penal laws nor priestly despotism, not sectarian intolerance, 
nor mob violence can be permitted to interfere with the freedom of 
the platform or the press, without violating that right which 
MILTON wisely held to be the most important and valuable of all 
liberties. For let this right to be claimed and maintained by each 
man, not merely for himself, but also for his fellow men, and no evil 
power can prevent the progress of the Human Race from ignorance, 
error, slavery, and misery, to knowledge, wisdom, liberty, and 
happiness. I 
6.1: Introduction 
It is my intention in this chapter to analyse the socialist justification of freedom of 
speech during the nineteenth century in Britain. This task is complicated by the 
fact that free speech was given varying status within socialist thought and praxis 
during the nineteenth century. Unlike utilitarianism or liberalism, where free 
speech is a major component of the doctrines' philosophical make up and 
political requisites; free speech, within what I will term the 'socialist sphere of 
analysis', has varying levels of importance and significance to different actors and 
groups. As Williams and Pearson note '[t]he political theory of nineteenth-
century British socialism exhibits a wide range of attitudes and beliefs about 
industrial society [ ... ]. At one end of the spectrum of ideas we find socialism 
rejecting the values of industrial capitalism [ ... ]. At the other end of spectrum we 
find the acceptance of industrialism and its benefits but a rejection of its forms 
I The Friend of the People. No.2, December 21st 1850. 
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and organisation.'2 Moreover, when attempting to define socialism within this 
context, it is important to note that the idea of socialism was largely raw and 
underdeveloped (at least until the 1860s); this will have to be borne in mind, 
particularly as some writers and agitators that are referred to within this chapter 
may hold views that would not necessarily 'neatly' fit into what might generally 
be known as socialist thought. However, they are included because of their 
commitment to the interests of the working classes and are important characters 
within the history of socialist politics. For example, William Cobbett in his early 
years was a staunch monarchist and Tory but is included in this section as a 
testament to his work fighting for the cause of the poor and in defence of the 
interests of the working-classes. Given the varying range and scope of socialist 
political philosophy during the nineteenth century, it should be of no surprise that 
such a breadth of focus should be taken into account in my analysis of free 
speech. Moreover, until Robert Owen and William Thompson, the phrases 
socialist and socialism were little used. This chapter, therefore, will capture and 
analyse the range of debates concerning freedom of speech, which emanate from 
radical working-class politics, within the very wide parameters of what can be 
termed (though I acknowledge, not un problematically) socialist thought during 
the nineteenth century. 
Two other important considerations should be borne in mind within the context 
of this chapter. Firstly, there can be little doubt that Robert Owen and William 
Morris were two of the nineteenth century's leading socialist figures. However, 
this chapter makes only a sparse mention of Owen and, other than in this 
introductory section, does not discuss William Morris. The reason for this is 
simple. Owen and Morris did not feature significantly in the debates around free 
speech and a free press as they both saw that these were largely unimportant 
2 Pearson, & Williams, Political Thought and Public Policy. p. 102. 
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elements of the socialist programme. For Owen, socialism would emerge through 
education as experienced by people living within co-operative communities. Such 
communities would emerge as a result of direct guidance from himself. Morris 
also believed that education was important but that enlightenment stemmed from 
within and not through exposure to a free press. Such 'messianic' perspectives 
assert that knowledge and understanding depended not on the circulation or free 
exchange of ideas but on the mass of working people following enlightened 
leadership, as only the enlightened guides were in possession of the means to 
comprehend and articulate the totality of the socialist vision. 
Moreover, the lack of representation of thinkers such as Owen and Morris is also 
due to their particular lack of interest in and attention to arguments for freedom of 
speech. Such arguments were historically speaking largely 'not an issue' within 
the confines of socialist political activity and analysis, as the 'solutions' or 
'remedies' to the constraints upon the working people were perceived to lie 
elsewhere and not in or around arguments for freedom of speech. Finally, it will 
become evident that the main focus of this chapter is on working-class radicalism 
during the first half of the nineteenth century; this is primarily because debates 
around free speech that emanated from socialist organs were generally (but not 
exclusively) confined to the period between 1819 and around 1850. Thus the 
focus of the chapter places greater weight on ideas that were generated before the 
tum of the mid-century when a small number of socialist thinkers and writers 
prioritised freedom of speech. The substance of the chapter will be an analysis of 
radical socialist or collectivist nineteenth-century pamphlets, journals and 
newsletters, monthlies and weeklies and their editors, writers and publishers. 
This chapter will be divided into a number of interrelated parts and the first will 
focus on the core components of socialist thought. This is an important part of 
this chapter in that it sets out the parameters of the socialist sphere of analysis. 
Secondly, we examine arguments for freedom of speech that emanated during the 
early years of the nineteenth century. Here we see the likes of Cobbett and Hone 
challenging the Old Regime of church and state, and arguing for freedom of 
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speech as a component of political refonn. This section will look closely at those 
pamphleteers and socialist radicals that have some stake in the heritage of 
socialist thought in Britain and see freedom of speech exemplified in a free press 
as, if not fundamental to their struggle, then a major part of it. 
From this relatively immature socialist analysis which seeks to widen the political 
franchise and assert an accountable legislature, we move on to the third section 
where we examine arguments from socialist radicals who see freedom of speech 
as a major component of their political programme. Here we see agitators such as 
Richard Carlile who sought freedom of speech almost as a distinct right in itself, 
and combined this with calls for Parliamentary refonn and a better deal for the 
working man. The theme of an emerging political consciousness, in part 
facilitated by a free press is a major theme in the fourth section of this chapter. 
Here we observe the fonnulation of a distinct class dimension in the arguments 
for freedom of speech. Not only do we see this class identity emerging in the 
arguments, but also a sharp and focussed critique of capitalism, emerging from 
the likes of George Jacob Holyoake, Henry Hetherington and Julian Harney. This 
theme is even more resonant in the fifth section of this chapter in which we 
examine the arguments of Marx. 
Although Marx's writings on free speech at this time were generated outside 
Britain, I contend that their inclusion within the context of this survey is 
warranted on three counts. Firstly, the philosophical and historical importance of 
Marx's work should not be underestimated; no historical or theoretical discussion 
that has socialist thought and tradition as one of its main foci should ignore this. 
Even during the mid-nineteenth century, Marx and Engels's work was starting to 
influence socialists in Britain, and their work was often translated into English 
228 
and reproduced within the radical press.3 Moreover, even today, twelve years after 
the fall of the Berlin wall and the so-called 'death of Marxism,' Marx's ideas still 
have resonance in academic and scholarly discourse. Secondly, very little 
attention has been given to Marx's perspective on freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press4 and as such an exploration of this aspect of his work should be 
included as I argue it provides a 'more mature' socialist justification of freedom 
of speech than earlier socialist writers. I feel that in including an analysis of Marx 
within the context of this chapter I am providing some evidence of progress in the 
development of arguments for free speech within the socialist tradition. I argue 
that the earlier writers on freedom of speech acted as a precursor to Marx's 
writings as many of the arguments that writers in the 1820s and 1830s put 
forward have a similar political philosophy and use of language to that employed 
by Marx. Thus, the mechanism of freedom of speech is developed and formulated 
within the earlier arguments and culminates in a more mature and fully rounded 
defence of freedom of speech from a socialist perspective. 
The next part of the chapter will explore the theoretical underpinnings of socialist 
justifications of free speech. Thus, within the confines of this chapter, I hope to 
provide an insight into the practical and theoretical components of free speech 
from the perspective of socialist agitators and thinkers. The focus of this section 
will be devoted to providing a discussion of the 'mechanism' of free speech 
within the context of socialist thought. The concluding section of this chapter will 
examine the accountability argument, the truth argument and the liberty argument 
in the light of the work discussed. From this I suggest that the socialist arguments 
3 For Example, the first English translation of the Communist Manifesto was published in Julian 
Harney's Red Republican in 1850. 
4 Work that does exist includes: A. F. McGovern, 'Karl Marx First Political Writings: The 
Rheinische Zeitung, 1842-1843' in Demythologising Marx (Boston: College Chestnut Hill, 
1969), and G. Teeple, Marx's Critique of Politics 1842-1847 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984). Both works are also cited below. 
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for freedom of speech, despite surface similarities, differ sufficiently enough from 
those arguments provided by utilitarians and liberals. As such the concepts of 
equality and fraternity are posited as key components of a socialist defence of 
freedom of speech; such concepts thus set socialism apart from liberal and 
utilitarian formulations of freedom of speech. In sum, I suggest that the socialist 
arguments highlighted present us with a re-assertion of freedom of speech. Also 
in this concluding section I speculate on the value of freedom of speech to 
socialism as an idea and as a practical component of socialist society. Here I look 
at the limits of the socialist argument and suggest that a broader conception of 
freedom of speech is a necessary component of any socialist programme. 
6.2: Focus 
The focus of the philosophical justifications for free speech under examination 
within this thesis stems from the weight given to particular fundamental aspects 
of the theory in question. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the weight of 
the utilitarian justification of free speech stemmed from the belief in the theory of 
utility and the application of this theory to practice. As has been demonstrated, 
the attainment of utility depended (amongst other things) on unrestricted press 
freedom. Within the confines of this chapter, a similar method will be deployed in 
that it is first necessary for me to focus on key elements or strands of socialist 
political thought, before I explore the conceptualisation and practice of free 
speech which is set against this theoretical backdrop. I will not, however, dwell 
too much on this preliminary task, as analyses of nineteenth-century socialist 
thought and its foundations have been given much attention, especially by 
socialist historians such as G.D.H Cole, E.P. Thompson and others. I will 
however, pick out elements of socialist philosophy that offer a 'way in' to 
discussion about socialism, free speech and its analysis. 
In order then to place the discussion of free speech within the parameters of 
nineteenth-century socialist thought, some common ground or general principles 
should be developed. It is important to note, however, that no overarching 
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definition or statement of intent will be provided in this thesis. BerkP reminds us 
that socialism is difficult to get to grips with because it is all too easy to fall into 
the traps of 'dogma', 'essentialism', and 'reductionism'. Moreover, he notes that 
socialism 'is not a single thing, but a range, an area, an open texture [ ... ].'6 
Perhaps the best way of thinking about the emergence of socialist thought is that 
provided by William Stafford, when he states that 'between 1775 and 1830 
occurred a remarkable flowering of radical social criticism in Britain. When we 
survey them, we can see the gradual emergence of ways of thinking that have 
subsequently been labelled socialist.'7 The nature of this criticism emanates from 
a number of sources which predominantly stem from the onset of the 
Enlightenment. This new Enlightenment thinking follows on from the victories of 
the 'bourgeois revolutions'. Again it is worth quoting Berki. 'Socialism is almost 
exactly coeval with classical liberalism: it is its reverse side, giving expression to 
the spiritual traumas and social and economic dislocations which were the effects 
of bourgeois-liberal victories. It became a stream at first of tiny, separate trickles, 
soon deepening and widening into a mighty river.,8 In attempting to characterise 
socialism Berki goes on to outline what he tenns the four basic tendencies of this 
political and philosophical creed. The first tendency is the commitment to some 
fonn of egalitarianism in the sense of a rejection of the notion of the individual as 
the focus of human activity. What is prominent is the idea that all human beings 
should be treated equally, irrespective of the circumstances that they might find 
themselves in. The second tendency that Berki notes is the emphasis on 
moralism, primarily etY;lanating from Christian socialists and evoking values of 
social justice, peace, co-operation and brotherhood. It primarily focuses on 
SR. N. Berki. Socialism (London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1975). 
6 Berld. Socialism. p. 16. 
7 W. Stafford. Socialism. Radicalism and Nostalgia. Social Criticism in Britain. 1775 - 1830 
(London: Cambridge University Press. 1987). p. 1. 
8 Berki. Socialism. p. 23. 
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capitalism's institutionalised exploitative nature. Thirdly and explicitly stemming 
from the Enlightenment tradition, is rationalism which emphasises the rational, 
purposeful organisation of human society towards ends that contribute to human 
progress. This is in contrast to the values of superstition and tradition which are 
generated by ignorance. The final tendency that Berki highlights is libertarianism, 
which he says is the most extreme tendency within the socialist sphere, in that it 
is a value that upholds total freedom and absence of restraint, both internal and 
external. 
If one was to point to leading figures that have had influence on the development 
of socialist thought, it could read like a complete history of political thought that 
goes back as far as ancient Greece or Rome. MacKenzie9 and Crick 10 note figures 
such as Plato, Lycurgus of Sparta, Thomas More, Rousseau, Bentham, Paine, 
Babeuf, Saint-Simon, Fourier and of course Marx as all contributing, in some 
way, to the 'socialist vision'. However, to go into great detail about the specific 
individuals that contributed to the development of socialist thought and its 
political tradition, is to go far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Berki's model should not be seen as a steadfast guide to socialist thought within 
the context of this thesis. It is meant to be a loose framework and at least a 
pointer to themes that reverberate through some of the socialist justifications for 
freedom of the press and free speech that are examined in the chapter: a 
contextual theoretical precis which provides a backdrop on which the examples of 
socialist justifications for free speech can be placed. I will return to Berki's model 
at the end of this chapter and discuss socialist arguments for free speech with 
reference to his framework. 
9 N. MacKenzie, Socialism (London: Hutchinson'S University Library, 1949). 
10 B. Crick, Socialism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987). 
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6.3: Libel's Dissenters: Revolution and Reform 
Having outlined the focus of this chapter, it is now necessary for me to engage 
more closely with socialist thought in relation to arguments for freedom of 
speech. A good place to start this discussion is at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, when movements for reform replaced the threat of revolution, if only 
marginally. 
As the war with Napoleon came to a close, reform as opposed to revolution 
seemed to be the new ideal of radical thinkers and movements. Thomas Paine's 
Rights of Man inflamed the heart of many a radical towards the end of the 
eighteenth century and its impact was no less during the start of the nineteenth. 
However, the revolutionary zeal that accompanied Paine's work during its early 
inception gradually turned to enthusiastic calls for reform. II It was during these 
early years of the nineteenth century, after the war with France, that it became 
clear to many observers that the Tory government of the day was corrupt and self 
serving and that some radical change was needed. As Wickwar notes: 
The Government had failed to secure the welfare of its subjects, and 
the criticism of many of them went to what seemed to be the root of 
the trouble: they sought a remedy in a change of constitution rather 
than a change of policy or of men. 12 
The post war slump brought no better life for the majority of working people in 
Britain, even the middle and upper classes were suffering hardships. No longer 
could the people blame the war with France and its drain on resources for their 
II The reasons for this change in direction of many of the late eighteenth/early nineteenth 
century radicals are many and complex. However, a large part of the transition has to be seen in 
the perceived failure, by many, of the original ideals of the French revolution. The ideals in 
themselves were not at fault. but the way in which Napoleon contorted these ideals sounded 
alarm bells in the minds of many radical thinkers and agitators; reform was increasingly being 
perceived by agitators as the way in which society could be changed. 
12 W. H. Wickwar. The Struggle for Freedom of the Press 1819 -1832 (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1928). p. 49. 
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miserable plight. The answer was becoming clearer, the blame for their plight and 
its solution lay closer to home. Without any radical reform in the political 
structure of Britain, reform which gave men the right to have a say in the running 
of their country, there would be no rest for those who sought to challenge the 
patronage, corruption and privilege at the heart of the British political system. 
Those who did challenge the excesses of political privilege provided the 'lower 
orders' with the ammunition to generate a critical consciousness that would 
eventually seek to replace the 'oafish' patronage of Parliament with a more 
democratic system of government. As Hollis argues in The Pauper Press 13 , the 
working-class justification for freedom of the press particularly during the early 
part of the nineteenth century rested primarily, as seen in other arguments 
discussed in other chapters in this work, on the extension of the franchise and the 
repeal of taxes on the poor. The 'Unstamped' press (both working-class and 
middle-class) during this time was chiefly concerned with highlighting the 
injustices of privilege and the corruption inherent within such a non-
representative system of government. 
One such challenger ofthe status quo was Major John Cartwright (1740-1824) an 
ex-sailor and early pioneer of the cause of political reform (he was politically 
active even before the French Revolution), who took a diligent part in many of 
the radical movements of the time. Imprisoned in 1813 for his views, he 
published a number of reformist works including Take Your Choice which was 
his main work on radical reform and which forms the basis of much of his 
political philosophy. In addition to Take Your Choice, Cartwright wrote Rights 
and Liberties, or an Act for a constitutional Parliament, which was published 
13 P. Hollis, The Pauper Press, A Study in Working-class Radicalism of the 1830's (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1970). 
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after he spent a year touring the provinces gauging the discontent of many 
workers and labourers. 
Osbourne notes that 'Cartwright helped to shape the policies which were to 
influence the mainstream of British radicalism until the middle of the nineteenth 
century'14; however, this radicalism was centred around reform rather than 
revolution as gradual reform was the key to uniting middle-class moderates with 
radical working-class movements. Even though he was an advocate of peaceful 
change rather than violent insurrection, IS in 1820 Cartwright found himself 
indicted for being: 
malicious, seditious, evil-minded and unlawfully and maliciously 
intending and designing to raise disaffection and discontent in the 
minds of his Majesty's subjects, and intending to move them to 
hatred and contempt of the government and constitution as law 
established. 16 
Following this indictment, he was fined £100. However, this did not deter 
Cartwright as his clear and strident message, particularly aimed at advancing 
liberty for the poor, could not be more pronounced: 
Every person if not a peer is a commoner, or a member of the 
democratic branch of the state; and consequently hath, with all other 
commoners, an equal right to legislative protection, and the means 
of it by having a vote in electing Representatives of the Commons. 
To this right the POOR have equal right with, but far more need 
than the rich. 17 
14 J. W. Osbourne, John Cartwright (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 18. 
IS See Cartwright's If Letter to the Luddites which he urged the working-class to avoid violent 
insurrection as an example. 
16 Cited from 'The Life and Correspondence of Major John Cartwright', published in 1826 by 
Cartwright's niece F. Cartwright, in Osbourne, John Cartwright, p. 128. 
17 In an extract form a letter to Sir John Bailey, Knight of His Majesty's Justices of the Court of 
the Kings Bench. Cartwright outlined 23 clauses in his 'Bill of Rights' in which he advocated 
the 'establishment of Liberty on immovable grounds'. Black Dwarf, No. 26, June 27. 1821, p. 
926. sections 9 and 10. 
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As was the case with many radical dissenters of the day, Cartwright had a number 
of 'near misses' with the authorities, as his publications attacked the corruption 
and greed of the government; it was becoming clear that in order to get his 
message across, battles with the courts over his publication practices would 
become even more fervent. 
At the same trial at which Cartwright was being fined £100 for Take Your Choice, 
another political agitator and publisher was also under indictment at the same 
hearing. Thomas 1. Wooler (1786-1853) was not as lucky as Cartwright as he was 
imprisoned for fifteen months for similar charges to that of Cartwright. Thomas 
Wooler was a radical reformer who in 1815 published the radical pamphlet Black 
Dwarf, which John Cartwright supported financially and to which he contributed 
regular articles and letters. Black Dwarf was a sharply satirical pamphlet aimed at 
making 'public men look ridiculous'.18 In some contrast to other pamphlets, 
Wooler's Dwarfheld nothing back in its calls for political reform and justice for 
the poor. Wooler advocated the notion of 'open constitutionalism' where debates 
about new forms of political organisation were out in the public sphere and open 
to scrutiny of government and people alike. The Black Dwarf was particularly 
adept at presenting the status quo in stark terms and was often the target of 
censorship. Like other radical pamphlets, the Black Dwarf was vehement in its 
criticism of the 'establishment press' in which the interests of those in power 
were represented. Such 'corruption of the press' was perceived as a vehicle of 
exploitation as the 'so-called' middle-class radical press presented the case of the 
poor, but with the interests of the rich still firmly in hand, as this critique of the 
paternalism of the middle-class press highlights: 
The weak and ignorant are accustomed to look up, as they turn to it, 
[the press] to their "betters" for such information as it may please 
18 Wiclcwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 57. 
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them to bestow. Afraid of fonning any opinions for themselves, the 
timid beg them, of those who live by keeping them ignorant, and 
leaving them destitute. When tyranny was defeated in its open 
attacks upon the liberty of the people, it devised a more covert, and 
more successful means of warfare. It flattered the prejudices, and 
fostered the credulity of the people. It commended their valour, that 
they might not exert their strength:- it complemented their wisdom 
that they might not learn no more. [ ... ] Both kings and people have 
been fools enough to follow the advice of the interested knaves; and 
the consequence is, that they have become the absolute masters of 
both - plundering the one, and imprisoning the other [ ... ].19 
The Black Dwarf was particularly eloquent when it came to arguing that the 
censorship of vehicles such as the Black Dwarf was useless, as it only reflected 
the existence that many working people were experiencing. Unlike much of the 
utilitarian radical press that was to emerge, and which as we have seen saw that it 
was enough to merely educate the poor, the Dwarf did not patronise its audience. 
The paternalism of the utilitarians saw that the poor needed to be educated as to 
the causes of their misery and guided accordingly. Wooler and Cartwright knew 
that working men and women were more than capable of realising and 
understanding the causes of their misery without such paternalistic guidance. 
Moreover, they were quite capable of coming up with their own solutions to their 
problems and need not be patronised by the middle-class press, radical or not. 
Such a belief in the ability of the poor to comprehend and negotiate their plight is 
demonstrated in the following passage and combines the case for a free press with 
the cause of the working man and woman: 
These [censorship] laws, and the various inferences which the 
country magistrates are to be empowered to make at their pleasure, 
in confonnity to the general design of exterminating everything 
radical, it is presumed will be sufficient to effect the great object of 
rendering the people loyal and happy. It is presumed the poor will no 
19 Black Dwarf, Vol. II. No. 42, October, 1818, p. 666-667. 
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longer discover they are hungry, or naked when the radical press 
ceases to infonn them of it [ ... ].20 
E. P. Thompson in The Making of the English Working-class notes that the period 
of the radical press during the early 1820s was very important in that it paved the 
way for the emergence of a distinct class consciousness when 'there came a 
climactic contest between Old Corruption and Refonn. '21 This is clearly evident 
in the writings of the working-class radicalism of the day, as the powers of the 
press were seen as a constituent part of the movement for refonn within the 
context of the interests of the poor, which were not solely parliamentary. Such 
interests fennented within the context of such radicalism and laid the seeds of 
working-class movements that were to come much later. 
This aspect is evidenced in the work of another pro-refonn pamphleteer - William 
Cobbett (1763-1831). Cobbett was initially a Tory but after travelling in France 
and America he became influenced by the work of Thomas Paine; as a result he 
became more radical and by 1806 was a strong advocate of Parliamentary refonn. 
The first time that Cobbett felt the wrath of the libel laws was in 1810 when he 
had, a year earlier, criticised the use of German troops by Britain to quell a 
mutiny in Ely. The result was a conviction for seditious libel and a resulting 
sentence of two years in Newgate prison. On his release Cobbett continued to 
attack British policy in the pages of the Political Register, particularly the 
censorial newspaper taxes. Cobbett severely distrusted the ordinary press and 
sought to enlighten everyday people about the real roots of their day to day 
tunnoil. 'The root cause of their distress was political and constitutional, and not 
primarily due to either machinery or profiteering.,22 In his popular Weekly 
20 Black Dwarf. Vol. VI. No.1. January. 1821. page 16. 
21 E. P. Thompson. The Making of the English Working Class (London: Victor Gollancz. 1980 
[1963]). p. 781. 
22 Wickwar. The Struggle for Freedom of the Press. p. 53 
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Political Register, later to become the Political Register, Cobbett was vehemently 
outspoken, reacting against the privileges of the establishment and the liberties 
they took to the detriment of normal working people. Cobbett, however, was 
despairing of their lack of verve for political change, change that would benefit 
the middle-classes as well as journeymen and labourers. Seeing working people 
as being pivotal to change, he reduced the price of his Weekly Political Register 
to two pence in 1816 (later to be known as 'Twopenny Trash'), in the hope of 
stirring up unrest and dissatisfaction amongst the working class; he also changed 
its distributed form from a newspaper to a pamphlet. As a result, Cobbett's 
Political Register soon had a circulation of 40,000 and was now the main 
newspaper/pamphlet to be read by the working classes. 
An example of his agitational prowess is evident 10 his 'Address to the 
Journeymen and Labourers' in the Political Register in 1816. In this issue, 
Cobbett severely criticised the British constitution which he saw as highly 
dysfunctional to the majority of British subjects in that it deprived them of the 
right (as he saw it) to have their say in the running of the country. Although he 
did not advocate violence as such, the increasing number of riots and disturbances 
was seen by him as almost a natural consequence of the misery inflicted upon 
working people, asking: 'when did hunger listen to reason'.23 Cobbett saw that 
violence would lead to even greater repression and never viewed it as an answer 
to the problems of the poor, thus he placed great emphasis upon reform of the 
Parliamentary system. He was sure that if he could make people aware of the 
system upon which their misery was founded, they would understand how and in 
what way government could be reformed. Issue 'No. 18' of his Political Register 
was one of Cobbett's most celebrated attacks on the political system in Britain. In 
the pamphlet, Cobbett attacked the nature of its constitutional make up and 
23 Political Register, No. 20, May 18111, 1816, col. 626 
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lambasted those in power for exacting vast amounts of taxes from the working 
people of the country: 
As to the cause of our present miseries, it is the enormous amount of 
taxes, which the government compels us to pay for the support of its 
armies, its placemen, its pensioners, and for the payment of the 
interest of its debt. That is the real cause has been a thousand times 
proved; and, it is now so acknowledged by the creatures of the 
government themselves.24 
He continues: 
The remedy is what we have now to look to, and that remedy 
consists wholly and solely of such a reform in the Commons, or 
People's House of Parliament [ ... ]. We must have that first or we 
will have nothing good [ ... V5 
Twenty thousand copies of the famous 'No. 18' were sold within two weeks, 
forty-four thousand within a month, and two hundred thousand within the next 
year.26 In 1817, Cobbett heard that he was again to be tried for sedition and fled to 
America where he continued to publish the Political Register with the help of his 
friend William Benbow, who was based in London. Wickwar notes that '[I]t was 
then for the first time that one who was conscious of being a writer with a social 
message tried to speak to (my emphasis) the people instead of speaking for them, 
to lead them instead of patronising them, and to educate them instead of lecturing 
their unheeding Government. '27 He goes on to argue that this marked an 
unprecedented moment in press history, in that the printing press not only became 
the instrument of the oligarchic Parliamentary Government, belching out 
government propaganda, but also the instrument of democratic change in terms of 
its potential to reach a large number of people with its message. I am not sure that 
24 Political Register. No. 18. November 2nd. 1816. col. 435. 
25 Political Register. No. 18. November 2nd, 1816. cols. 453 and 454. 
26 J. W. Osbourne, William Cobbett (New York: Rutgers, 1966), p. 54. 
21 Wickwar, The Slrugglejor Freedom ojlhe Press. p. 54. 
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Wickwar is totally correct in this assertion, as the printing press had already been 
used in the production of many 'pro-democracy' political tracts; not least Thomas 
Paine's Rights of Man. However, it is correct to assert that this particular 
medium, cheap to produce and readily available, was pivotal in creating a form of 
political consciousness that was in part responsible for a new mood of radicalism 
that sought great change in the political system. 
At this period in time, many other similar messages were being echoed from like-
minded individuals who saw the use of print as a key means to undermine the 
corruption of the current political system. The pamphlet or weekly was now being 
perceived as a potent political force in generating and maintaining political 
dissatisfaction amongst the un-propertied classes. Rather than aiming to record or 
report particular events as did newspapers and magazines, the pamphlets sought 
to effect or shape events, and they were much cheaper to produce and distribute. 
Also, as newspapers and magazines had to depend upon advertising for their 
existence, the pamphlets expressed the views of one, or a small number of 
disaffected individuals, and due to their low cost did not, for the most part, have 
to depend upon advertising revenue.28 
As with many of the pro-refonn pamphleteers, Cobbett was also a vehement 
advocate of a free press which he saw as necessary in order to contribute to 
widespread liberty in general. As Osbourne notes: 'Basic to Cobbett's ardent 
championing of a free press was his insistence upon the ability of people to 
choose correctly between truth and error if an argument was presented without 
favour. ,29 An example of Cobbett's belief in the freedom of the press is revealed 
in a letter to the Prince Regent regarding the dispute with the American States. He 
28 In his Political Register, William Cobbett originally refused to allow space for 
advertisements, though he changed his views later on in the life of the pamphlet and allowed 
some advertisements. 
29 Osbourne, William Cobbett, p. 59. 
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notes: 'If left free, it is impossible that it can, upon the whole produce harm; 
because, from a free press discussion will flow; and where discussion is free, 
truth will always prevail [ ... ].'30 Clearly we see Cobbett stressing faith in human 
rationality as a mechanism by which the truth could be attained. Thus an early 
example of the truth argument which, as we have seen, has its roots in the 
Enlightenment belief in rational progress. This stress on rationalism, is present in 
the arguments already discussed in this work. It is also clear that Cobbett views a 
free press as a vital mechanism by which it is possible to keep officialdom in 
check by public scrutiny. As such we can make connections here with the 
accountability argument already discussed in the introduction to this work and 
seen in operation in Chapter Three. 
Another notable ally of Cobbett was Henry Hunt (1773-1835). In 1800, Hunt was 
introduced to radical politics by Henry Clifford, a lawyer, whilst in prison for a 
domestic matter involving a member of the aristocracy, Lord Bruce. Clifford 
introduced Hunt to like-minded men such as Richard Carlile, Thomas Hardy and 
John Home Tooke. It was a natural progression for Hunt to become actively 
involved in radical politics. Hunt soon became a prominent figure in the radical 
movement and gained a reputation as a fine orator and the name of the 'Orator 
Hunt' followed him throughout his career. With Richard Carlile, Henry Hunt was 
speaking in St Peters field in Manchester in 1819 when the yeomanry charged and 
killed eleven people in what later came to be known as the PeterIoo massacre. He 
was later arrested and charged with holding an unlawful and seditious assembly. 
The resultant sentence saw him in Illchester gaol for six months. In addition to 
Parliamentary reform, Hunt was involved in other issues that were particularly 
pertinent to working-class people, issues including child labour and the call for a 
ten-hour day. Hunt too was subject to censorship and his printed speeches often 
30 Political Register, No.5, February 1. 1812. col. 129. 
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suffered at the hands of censorship legislation. Hunt was also opposed to the 1832 
Refonn act as it did not give the franchise to working-class men. 
As the refonn movement took hold, more and more men were prepared to risk 
fines or imprisonment for the sake of advocating a greater system of democracy. 
William Hone (1780-1843) was one such radical refonner. Hone was an 
auctioneer and bookseller who after his move into publishing in 1818 soon found 
himself at the mercy of the Attorney General for blasphemous libel. Much of 
Hone's publications involved parody, partiCUlarly aimed at the Royal family and 
the ministers of Government. Hackwood31 describes Hone's writing at this time 
as 'always topical and full of invention, and by a happier combination of 
caricature and satire, they oftener than not accomplished the particular purpose 
they aimed at [ ... ] .'32 In 1817 Hone published the pamphlet entitled Hone's 
Weekly Commentary, this short-lived periodical being replaced by the cheaper 
(two pence) Reformer; both publications lambasting the current political set up, 
and such diatribes were to get Hone and his supporters in trouble. The first 
incident that found Hone in trouble with the courts concerned an alleged insult to 
the Prince Regent. After the Prince's speech on the opening of Parliament in 
181 7, the Prince, on his way from Parliament found himself being attacked 
verbally and physically (stone throwing and other acts of civil disobedience). 
Hone reported the incident and argued that for the most part that there had been 
an overreaction by the Prince and his entourage. However, Hone did report on the 
ill feelings of public opinion towards the Prince Regent and he dared reflect that 
such public outrage was enough to ruffle the feathers of the Courts given that they 
were concerned to avoid further outbursts of public dissatisfaction. At this time of 
public unrest the Government did its utmost to hinder the development of ideas 
31 F. W. Hackwood, William Hone His Life and Times (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912). 
32 Hackwood, William Hone, p. 219. 
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and opinions that it viewed as seditious, or which sought to make political capital 
of civil unrest. In no time the government moved to pass measures such as the 
Seditious Meetings Bill, a Treasonable Practices Bill and the Army and Navy 
Seduction Bill. In 1817 these (and other similar) Bills were passed in the Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Act. It would now become much easier for the Government to 
hinder the reform movement, with prosecutions for criminal libels becoming 
easier to secure. Hone and his parodies were an ideal target. Although Hone was 
not part of any secret society or political club, the Attorney General found that by 
charging Hone with blasphemy with regard to his parodies of the Church, Hone's 
sedition could be kept in check and made an example of. Hackwood notes: 
[Hone] was marked out for prosecution simply because it was 
possible to construe his 'parodies' as blasphemous [ ... ] when 
charges of sedition failed to convict a man, a conviction for 
blasphemy had been secured from the mQst public spirited juries.33 
On May 3, 1817 William Hone was arrested and imprisoned on three separate 
charges of 'printing and publishing certain impious, profane and scandalous 
libels,' although Hackwood argues that the arrest was solely down to the biting 
satire against the ministers of government. In three trials Hone represented 
himself in Court and much of his defence rested on references to Church 
hypocrisy. Hone recited work of a similar nature to his own which had gone 
previously unpunished and was written by Church dignitaries. This line of 
defence lasted over three days and was meticulous in its construction and 
execution, and he was subsequently found not guilty on all charges. Hone's trials 
and subsequent acquittal can be seen as a pivotal event in free press law as there 
was no other instance after the trial of a prosecution being brought forward 
against a 'witty parody'. William Hone had found a method of attacking the 
33 Hackwood. William Hone, p. 122. 
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status quo which was safe from public prosecution.34 Hackwood notes of Hone's 
trial that it 'must be regarded as a landmark in the history of the public press; '35 if 
this is so, then so too must the trial of William Cobbett noted above. 
The agitators above then represent political radicalism that sought, via arguments 
for a free press, to enlighten the working class so as to challenge the Old Regime 
of privilege and corruption. Thus in this sense, freedom of the press is 
instrumental in overcoming the Old Regime and part of a wider struggle for the 
franchise. Clearly, the arguments of the radicals and dissenters highlighted above 
provide arguments that are similar to those expressed by utilitarians and later by 
liberal commentators. Notably the fundamental stress on rationality, the search 
for truth and the assertion of public accountability in politics via a free press. 
However, though the accountability argument and the truth argument are being 
articulated in much the same way as the utilitarian and liberal arguments, a 
crucial difference is an emerging sense of class cohesion within socialist 
discussions of freedom of the press. The accountability and truth arguments are 
increasingly being articulated in the interests of the working classes themselves 
rather than a middle-class elite who act as guides or leaders for the poor. As we 
saw starkly in Chapter Four, similar arguments were used but with an overt 
paternalistic tone. Cobbett, Cartwright and Hone saw themselves not as leaders of 
the working classes as such, but as facilitators to their incorporation into the 
machinery of politics and political practice. What we have is an early assertion of 
working-class interests that seeks to highlight middle-class complicity in the 
torment of the working classes, the quote from the Black Dwarf No. 26, June 
1821 cited above being a good example of this type of analysis. Though at this 
stage familiar arguments were employed, stressing accountability and the 
34 William Hone later published The Three Trials of William Hone in which he gave full account 
of the proceedings against him and his articulate and calculated defence. 
35 Hackwood, William Hone, p. 170. 
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assertion of truth, the emphasis of these arguments was increasingly focussed on 
the social whole, and particularly on working-class interests within this social 
whole. Thus within these early attempts at a broader more inclusive social 
analysis are starting to develop notions of class identity and class cohesion. 
Theses themes will reverberate more strongly in arguments later to be developed. 
6.4: Free Speech as an End in Itself: Richard Carlile 
Although as has been noted the struggle for a free press often went hand in hand 
with the struggle for Parliamentary refonn, there are also examples of a free press 
being fought for as an end in itself, as a political ideal. One such tireless 
campaigner was Richard Carlile (1790-1843). Carlile, a journeyman tin-plate 
worker, suffered greatly as did many of the craftsmen and labourers in the early 
part of the nineteenth century. He was an avid reader and spent much of his 
money buying 'agitational' literature; inspired by these works he set himself the 
task of first circulating and then producing similar works. Before long, it became 
clear to Carlile that a free press was of utmost importance. He notes: 
Having my attention drawn to politics, I began to read everything I 
could get my hands on with avidity, and I soon saw what was the 
importance of the Free Press. I had the same opinion of Mr 
Cobbett's two penny sheets, ofMr Hone's register, and indeed of all 
that was published in 1816. As well as to read I began to scribble, as 
I wanted to be doing something in the great cause as I saw it then. I 
was an enthusiast with the best intention and anxiety to do more 
good than I saw doing. Being fired with ardour by the political 
publications of the day, in the spring of 1817 I resolved to try my 
fortune at giving them a more extensive circulation.36 
One of the pamphlets that Carlile sought to give a greater audience was the 
Republican, later to be known as Sherwin's Political Register. This 'Painite' 
36 G. A. Aldred, Richard Carlile, Agitator, His Life and Times (Glasgow: Strickland Press, 
1941). Sections reproduced in edited form from pages 52-55. 
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pamphlet was published by W.T. Sherwin. However, due to the increased risks of 
publishing such material, Sherwin decided that he would confine himself to 
printing alone and leave publication to someone else. Carlile was only too keen to 
oblige, taking up an offer from Sherwin on his shop and the publication of the 
Republican. He continues: 
As the publisher of Mr Sherwin's Political Register, and as the 
person responsible for the publication, it was I who urged him on to 
that strength of writing and sometimes even violence which he 
subsequently assumed, and which I knew was calculated to keep up 
the other political writings to something near the standard. I may 
look upon myself as the author of all bold writing for it was the 
work of my responsibility, and he was always encouraged by me to 
go his full length under a pledge that I would never give him up as 
the author unless he wished it. This fearless responsibility on my 
part brought the Gorgon into existence, and evidently led to many 
other spirited publications.37 
Carlile's first taste of the libel laws was as a result of printing Hone's parodies, 
for which he served eighteen months in prison. Whilst in prison he amused 
himself by writing. On his release he published a satirical attack on the Anglican 
Communion Service.38 However, Carlile's most celebrated conflict with the libel 
laws came as a result of publishing Thomas Paine's Age of Reason and Elihu 
Palmer's Principles of Nature. Previously these publications had been 
condemned as seditious and blasphemous; however, Carlile felt that it was his 
duty to republish these tracts in the hope of pressing forward his claim to absolute 
freedom of the press. It was no surprise to anyone when on January 12th 1819, the 
new Attorney General, Sir Robert Gifford, indicted Carlile for blasphemy 
following his publication of Paine and Palmer's works. If this was not enough, 
37 Aldred. Richard Carlile. p. 54. 
38 The title page read: 'The Order for the Administration of the Loaves and Fishes; or. The 
Communion of Corruption's Host [ ... J.' 'Printed and Published by Richard Carlile. and sold by 
those who are not afraid of incurring the displeasure of His Majesty's Ministers. their Spies or 
Informers. or plunderers of any denomination.' 
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Carlile was also to be charged with sedition on account of his letters to the King 
and Prime Minister concerning the killing of eleven people at the Peterloo 
Massacre in Manchester.39 Carlile was later released on bail. However, before the 
Court of the Kings Bench on 12 October 1819, Richard Carlile was charged with 
being a 'wicked, impious, and ill-disposed person, who had caused to be printed 
and published a scandalous and blasphemous libel of, and concerning, the Old 
Testament. ' 
The following trials, based upon three separate instructions, produced a clear 
statement of the Court's case against a free press, and, as usual, the reason for the 
vehemence of the prosecution reflected a deep unease by the establishment about 
dangerous publications and the effect of such material on the 'lower orders'. As 
Aldred notes: 
The prosecution wished to protect the lower and illiterate classes of 
society from having their faith sapped and their minds diverted from 
those principles of morality which were so powerfully inculcated by 
the Christian religion. When such noxious productions were 
deliberately put into the hands of the ignorant, into the hands of 
those, who unlike the rich and powerful, were unable to draw 
distinctions between ingenious but mischievous arguments and 
divine truths, like vice, they become familiar to their minds, all 
respect and veneration for religion would diminish, and 
consequences too painful must ensue.40 
Carlile's defence was based upon convincing the jury that Paine's Age of Reason 
was not a blasphemous work as charged but a tract on 'human improvement'. In 
his defence, Carlile read passages from the Age of Reason to the jury, hoping to 
show them at first hand that the charges against him were ridiculous. Carlile then 
tried to read extracts from the Bible to substantiate Paine's assertions in the Age 
39 The rally was also addressed by Henry Hunt and attended by between 50, 000 and 60, 000 
people. 
40 Aldred, Richard Carlile, p. 64. 
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of Reason. The Judges, the Attorney General and the jury denied Carlile this 
opportunity, arguing that Carlile would only attack and revile the Christian 
religion and this would cause great offence to many and 'injure the minds of 
individuals' . 
On his summing up of the first instruction against Carlile, Chief Justice Abbott 
noted that a man might, in accordance with the law, doubt or disbelieve in the 
divinity of the Christian religion. He might also communicate these beliefs to 
others so long as he did it 'privately' 'silently' and 'respectfully'. However, by 
publishing opinions which openly attacked the 'veracity' ofthe Bible, it was clear 
that the defendant aimed at creating a breach ofthe peace!1 The jury found Carlile 
guilty. He was subsequently led from the dock and taken into custody. The next 
day Carlile appeared in court on account of the second instruction against him for 
publishing Palmer's Principles of Nature; an indictment instigated by the Society 
for the Prevention of Vice.42 Again, Carlile was found guilty. On the fifth day of 
the trials, Carlile was brought into court and charged with publishing a seditious 
libel in Sherwin's Register; however, the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice 
postponed the prosecution. The case was never called upon again. Richard Carlile 
was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of £1,000 for publishing 
Paine's Age of Reason, and one year imprisonment and a fine of £500 for 
publishing the Principles of Nature. 
Although Carlile was an advocate of Parliamentary reform, the main focus of his 
energies were dedicated to a free press as a crucial component of human 
development. Unlike many of his contemporaries who saw a free press as being 
41 Aldred, Richard Carlile, p. 72. 
42 'The Society for the Suppression of Vice' was founded in 1802. Its aim was to keep a 
watchful eye on blasphemous literature and encourage godliness and virtue throughout Britain. 
In its Annual Register the guardians of public morality, as they saw themselves, were keen to 
suppress any material which, whether lewd or not, could pose a threat to the moral, social and 
political fabric of Britain. 
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something to fight for as a method of gaining political representation, Carlile saw 
a free press as an end in itself. He notes: 'My whole and sole object, from first to 
last, of the time of putting off my leather apron, to this day, has been a Free Press 
and Free Discussion. ,43 When we examine Carlile's arguments we can see that his 
view of freedom of the press as an expression of the rational character of man and 
as a means to overcome oppression and corruption, echoes the sentiments of 
Paine. As he notes - 'correct principles require nothing but a clear and forcible 
statement to have them adopted and admired [ ... ].'44 He continues: 
The first object necessary to raise man from a degradation is to show 
him what he ought to be, and elevate his mind with useful 
knowledge and sound philosophical principles. This Paine saw, and 
no human being before or since has ever elevated the minds of 
mankind to so great an extent. No man can rise from reading the 
writings of Paine without feeling an additional importance, in his 
character of man, and as a member of society. Paine troubled not 
about inculcating respect and obedience to existing powers: the first 
object he taught man was to examine whether those powers were 
constituted and existing for the welfare of society at large; if not, to 
set earnestly about reconstituting them, not by any violence, but by 
temperate discussion and a dissemination of correct principles. To 
the best of my ability I have endeavoured to tread in the steps of that 
celebrated character.4s 
Clearly we have a representation here of the accountability argument and the truth 
argument. Evident here is the combination of the two in the arguments of Carlile. 
The truth unveiled, society and mankind will be the better for it. On the surface, it 
seems that the socialist justification articulated by Carlile and that espoused later 
by classical liberals such as Mill are very similar. Similar in the sense that both 
stem from the Enlightenment belief in rational progress and both point to 
43 R. Carlile, cited Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 75. 
44 R. Carlile, cited Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 74. 
4S R. Carlile, cited Wickwar, The Struggle/or Freedom o/the Press, p. 74. 
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unfettered debate and openness as a means of obtaining greater understanding and 
truth of a given situation. 
Though similar these arguments do diverge in one key area. The crucial 
difference between the approaches, is centred upon each position's underlying 
analysis of society. For Mill and for liberalism in general, the focal point of 
society is determined by the realm of the individual. Individuals' rights are 
inviolable, whether they be the right to gain profit from another's labour; the right 
to own property or the right to speak freely on whatever matter one chooses, and 
no authority has legitimacy over these rights.46 Thus the right to free speech 
coupled with the truth argument within this context is connected to the rights of 
individuals as autonomous, free-thinking beings. 
From a socialist perspective, however, even in the more immature representations 
(from the likes of Cobbett and Hone), the notion of individual rights is rejected as 
it succumbs to fundamentally divisive aspirations; whether they be the divide 
between the middle-class in their paternalist role as 'superior guide' for the 
working man, or the capitalist who sets himself apart from the worker within the 
context of capitalist production relations. For the liberal, the autonomous 
individual is posited as the central feature of the moral, political and economic 
analysis of society. In the case of developing nineteenth century radical socialist 
thought, (which is even more evident in later works), there is a clear 
understanding that the search for truth, through an unrestricted press is necessary 
for the great mass of people to come to terms with their existence and further 
their interests as a whole. The focus on the individual search for truth, is 
46 This list of liberal rights is obviously not comprehensive, nor should it be assumed that these 
rights are to be acted upon without some prior restraint i.e. these rights are acceptable only if 
they do not infringe upon another's equally valid rights. 
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sunnounted by unified movement towards collective understanding. It is worth 
quoting the following passage from The Red Republican at length: 
[W]e must not say I, but must say we. It must be understood that 
rights are only the results of accomplished duties, that the theory is a 
dead letter whenever we do not practically translate the principle in 
our every day acts [ ... ]. Those who follow their individual 
susceptibilities, refuse the little sacrifice which organisation and 
discipline exact, deny, in virtue of the habitudes of the past, the 
collective faith they preach. Every man who pretends by the isolated 
labour of his intelligence, however powerful it may be, to discover 
to-day a definitive solution to the problems which agitate the 
masses, condemns himself to error by the incompleteness in 
renouncing one of the eternal sources of truth - the collective 
intuition of the people in action. The definitive solution is the secret 
of victory. Placed to-day under the influence of the medium we 
desire to transfonn, agitated in spite of all the instincts - by all the 
reactionary feelings of the combat between persecution and the 
spectacle of egoism given us by a factitious society built upon by 
material interests and mutilated in its most noble faculties, we can 
hardly seize what there is of most holy, most vast and most energetic 
in the soul of the Peoples. Drawn from the depth of our cabinets into 
the teaching of tradition - disinherited of the power which springs 
from the cry of actuality, from the I, the conscience of humanity, our 
systems cannot be, in great part, other than an atomising of corpses, 
discovering evil, analysing death, but powerless to comprehend life. 
Life is the people under emotion, it is the instinct of multitudes 
elevated to an exceptional power by the contact, the prophetic 
feeling of great things to do, by spontaneous, sudden electrical 
association in the public place; it is action exciting to the highest of 
all the facilities of hope, devotion, enthusiasm, and love which 
slumber now, and revealing man in the unity of his nature in the 
plenitude of his realising powers,,7 
Not only though do we see an emphasis on accountability and truth as serving the 
interests of the social whole, we also see the importance of generating and 
developing a coherent critique of the prevailing political and economic system. 
47 The Red Republican. No. 12, Vol. 1, September 7th 1850. 
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Therefore, the use of the truth argument from a socialist position rests upon far 
more critical grounds for free speech than for liberals in that it is not based upon 
the 'supposed' rights of individuals, but the 'necessary' commitment, especially 
by the later socialists, to disentangle the complex, socially divisive and 
contradictory nature of capitalist production relations and offer the foundations of 
a more egalitarian, less socially divisive society. In an analysis taken further by 
Marx, the cult of individualism is transcended by de-mystifying commodity 
production relations and the real rational nature of mankind emerges. Importantly, 
unearthing of the 'truth' is not accomplished by theoretical positions that 
emphasises individual political action, but by social action and participation; the 
transmission of ideas into practice - praxis. I will discuss this aspect of socialist 
thought in greater detail below. 
For now we can observe, particularly in the works of Carlile, a socialist argument 
for freedom of speech that takes on an overt rationalist tone with an emphasis on 
discussion and exchange of ideas leading towards a better understanding of how 
society could be organised for the masses. In Carlile's work there are also 
currents of the accountability argument, but the thrust of his arguments for 
freedom of speech seem to point to a belief in rationalism and the attainment of 
certain truths about the proper organisation of society. This absolute belief in 
liberty of the press for Carlile is, as it was for J. S. Mill some years later, a means 
of achieving a rationally grounded mechanism for generating knowledge about, in 
Carlile's case, the welfare of society as a whole. In expressing this focus on wider 
social inclusion and participation, indeed a sense of equal citizenship, that clearly 
emanates from Paine, we see Carlile re-articulating the truth argument in a way 
that is largely absent in Mill's arguments. 
Carlile, even from his prison cell in Dorchester gaol, never ceased to be active in 
the name of liberty of the press and social and Parliamentary reform. E. P. 
Thompson sums up Carlile's radical character when he notes that 'unlike Cobbett 
and Wooler, who modified their tone to meet the Six Acts in the hope of living to 
fight another day (and who had lost circulation accordingly), Carlile hoisted the 
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black ensign of unqualified defiance and, like a pirate cock-boat, sailed straight 
into the combined fleets of State and Church. '48 
6.5: Holyoake. Hetherington and Harney, Radicalism Unfettered? 
As noted, a key socialist agitator and propagandist of the nineteenth century was 
of course Robert Owen. Clearly, Owenite socialism was a strong current of 
working-class radicalism of the nineteenth century, and as previously highlighted, 
Owen himself was largely unconcerned with the movement for a free press. One 
political activist who was sympathetic to Owenite views, and who saw the 
struggle for a free press as being part of the struggle for working-class rights, was 
George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906). Although many of the dissenters and 
propagandists mentioned in this chapter can be accredited with belonging to what 
might be termed a socialist tradition, few can be more firmly seated than George 
J. Holyoake. 
Coming from a solid working-class background in Birmingham, Holyoake had 
both adroit abilities and intellectual prowess even at an early age. At the age of 
seventeen, he was introduced to the socialist ideas of Robert Owen and developed 
a sympathetic ear for Owenite socialism and co-operativism. Holyoake soon 
cultivated a reputation as a radical atheist and socialist, often contributing articles 
to the secularist journal Oracle of Reason which was edited by Charles 
Southwell. After the arrest of Southwell on charges of blasphemy in 1842, 
Holyoake became the journal's new editor and not long after, he too was charged 
with blasphemy and 'condemning Christianity'. He was sentenced to six months 
in prison. After his release Holyoake began the journal called The Movement 
which was replaced three years later by The Reasoner, espousing secularist and 
co-operativist views. Because of his radical views, Holyoake became associated 
48 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 791. 
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with the likes of Carlile and Hetherington and as such was 'committed to the 
principle that all men should be allowed to express their views in whatever 
language they saw fit, being punished not by the law but by the contempt or 
indifference of the reading public. '49 Although fighting the Owenite cause, 
Holyoake was not in full agreement with all of Robert Owen's views, was closely 
associated with the Chartist movement and, as such, was disillusioned with the 
1832 Reform Act and in particular the 1834 Poor Law. Following on from 
Carlile, the Chartist movement saw the fight against censorship as an element of 
the struggle for working-class rights as a whole. 
Another key agitator who is perceived to have taken forward the socialist agenda 
during the nineteenth century was Henry Hetherington, who with his editor 
Bronterre O'Brien produced the Poor Man's Guardian from 1831 to 1835. The 
Poor Man's Guardian was one of the chief organs of working-class radicalism in 
the 1830s. Avowedly anti-middle class, the radical Poor Man's Guardian 
developed an analysis that increasingly took into account the new political 
economy developed by middle-class radicals such as Ricardo, James Mill and 
McCulloch, and made popular by middle-class radicals like John Wade, Francis 
Place and Charles Knight. sO Hollis notes that there were two radical periods of 
socialist agitation, from that stemming from the likes of Cobbett and Wooler 
writing in the earlier 1820s, to the more developed critical works of the likes of 
Holyoake, Hetherington and O'Brien in the 1840s. She notes that the first period 
was focussed mainly on Old Privilege and as such denounced the aristocracy and 
the church with a particular emphasis on taxation of the poor and an extension of 
the franchise. The second period was more sharply concerned with economic 
exploitation of the poor, though again with particular emphasis on further 
49 A. C. Marshall, Lewd, Blasphemous &: Obscene; Being the Trials and Tribulations of Sundry 
Founding Fathers of Today 's Alternative Societies (London: Hutchinson, 1972), p.131. 
so See P. Hollis, The Pauper Press, Chapter VII. 
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extension of the franchise and an end to Parliamentary corruption. Moreover, this 
'new analysis was compounded by the exploitation theories modified by other 
sources of social criticism, the attack on Old Corruption, land theft and 
competition; and it was stretched and shaped by debates with popularised 
political economy. '51 
As such, the arguments for a free press that emanated from the likes of 
Hetherington echoed the sharper more focussed critique emerging from working-
class sympathisers and agitators that went on to influence the Chartist movement 
later on in the 1840s. Indeed arguments for a free press gradually became 
subsumed within Chartism and it was left to a few key writers, including 
Holyoake,s2 to continue the critique of censorship. In the first edition of The Poor 
Man's Guardian, Hetherington sets out clearly his defence of a free press, a 
defence that not only has within it strong working-class sympathies, but also a 
sharper sense of coherent class awareness: 
Yes, we buckle on our armour of patience and perseverance - we 
draw forth our sword of reason, and we brave the whole host of 
tyranny! Defiance is our only remedy; - we cannot be slave in all: we 
submit to much - for it is impossible to be wholly consistent - but 
we will try, step by step, the power of RIGHT against MIGHT, and 
we will begin by protecting and upholding this grand bulwark and 
defence of all our rights - this key to all our liberties - THE 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS - the press, too, of the IGNORANT 
and the POOR! we have taken upon ourselves its protection, and we 
will never abandon our post: we will die rather.S3 
Clearly the emphasis on 'we' is strong and the notion of Hetherington writing as 
part of the working class and on behalf of the working class sets him apart from 
51 Hollis, The Pauper Press, p. 220. 
52 Holyoake and Hetherington both had some involvement in the setting up of the largely 
middle-class organisation the 'Association for the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge' which 
was effectively run by middle-class liberals and MP's. See chapter S. 
53 The Poor Man's Guardian. No.1, July ~ 1831. 
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the likes of Place or Cobden and even Cobbett to some degree, who saw 
themselves as over and above the emergent working class.54 In addition to the 
shaping of a class consciousness was a burgeoning economic analysis within the 
pages of The Poor Man's Guardian. Although relatively immature, some of the 
language is similar to that employed much later in the works of Marx. Indeed 
John Saville notes that O'Brien's contribution in particular had an affinity with 
the broader historical understanding of Marx and Engels:55 
Everywhere do we find hordes of lazy, dark-minded villains, 
devouring the fruits of industry, and ruling the population with ropes 
and bayonets. Every where do we find the foot of insolence upon the 
neck of virtue, and innocence craving mercy at the feet of guilt. 
There must be a cause for this. Such complicated wickedness could 
not exist without a cause. Yes fellow-country-men! there is a cause, 
and only one cause, but that a perfectly adequate cause. It is told in a 
word, and though it is almost death to name it, we shall tell it you, -
IT IS "PROPERTy!".56 
Fools imagine that it is the government that makes itself what it is, 
when the real fact is that the government is only the creature of the 
usurious classes to protect them in their exorbitant profits, rents, and 
impositions on the labouring classes. The middle-classes, or profit 
men, are the real tyrants of the country. Disguise it as they may, they 
are the authors of our slavery, for without their connivance and 
secret support no tyranny could exist. Government is but a tool in 
their hands to execute their nefarious purposes.57 
The above passage goes on to note how the working class can impact on the 
'profit-mongering' capitalists by way of 'mutual exchanges of labour for labour 
54 Examples of increasing class consciousness developed through class association was the 
formation of organisations like the 'London, Working Men's Association' formed by 
Hetherington and Lovett and later the 'London Democratic Association', formed by Harney, 
Davenport and Neesom. 
55 1. Saville, The Red Republican and The Friend of the People in Two Volumes. Introductory 
notes (London: Merlin Press, 1966), p. ii. 
56 The Poor Man's Guardian. No. 164, July 26th 1834. 
57 The Poor Man's Guardian. No. 126, November 2nd 1833. 
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on the co-operative principle.' What is starting to emerge within this analysis is 
the idea of an alternative economic and social system which again influenced the 
Chartist movement. 
In addition to the development of a sharper more focussed class consciousness 
and a critical economic analysis, we also have some insight into the mechanism 
for social change. Thus stemming from an increasing class awareness was the 
developing belief that the working classes themselves could be the agents of 
social change. Rarely was overt revolution and violent revolt explicitly called for 
in the pages of The Poor Man's Guardian, but there was, however, the assertion 
of the possibility that the working classes could bring pressure on the status quo 
through direct action - petitions, demonstrations, processions etc. Thus we see a 
strong sense of social solidarity and belonging to a broad social group. These are 
clearly important elements of a socialist vision, and we can see arguments for 
freedom of the press reflecting these beliefs. 
Although The Poor Man's Guardian did not advocate violent insurrection, some 
pamphlets that have their intellectual roots in The Poor Man's Guardian did, one 
of which was edited by George Julian Hamey8 and entitled The Red Republican 
(the title was later changed to The Friend of the People). This publication 
provided a voice to the more extremist tendencies within the Chartist movement. 
The Red Republican and the Friend of the People provided a damning critique of 
capital and of middle-class reformers, who were perceived as apologists for 
capital with their 'individualist' theories of reform. Rather than stressing 
autonomy and individuality within which freedom would be expressed, such 
S8 George Julian Harney (1817-1897) had, in his teens, worked as a shop boy with Hetherington 
and O'Brien on The Poor Man's Guardian and as such soon developed a keen interest in 
working-class politics, an interest that soon developed into active participation. See Saville, The 
Red Republican. 
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pamphlets stressed a wider social perspective and analysis, where the social 
whole was the focus of attention rather than the realm of the individual: 
The modem bourgeoisie, the discoverers of the natural rights of 
men, have raved and are increasingly raving against feudalism, 
against serfdom and bondage. They call it the age of anarchy and 
oppression; yet they have commenced business with the stock which 
they accumulated under the wings of feudalism; they have extended 
that knowledge and industry which they acquired under its 
protection; they have abolished serfdom and bondage for their own 
aggrandisement, and have created a numerous proletariat - modem 
slaves - who have to get a scanty subsistence by working for 
wages.59 
Before we move on and for purposes of clarity, it is necessary to summarise the 
arguments present thus far in this chapter. We can observe that a justification for 
freedom of speech was emerging which started to differ in significant ways from 
the arguments discussed in the previous chapters. Initially we see that the 
accountability argument was evident in early working-class radical arguments 
from the likes of Cobbett and Cartwright, with however, a greater sense of 
inclusion and belonging. Carlile's emphasis on the social whole and the 
progression of society through greater understanding takes the earlier socialist 
arguments closer to Mill's assertion of individual fulfilment being attained 
through the search for truth. However, as we have seen, Carlile's arguments differ 
significantly from the later arguments developed by Mill, in that the emphasis on 
the social whole and of society moving forward in a state of solidarity that is 
increasingly class bound is in stark contrast to Mill's stress on individual 
autonomy. This is later emphasised to an even greater extent when one examines 
the work of Holyoake, Hetherington and Julian Harney, whose work starts to 
develop a stronger notion of class awareness and cohesion - the working classes 
acting in the interests of themselves. As such, arguments for freedom of speech 
59 The Friend o/the People. No.4, January 4th, 1851. 
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start to take on a radically different character from the arguments cited 
previously. The later arguments represented in this section offer us a critical 
denunciation of capitalist exploitation. An assertion of freedom of speech is being 
harnessed to undermine the arguments of middle-class elites, with equality and 
solidarity being highlighted as a key component of their analysis. 
Though similar to the truth argument articulated by Mill, the key difference 
between the arguments of Mill and the arguments presented above, are that 
working-class radicals believed that the working classes themselves could 
progress towards a greater understanding of their condition and through this, they 
could become the chief organ of political change. Mill was far less confident 
about the working-classes' ability to progress towards the truth and thus 
adequately comprehend their plight and come to terms with the causes of their 
misery. This is one reason why Mill was largely not in favour of immediate 
representative democracy. He thought that it was perfectly reasonable for 
intellectuals, or those of higher intelligence, to have a greater say in public affairs 
and politics. Though Mill saw that everyone could eventually realise their full 
individual potential if social and economic conditions permitted, it was 
imperative that political power be balanced in favour of those who had the 
necessary expertise. This analysis lay in contrast to that in the pages of the Red 
Republican: 
In demanding representative institutions, universal suffrage, freedom 
of the press, trial by jury, and the usual order of "Reforms," 
advocated by mere political agitators, the people of Continental 
Europe were ignorant of the all-important fact that such ''reforms'' 
are utterly valueless, unless associated with such social changes as 
will enable the great body of the community (my emphasis) to 
command the actual sovereignty of society. Political freedom is 
incompatible with social slavery.60 
60 The Red Republican. No.1, Yol.1, June 2200 1850. 
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And following the summary from Robespierre's Report of the 18th Pluvoise: 
We desire an order of things, in which all the mean and cruel 
passions shall be chained down, all the beneficent and generous 
passions awakened by the laws; in which ambition shall consist in 
the desire of meriting glory, and serving our country; in which 
distinctions shall spring from but from equality itself; in which the 
citizen shall be subject to the magistrate, the magistrate to the 
people, and the people to justice; in which the country shall ensure 
the prosperity of every individual, and in which each individual shall 
be elevated by the continual intercommunication of Republican 
sentiments, and by the wish to merit the esteem of a great people; in 
which all the arts shall flourish as the decorations of liberty that 
ennobles them; and in which commerce will be a source of public 
riches, and not the monstrous opulence of a few great houses only.61 
Again it seems that the assertion of equality and a sense of fraternity and 
solidarity is a key feature of differentiation between the arguments from truth in 
Mill and in key sections of the working-class press. It is this sense of class 
dynamism, uniting a class in the interests of itself, with equal respect for all, 
whatever their mental capabilities and aspirations, that separates the truth 
argument from that of the working-class radical press, from that of Mill. 
Hollis notes that the campaign to repeal the stamp taxes on newspapers between 
1830 and 1836 is important in at least five ways. Firstly, it was another arena for 
the battle for popular education; secondly, it opened up the market to cheap 
literature; thirdly, it united, to some degree, working class and middle class 
radicals in that some of their aims and methods overlapped; fourthly and fifthly, 
the war of the unstamped had 'its own martyrs and heroes' which contributed to 
the development of a working-class critique of exploitation, poverty and 
government and as such went a long way in laying the seeds of a unified class 
consciousness. This assertion by Hollis provides a useful analysis of the role of 
61 The Red Republican. No.1, VoLl, June 2200 1850. 
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the unstamped press in developing a critique of capitalism and the Old Regime. 
What Hollis's examination shows us is that the later socialist analysis went a long 
way to advancing the repeal of the stamp taxes and made moves into changing the 
plight of the working class, through self recognition and self-awareness. Thus 
what we see are the makings of a sufficiently distinct set of arguments for 
freedom of speech. As we have seen, the stress on belonging to a social group, 
whose interests are shared, is crucial. 
Having examined some of the arguments of working-class radicals during the 
nineteenth century, we can see the development of a set of arguments for freedom 
of speech that are changing character to those highlighted in previous chapters. 
To emphasise this further, I now turn to Marx's work on freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press, which stresses the components highlighted above to an even 
greater degree and with greater analytical sophistication. In doing this I will turn 
firstly to Marx's arguments in the Rheinische Zeitung. 
6.6: Censorship. Oppression and Capital.' Marx and Freedom o[the Press 
In short, Marx argued that free speech was essential to the spiritual and 
intellectual development of man. When the shackles of capitalist oppression were 
removed, man would be free to express himself and develop true to his species 
being. Marx's justification of free speech serves a dual purpose, firstly 
highlighting the oppressive nature of the state therefore being part of the 
mechanism for bringing about its destruction; secondly it is as an inherent 
ingredient to man's fulfilment in a rational, and in Marx's case, communist 
society. Though we see some parallels here to some of the arguments above, it is 
necessary to go further and explore in greater detail Marx's arguments for 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
In April 1842 Karl Marx began his journalistic career, writing for the 'liberal' 
Rheinische Zeitung newspaper. His work was of such a calibre that he progressed 
to editor only six months later. Much of his time, similarly to other young 
Hegelians, was spent severely criticising the oppressive nature of the Prussian 
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regime. After the death of Frederick Wilhelm III, there were hopes that a more 
sympathetic, less repressive monarch might make life easier for everyone, 
especially critical journalists. When the new monarch acceded to the throne, he 
did issue a new press instruction, one which surprised and pleased the majority of 
journalists with its leniency. The new instruction decreed that the official censors 
should be less rigorous in their prosecutions and more lenient when implementing 
existing laws. 
Unlike many other journalists who saw that the latest Prussian censorship 
instruction was less severe than the previous one, Marx was not as easily pleased 
and saw that 'the new instruction, far from liberalising freedom of the press, 
simply add[ ed] new chains'. 62 In his first work as a revolutionary journalist, an 
article entitled Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction,63 Marx 
aimed to show the hypocrisy and orthodoxy of the newly revised and, as he saw 
it, even more strict press legislation. Although as McLellan64 notes, Marx's 
writing at this time was highly eclectic and somewhat unsystematic, we can 
observe the fonnulation of a foundation on which Marx's justification for free 
speech and a free press was fonned. Marx questioned whether the new instruction 
really advanced the freedom of the press; more likely it was an even clearer 
indication ofthe tightening grip of censorship. 
As with all the arguments represented above, which express the spirit of 
enlightenment progress through critique, continued questioning was of course an 
62 A. F. McGovern. 'Karl Marx First Political Writings: The Rheinische Zeitung. 1842-1843' 
in Demythologising Marx (Boston: College Chestnut Hill. 1969). p. 26. 
63 Marx. In Marx and Engels Collected Works (MECW) , Vol. 1, (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 1975), note 39, p. 738. This article was prompted by the new censorship instruction of 
Dec. 24, 1841. Originally intended for the Deutsche Jahrbucher. the article was subject to the 
new censorship restrictions. It eventually appeared in 1843 in Switzerland in Anekdota zur 
Neuesten Deutsche Philosopie und Publicistik. a collection of works by 'oppositional' authors. 
However, selected excerpts were published in the Mannheimer Abenzeitung in 1843. 
64 D. Mclellan, Karl Marx Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 17. 
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important component of human development. Marx at this stage of his 
intellectual development saw free speech and a free press as a necessary condition 
of self-examination and progression; press freedom was necessary if the press 
was to develop and improve itself. Moreover, and more in keeping with the 
socialist analysis, self-understanding through a free press was essential for the 
people as a whole to gain awareness of their predicament and come to terms with 
the nature of their existence. For Marx, a free press was 'the spiritual mirror in 
which a people can see itself, and self-examination is the first condition of 
wisdom' .65 More than a mere characteristic of freedom, free speech in its own 
right was the means by which people could grasp their own destiny and further 
their own interests as a class: 
The free press is a ubiquitous vigilant eye of the people's soul, the 
embodiment of a people's faith in itself, the eloquent link that 
connects the individual with the state and the world, the embodied 
culture that transforms material struggles into intellectual struggles 
[ ... ].66 
This particular statement explicitly provides a primary justification for Marx's 
advocacy of a free press. There is more than a hint in this passage that Marx saw 
free and open criticism, the 'vigilant eye of the people', as necessary if the people 
are to improve their lot. Clearly here we have an extended version of the 
accountability argument, it is extended not only in terms of connecting the 
'individual with the sate' with a 'vigilant eye', but also turning that eye inwards 
towards themselves as a people. As such we see a more critically reflective 
accountability argument, one that not only projects its gaze on the state, but also 
towards the people themselves. This type of argument is crucial with regard to 
Marx's understanding of political action, in that only when the people truly come 
to realise their plight in totality, can they begin to make strides to change their 
65 K. Marx, 'Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction', (MECW), Vol. 1, p. 165. 
66 Marx, 'Comments on the Latest Pruss ian Censorship Instruction', pp. 164-165. 
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predicament. Later works by Marx highlight this process much more clearly. By 
emphasising the effects of political economy, Marx is demonstrating the power of 
capital to mystify social reality. Through a thorough analysis which stresses 
dialectical historical insight Marx exposes the power of capital as a force of 
oppression. 
For later socialists and Marx in particular, (and this represents a more 
sophisticated analysis than earlier socialists), capitalist commodity production by 
its very nature mystifies social relationships; relationships, which appear on the 
surface as freely chosen by individuals and equitable, are subsumed in the inverse 
logic of capitalist commodity production. These relations disguise the material 
relations between individuals and are thus self mystifying. The result is an 
alienated workforce which cannot grasp the reality of their situation. It is helpful 
again here to draw on the work of Marx: 
Political economy hides the alienation in the essence of labour by 
not considering the immediate relationship between the worker 
(labour) and production. Labour produces works of wonder for the 
rich, but nakedness for the worker.67 
In the much later work Capital, Marx outlines the way in which commodity 
production is itself self mystifying: 
Capitalist production is the first to develop the conditions of the 
labour process, both its objective and subjective ones, on a large 
scale - it tears them from the hands of the individual independent 
worker, but develops them as powers that control the individual 
worker and are alien to him. In this way capital becomes a highly 
mysterious thing.68 
67 K. Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in Mclellan, Karl Marx Selected 
Writings, pp. 79-80. 
68 K. Marx, Capital Vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1976 [1867]), p. 1056. 
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It is not, however, impossible for us to break through the barriers of mystified 
capitalist production relations and the effect these have upon society. Part of the 
answer in helping the working class do this depends upon working through the 
errors imposed upon us by commodity production. For socialism, free speech, via 
unrestricted criticism, is such a mechanism for helping to overcome the 
mystification of society and exposing the inherent contradictions of alienating 
capitalist production. 
A re-articulated truth argument, based upon this premise, IS a consummate 
mechanism which enables mankind to work through the inverse logic of 
capitalism and overcome its repression. Any restraint upon expression, whatever 
that expression might be, can halt debate and hinder the search for greater 
understanding of society's situation and so serves capitalist domination of 
mankind. It is clear that Marx and other radical agitators that belong to the 
socialist tradition were committed to free speech partly because it could help 
break down the mystified social relations of capital and serve to undermine these 
relations and help replace them with a more rational and just mode of production. 
Thus the instrumentality of free speech emerges again, but this time with a 
parti~ular twist, free speech takes the form of both a means to an end as well as 
being a constitutive end in itself.69 Even in the more immature socialist advocacy 
of free speech we can see that knowledge is necessary so as to provide the mirror 
in which 'the working man can see himself as the most useful and most important 
member of society, raising him in his own estimation [ ... ].'70 
Thus we can discern a representation of Marx's understanding of the function of a 
free press with regard to political action. The free press is in itself political, as it 
69 In the conclusion of this chapter I speculate on the importance of freedom of speech within 
the socialist vision of the ideal society. 
70 Hollis, The Pauper Press. p. 20. 
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is an expression of political freedom, and it also promotes, in Marx's view, 
political awareness and activity among the population. This argument, in short, is 
a more reflective form of the accountability argument and the truth argument 
which as we have seen is also evident in later socialist arguments. However, this 
reflective component is far stronger in Marx as there is a more explicit sense of 
political dynamism in his arguments. In Marx's view, active engagement in 
political action was necessary to overcome the oppressive nature of the state, and 
this political action in part stems from the operation of freedom of speech. It 
stems from reflection and interpretation, and this was necessary for change. 
Famously in his Theses on Feuerbach Marx emphasises the importance of 
political activity. Criticising Feuerbach, Marx notes that: 'he does not grasp the 
significance of "revolutionary", of "practical-critical", activity. '71 He continues: 
'philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to 
change it. >72 
It is true that Marx eventually realised the limits of merely advocating free 
speech, whatever the motives that lie underneath this advocacy. Free speech was 
perceived as not the sole ingredient for social change. This is where the 
connection between philosophy, action and Marx's later, more scientific, analysis 
is most acute. In Marx's Preface to a Critique of Political Economy (1859), he 
argues: 
At a certain stage of their development, the material productive 
forces of society come into conflict with existing relations of 
production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing -
with the property relations within which they have been at work 
hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these 
relations tum into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social 
71 K. Marx, 'Thesis on Feuerbach', in D. McLellan, Karl Marx, Selected Writings (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990, [1845]), p. 156. 
72 Marx, 'Thesis on Feuerbach', 158. 
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revolution. With the change of the economic foundations the 
immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. 73 
It is then according to Marx, the contradiction between social forces that is the 
pivotal parameter that undermines capitalist production relations. However, the 
notion of free speech plays an important role in the writings of the younger Marx 
with particular reference to notions of political understanding and its contribution 
to social change and praxis for the working class as a whole. 
Thus we have an explicit connection between philosophy and political action, 
with freedom of speech playing a major part. The re-applied accountability 
argument is therefore infused with an assertion of radical political action and 
change. 
This radicalism is stressed further when we examine Marx's view of democracy. 
Doveton argues that Marx also saw democracy as 'the essential means by which 
the working-class can express itself politically' .14 Institutions based upon 
democratic principles would ultimately 'challenge social inequality and reinforce 
proletarian struggle.' Marx, in keeping with the socialist tradition, viewed the 
implementation of universal suffrage as part of man's move towards a truly 
rational state: 
In democracy the constitution itself appears only as one 
determination, that is, the self determination of the people [ ... ] In 
democracy the formal principle is at the same time the material 
principle. Only democracy, therefore, is the true unity of the general 
and the particular.1s 
73 K. Marx, 'Preface to A Critique of Political Economy' [1859]. McLellan, Karl Marx 
Selected Writings, p. 389. 
14 D. Doveton. 'Marx and Engels on Democracy'. History of Political Thought. Vol. XV. No. 
4. Winter (1994) pp. 555-591. 
7S Doveton, 'Marx and Engels on Democracy'. p. 559. 
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In later works too, Marx is clear that democratic fOTITIS of social and political 
organisation are the key to real freedom: 'Freedom consists in converting the state 
from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinated to it 
[ ... ].'76 Here we can see a move away from a narrow view of democracy as a 
system of majority rule to a situation in which every person eligible is able to 
participate equally, with equal respect for individual dignity and choice. This 
more egalitarian conception of the accountability argument is a crucial feature of 
truly representative democracy, as we see emerging a conception of equal respect 
for opinion and choice; one of the key cornerstones of socialist political thought. 
As we saw with Berki's four 'tendencies' of socialism, the first tendency he 
highlights explicitly rests on notions of equality and a sense of equal respect for 
all. 
Though we can see that Marx articulated a more sophisticated fOTITI of the 
accountability argument, which has its roots in a dialectical understanding of the 
nature of history, the themes represented above could be seen as re-articulations 
of the arguments of Hetherington and Harney. In order, however, to stress the 
sophistication of Marx's arguments for freedom of the press, and how these 
arguments take socialist arguments forward, we must examine further Marx's 
analysis of rationality and freedom. 
6.7: Marx, Rationality, Freedom and Unfreedom 
The arguments represented above go a long way in highlighting the shift in 
emphasis of the socialist arguments for freedom of the press. In highlighting 
Marx's contribution, we see this shift in emphasis even more clearly. However, 
by taking an even closer look at Marx's political philosophy, we are provided 
76 K. Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', in Mclellan, Karl Marx Selected Writings, p. 
564. 
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with further evidence of this shift. Indeed, we start to uncover the fundamental 
components of Marx's analysis, which shape his understanding of the nature of 
freedom and its contrary state. By gaining an understanding of Marx's concept of 
freedom, a clearer perception of the role and function of freedom of speech is 
provided. 
Before we can get to grips with Marx's conception of freedom and its opposite, 
we must initially re-examine the basis on which these arguments are made, and to 
do this we return to the concept of rationality and its connection to what Marx 
terms 'species being', in essence - real freedom. As we have seen, Marx leans 
heavily on Enlightenment assertions about the progress of rationality for 
enhancing human existence. This emphasis on rationality is reinforced by Marx's 
claim that the essential characterisation of man is as a social being, acting 
rationally to further the interests of the social whole. This state of man's essential 
species being for Marx is the expression of real freedom, as it is freedom from 
want, exploitation and oppression and the freedom to create and develop. The 
natural state of man is to act socially and intellectually and universally: 
Man is a species being [ ... ] because he relates to himself as to the 
present, living species, in that he relates to himself as to a universal 
and therefore free being. [ ... ] The whole character of a species, its 
generic character, is contained in its manner of vital activity, and 
free conscious activity, is the species characteristic ofman.77 
Thus for Marx freedom is the essence of mankind as creative and intellectual 
being unbound by the constraints that commodity production and political 
economy engenders. This assertion is reinforced by the focus on rationality as a 
fundamental component of man's species being - as such Marx sees that 
77 K. Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts', in McLellan, Karl Marx Selected 
Writings, pp. 82-83. 
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unfreedom is connected to irrationality. We will now see how this hypothesis is 
incorporated into Marx's understanding of freedom and censorship. 
In Marx's early articles in the Rheinische Zeitung, it is apparent that he is 
employing a critical rationalist analysis of the mechanism of the Prussian state. 
This critique, as Teeple78 notes, 'was the method by which reason, in the person 
of the philosopher (in this case Marx), would confront the real world. ,79 What 
follows is 'the real world becoming philosophical, that is, rational, and 
philosophy becoming worldly.' Philosophy, or rationality, necessarily must 
impose itself upon the real world of existence and correct the defects of such a 
world. The crucial component within Marx is his understanding of the disjuncture 
between the real world of irrationality and the world of the rational. In order to 
place the irrational world in some context, the rational world must be highlighted. 
In Marx's writings we see that his conception of the 'real' state represents his 
conception of rationality; Marx's ideal is represented in abstract terms in the 
notion of the rational state. Again, it is helpful to quote Teeple at length: 
As a concept, the state is seen as a whole, an organism, a community 
with a reality above and beyond the sum of its parts. It is only within 
this community that freedom can be realised; human nature being 
social nature, individuals only become human in relation to others, 
therefore freedom can have meaning only in the reflexive relation of 
the particular whole. Law, here, is to be understood as embodying 
the moral essence of rational principles of human behaviour, in 
short, the theoretical expression of freedom. And rationality is the 
state of affairs in which the interests of the whole are reflected in the 
individual and the interests of the individual are represented by the 
whole.80 
18 G. Teeple, Marx's Critique of Politics 1842-1847 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984). 
79 Teeple, Marx's Critique of Politics, p. 29. 
80 Teeple, Marx's Critique of Politics, p. 30. 
271 
This real, rationally based nature of man for Marx is the essence of freedom, as it 
is based upon mankind's real social nature, and this real rational state is one 
which Marx set against the existing state, and formed the basis of his criticism of 
it. These criticisms were directed at various measures undertaken by the state 
whose aims were divergent from the real rational state which stems from the 
essence of the community. Articles such as Debates on Freedom of the Press and 
Publication of the proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates81 and Debates on 
the Law on Thefts of WOO(f2 as well as other articles throughout this period, show 
Marx highlighting the disjuncture between the rational state and the actually 
existing state. The conflict between rationality and irrationality - between real 
freedom and unfreedom - was keenly represented as the conflict between narrow 
private interests i.e. the interests of capital, and the wider interests of society and 
humanity. It was clear to Marx that the state acted solely in its own interests, 
which were of course unrepresentative of the interests of the people as a whole. 
This meant the state was acting 'unnaturally'; it was operating contrary to the real 
state, whose interests, by definition, are the interests of the whole. 
In order that this position be corrected, and the state operate naturally in the 
interests of society, and to resolve this contradiction and generate a solution, an 
element should be introduced, which by its nature would counter private interests 
and convey the basis of true politics. This element would be a free press. A free 
press would not stand alone as a separate entity but would operate as a 'mediator 
between the divergent elements of existence and therefore be the means to bring 
reality into accord with its essence':83 
[b]ecause they [the censors] want to regard freedom not as the 
natural gift of the universal sunlight of reason, but as the 
81 In MECW, Vol. I, pp. 131-181. 
82 In MECW, Vol. 1, pp. 224-263. 
83 Teeple, Marx's Critique of POlitics, p. 42. 
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supernatural gift of a specially favourable constellation of the stars, 
because they regard freedom as merely an individual property of 
certain persons and social estates, are in consequence compelled to 
include universal reason and universal freedom among the bad ideas 
and phantoms of" logically constructed systems". 84 
It is clear that the basis of Marx's criticism of censorship lay in its irrationality in 
helping generate and then maintain the condition of unfreedom. Censorship 
represents only one interest in society: the interest of the state, which itself 
represents a minority of property-owning individuals, whose interests by their 
nature according to Marx, are at odds with those of the majority. Real freedom 
therefore is seen as rational, it is incompatible with illusory freedom in which 
men and women as individuals are perpetually in competition with one another: 
From the standpoint of the idea, it is evident that freedom of the 
press has a justification quite different from that of censorship 
because it is itself an embodiment of the idea, an embodiment of 
freedom, a positive good, whereas censorship is an embodiment of 
unfreedorn, the polemic of a world outlook of semblance against the 
world outlook of essence; it has a merely negative nature. 85 
Marx went even further and saw the nature of censorship as something distinct in 
itself and worthy of examination. Censorship was perceived by Marx as almost a 
form of sickness, a sickness that 'pollutes itself and the people as a whole'. 
Censorship was also an expression of the dominating nature of the state acting for 
its own interests at the expense of the majority: 
The government hears only its own voice, it knows that it hears its 
own voice, yet it harbours the illusion that it hears the voice of the 
people, and it demands that the people too should itself harbour this 
illusion. For its part therefore, the people sinks partly into political 
84 K. Marx, 'Debates on Freedom of the Press And Publication of the Proceedings of the 
Assembly of the Estates'. Rheinische Zeitung, No. 130, Supplement, May 10, 1842 (MECW), 
Vol. l,p.151. 
85 K. Marx, Rheinische Zeitung, No. 132, Supplement, May, 12, 1842, (MECW), Vol. 1, p. 
158. 
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disbelief, or, completely turning away from political life becomes a 
rabble of private individuals.86 
Censorship then, attempts to justify its own existence in that it sees itself as 
protecting the public, while in reality it is protecting its own interests, those being 
the interests of capital and private property. Marx saw censorship as part and 
parcel of wider oppression, in the sense that it is an expression of unfreedom and 
an explicit one: 
The censored press remains bad even when it turns out good 
products, for these products are good only insofar as they represent 
the free press within the censored press, and insofar as it is not in 
their character to be products of the censored press. The free press 
remains good even when it produces bad products, for the latter are 
deviations from the essential nature of the free press. A eunuch 
remains a bad human being even when he has a good voice. Nature 
remains good even when she produces monstrosities. The essence of 
the free press is the characterful, rational, moral essence of freedom. 
The character of the censored press is the characterless monster of 
unfreedom; it is a civilised monster, a perfumed abortion.87 
Marx was clearly attempting to show the irrational and contradictory nature of 
censorship and how it fitted in with the wider mechanisms of oppression. Marx 
viewed free speech, exemplified in a free press, as an actual expression of 
freedom which is fundamental to mankind's species being, and one that is 
essential if society and mankind is to develop and flourish to its fullest potential. 
Clearly freedom of the press, as with other freedoms, is part and parcel of a 
particular conception of freedom and corresponding to this position is its 
opposite: unfreedom. There is certainly no shortage of debate on the particular 
86 K. Marx, 'Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction', (MECW), Vol. 1, p. 167-
168. 
87 K. Marx, Rheinische Zeitung, No. 132, Supplement, May, 12, 1842, (MECW) , Vol. 1. p. 
158. 
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nature of Marx's conception of freedom. 88 However, a clear understanding of 
Marx's theoretical underpinnings of freedom of speech may provide the basis for 
an improved awareness of Marx's view of freedom in general. By drawing 
attention to Marx's arguments regarding real freedom and unfreedom, I suggest 
that a whole new ontology of the liberty argument is being developed. As we 
have seen, Marx developed a thorough explication of rationality and its relation to 
freedom and connected it to his understanding of the pure essence of mankind as 
a species being which is rational, creative but above all social. Here we see Marx 
asserting notions of liberty that go far beyond the narrow individualism of liberal 
thought. Marx's notion of freedom here is the embodiment of rationality applied 
to all individuals, to all society, to all humanity. 
In suggesting both a re-applied version of the accountability argument, and an 
articulation of the nature of freedom according to Marx, I am proposing that the 
Marxian justification of free speech, though having themes from the 
accountability arguments and of liberal notions of freedom within it, goes much 
further beyond its original parameters even than those that emanate from within 
the more radical socialist argument provided in previous sections. This is 
primarily apparent when we observe his emphasis on freedom and man's species 
being. Though I have identified examples of Marx's arguments for freedom of 
speech and placed them within the parameters of socialist arguments for freedom 
of speech during the nineteenth century, by examining Marx's arguments, we see 
a sharper analysis and one which makes freedom of speech as political praxis 
clearer and more dynamic. 
88 See S. Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); R. G. Peffer, 
Marxism, Morality and Social Justice (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1990), and G. G. 
Brenkert, Marx's Ethics of Freedom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). 
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In emphasising this even sharper analysis, I am also highlighting to a greater 
degree the difference in character of socialist arguments for freedom of speech. 
This examination of Marx's arguments provides greater weight to my assertion at 
the end of the last section, that the stress on the social whole, equality, solidarity, 
and the critique of economics makes socialist arguments for freedom of speech 
sufficiently different in character to those arguments seen in previous chapters. 
Indeed, I suggest that what this exercise has shown is that the arguments differ 
sufficiently enough for us to consider whether it is worth asserting a new form or 
type of free speech argument. 
From a socialist position, arguments for freedom of speech rest upon: a search for 
truth which is provided in part by an historical understanding of the mystified 
relations inherent in capitalist society; from this understanding some form of 
change would take place to a more rational mode of social organisation in which 
free speech would exist by the very nature of the then existing social relations. 
Within the context of rational socialist systems of organisation, the notion of 
equal participation and reward, equal respect for others' opinions resonates in 
many radical pamphlets. The virtues of true liberty, which is not compromised by 
narrow individualism, of equality which is shared by all, and of fraternity which 
sees humanity as one are asserted: 
We believe in Liberty, without which all human responsibility 
vanishes. In Equality, without which all human liberty is only a 
deception. In Fraternity, without which liberty and equality would 
only be a means without end. In Association, without which 
fraternity would be an unrealisable programme.89 
6.8: Conclusion - A New Typology of Free Speech? 
89 The Red Republican. No. 12. Vol. 1. September 7d1 1850. 
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Within the context of this chapter, it has been my intention to identify the 
components of nineteenth-century socialist arguments for freedom of speech, and 
examine examples of these arguments as political praxis. What we see at first 
glance is an articulation of the main types of arguments used by utilitarians and 
liberals. However, on closer inspection we can observe a number of elements 
within the arguments that impact on the nature of the arguments used. Indeed, I 
argue that the socialist arguments for freedom of speech are indeed sufficiently 
different from either liberal and/or utilitarian arguments; enough so, to assert a 
socialist typology of free speech in its own right. The arguments themselves, the 
accountability argument, the liberty argument and the truth argument are indeed 
to be found in the range of the socialist arguments for freedom of speech that we 
see in the nineteenth century and this is certainly no surprise as no argument 
exists in a pure form. However, the overwhelming shift in emphasis, from the 
narrow individualism of liberalism and the paternalism expressed in 
utilitarianism, to the stress of the social whole that is based on a belief in equality 
found in the socialist arguments for freedom of speech, is sufficient to change the 
character of the three types of argument in significant ways. 
It is worth returning to Berki's four 'tendencies' of socialism so as to remind 
ourselves of the wider socialist vision from which the arguments set out above are 
derivative, and within which we can view the socialist arguments for freedom of 
speech. Firstly, Berki notes that an overarching emphasis on egalitarianism is 
prominent within socialism, with a commitment to equality particularly within the 
democratic process. As I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, the socialist 
political philosophy of free speech is closely associated with the struggle for 
representation and democracy, both practically and theoretically. We see this 
most starkly in the accountability argument, the overriding premise of such an 
argument from the socialist position is that government should be accountable to 
all sections of society at all times. In other words, there is a commitment to 
complete democracy where all sections of society, irrespective of wealth, 
intelligence or social standing, have an equal part to play in the operation of 
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government. As we saw with the utilitarians, the accountability argument in 
practice generally applied to an elite of educated persons, best suited to lead the 
masses as they saw fit. This is in stark contrast to even the early arguments for 
freedom of speech based on the accountability typology. Though accountability as 
a justification for free speech is necessary to both political creeds, and it works in 
much the same way, only the socialist argument, with its core value of 
egalitarianism, stresses that this accountability should be available to all. 
Connected to the assertion of democracy as the ideal form of political 
organisation, is another tendency that Berki highlights - moralism. Again as has 
been seen, the arguments for freedom of the press, particularly in instrumental 
terms, rested upon a belief in the immorality of the aristocracy and the Old 
Regime. Less so with the later justifications but more evident with earlier 
examples, the moral weight placed on a free press was great, as the suffering 
caused by excessive taxation and lack of representation was a source of great 
misery for the poor. The free press would form part of the mechanism that would 
rectify this moral travesty. 
Berki also notes overt rationalism in which we see the second type of argument to 
be seen in socialist justifications of freedom of speech. Such arguments rest on 
the Enlightenment belief that the search for truth should be unfettered and 
unrestrained. This truth argument too, I argue, is sufficiently different in theory 
and practice as to change the character of the argument. We have seen that the 
unfettered search for truth is one component necessary, especially for Marx, in 
disentangling the mystifying relations of capital. The truth argument here though 
is sufficiently different in that it is committed methodologically to a specific way 
of interpreting and explaining historical processes; and it is linked to a connected 
process of political action, class awareness and solidarity. The truth here is 
ascertained by more than mental prowess, but by historical understanding, class 
consciousness and political action. Freedom of speech is more than a search for 
truth, it is a mechanism within a larger mechanism which leads to a 
transcendence of ideology and false consciousness towards a better society. For 
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Marx especially, unless the historical processes are confronted by reason 
untainted by false consciousness, truth is an illusion. This type of truth argument, 
which is tightly bound up with history, class consciousness and political activity 
is not to be found in the arguments of liberals during the nineteenth century. As 
such, the great weight placed on the socialist emphasis on class and history brings 
forth a sufficiently different emphasis to the truth argument. 
Finally we have libertarianism, a belief in absolute freedom from restraint in all 
spheres of activity. I have demonstrated that the socialist perception of freedom 
within socialist society is also sufficiently different to that of liberal conceptions 
with its emphasis on autonomy and individual liberty. The liberty argument 
within the context of socialism seeks to engender expression, fulfilment and a 
sense of solidarity. Freedom of expression and toleration are built into the 
socialist ontology and are therefore necessary components of an idealised socialist 
society. Unlike the liberal conception of liberty, for socialist radicals in the 
nineteenth century liberty for all is not compromised by the liberty of the few. 
The three types of argument for freedom of speech then take on a sufficiently 
different character to the arguments we saw in Chapter One and articulated in 
Chapters Four and Five. With their stress on political, social and economic 
equality, with a wider conception of freedom, the socialist arguments for freedom 
of speech are both theoretically and practically dissimilar to those we have seen 
before. In examining and analysing the range of arguments for freedom of speech 
from what has been broadly termed the socialist tradition, I have isolated crucial 
tendencies and differences in emphasis and as such, I have completed my task. 
Though it has been the purpose to identify and explore socialist arguments for 
freedom of speech during the nineteenth century in this way, it is worth stressing 
that we may get an even broader understanding of the significance of these 
arguments if we speculate on how these arguments might look within the context 
of a real socialist society. 
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Obviously, if we were to look to the so-called socialist experiments during the 
twentieth century, we see that if anything freedom of speech is often actively 
discouraged and censured. But if, as I have suggested, freedom of speech is not 
only necessary to bring about a transformation of society, but a necessary 
component of the society thus transformed, we need to at least speculate on the 
nature and function of free speech within this actually existing egalitarian, 
socialist or communist society. In other words, what implications do the 
arguments for freedom of speech, highlighted above, have on a society that has 
been transformed from capitalism to socialism? Is there any need for freedom of 
speech within such a society? If so what are its limits? 
Firstly, if we were to speculate on the political organisation of this socialist 
society, it is not beyond the realms of possibility to imagine a version of 
democratic participation and representation as the primary form of political 
organisation.90 The socialist variant of the accountability argument indeed stresses 
this point, not only does it provide a mechanism for change, but also provides an 
operational component which is necessary to a democracy. Clearly the operation 
of democratic systems requires an informed electorate, with an accountable 
political machinery of government. Thus speculating on an idealised form of 
socialist society, which has freedom of speech within a system of popular rule 
based on the sentiments expressed above, is not too problematic. What clearly 
emerges within the texts of socialist radicals in the nineteenth century is a clear 
commitment to a society in which participation in politics and equal respect for 
all is possible; in short, a notion of equal citizenship and participation. In political 
terms then, the socialist variant of the accountability argument fits neatly into a 
transformed socialist system of political organisation with little difficulty. 
~ must note that it is beyond the scope of this work to identify the exact form of democratic 
political organisation to be found within our 'idealised' democratic socialist society. 
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The socialist justification of the truth argument also has an operational 
component inherent within socialist society. Clearly within the context of social 
organisation, the operation of society will be along the lines of the socialist vision 
of truth in political practice. False consciousness is eradicated and the truth about 
the real nature of man is revealed. The historically bound transition from 
capitalism to socialism (and eventually to communism) will be proved as an 
expression oftruth. However, the operational validity of the truth argument is still 
a necessary component within our supposed socialist utopia. The search for truth 
or greater certainty in science and medicine would still presumably be necessary; 
as so too the search for a greater understanding in research and education. Here 
the Enlightenment belief in progress of knowledge is still pertinent, but is now 
bound up again with conceptions of citizenship and social solidarity. 
If we now tum to look to the socialist argument based on notions of real freedom, 
i.e. the liberty argument, we are faced with a number of issues that impact on the 
foundations of such an argument and as such this aspect of the socialist argument 
is not as simple to deal with. This said, we do not have an insurmountable 
problem, only the need for further clarification. 
As noted, the socialist conception of freedom, especially from Marx, has a 
particular conception of mankind. This is that mankind is truly free when he is 
operating within a productive social relationship with his fellow beings. This 
productive relationship is not based on any notion of oppression or exploitation 
but on a mutual understanding and respect for one's own kind. Thus to be human 
is to be social, and to be social is to be truly free. As Phillips asserts, 'socialists 
challenge individualism'; she goes on to note: 
Socialists would never define their objectives solely in terms of 
liberty and equality: the finest liberty and most scrupulous equality 
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would still be inadequate if they left us isolated and alone. [ ... ] A 
socialist society would be one in which we acknowledged and 
developed our common concerns; the movement to create such a 
society would be one of co-operation and solidarity.91 
However, the limits of freedom within socialism are similarly bound by those 
constraints that exist within liberalism. Notably, freedom can only exist within 
parameters that do not conflict with the interests, in liberal terms the individual 
and in socialist terms, the interests of the social whole. In this sense the 'liberal is 
no worse off than the socialist' ,92 This said, it is within the context of socialist 
society, where mankind is perceived to be truly free, with equal respect of opinion 
and choice for all, we can see that arguments for freedom of speech could be 
subsumed within broader arguments for toleration. We can thus imagine that in 
an idealised socialist society, freedom of speech is but one component of a 
broader conception of toleration which is based on notions of equal citizenship 
and social solidarity, as Susan Mendus notes: 
[ ... ] socialists will justify toleration both as a way of promoting a 
sense of citizenship, and as a way of sustaining a sense of 
citizenship [ ... ]. It is also the socialist desire to create a society 
where all can feel that they belong. [ ... ] [The socialist] therefore 
sees toleration as practically necessary, but also as morally required 
in the construction of a complex sense of socialist unity.93 
In sum, we have a view of freedom of speech which is liberated from the 
constraints of liberalism and capitalism; restraints we see socialism attempting to 
overcome. These restraints include inequality, oppression and poverty. In this 
sense we have arguments for freedom of speech which in a sense are re-asserted 
91 A. Phillips, 'Fraternity' in B. Pimlott, Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought (London: 
Heinemann, 1984), p. 231. 
92 S. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 161. For 
a discussion on the limits of freedom within liberalism and socialism, see Mendus, Toleration 
and the Limits of Liberalism especially Chapter Six, and A. Gutmann, Liberal Equality 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
93 S. Mendus, Toleration and the limits of Liberalism, p. 160. 
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in such as way as to ensure that freedom of speech is not just the privilege of the 
few but also a component of a more rational, truly democratic and fulfilling free 
life. 
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Summary 
The socialist justification of free speech took an evolutionary path through the 
nineteenth century. Initially claiming the right to the franchise, the argument 
developed into a radical critique of capitalist exploitation and of middle-class 
interests. From within the later arguments for freedom of speech emerged a 
stronger sense of class identification and a sharper analysis of the evils of 
capitalism. This class dimension - the demystification of production relations, 
coupled with a commitment to equality via common ownership - provides the 
socialist justification of freedom of speech with an instrumentalist and an 
operational force. The notion of equality and fraternity is pivotal to the socialist 
argument and as such changes the character of previous arguments for freedom of 
speech. In a sense the accountability argument, the truth argument and the liberty 
arguments are redefined within the context of the socialist analysis and liberated 
from their constraints as highlighted in previous chapters. What we have is a re-
articulation of free speech from within a socialist programme of political change 
and its view of the ideal formation of society. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
7.1: Aim ofthe Thesis Restated 
It has been the purpose of this work to combine an analysis of theory and action 
in the study of arguments for freedom of speech and their application during the 
nineteenth century in Britain. In undertaking this work, I have sought to add to the 
literature on both freedom of speech, and nineteenth-century press history. I have 
demonstrated that in analysing the philosophical dynamics of arguments for 
freedom of speech, and exploring these ideas in political praxis, a fresh insight 
into nineteenth century political history and political philosophy is provided. The 
language of free speech here is largely articulated in middle-class appropriation of 
the public sphere within the context of overt calls for freedom of the press, via an 
end to taxes on knowledge. Such calls can only be adequately examined in the 
light of the changing political and economic dynamic of the nineteenth century. 
By asserting that the study of political ideas necessitates a close inspection of the 
texts - the linguistic artefacts, the historical circumstances - and. the power 
dynamics of the society in question, as well as the theoretical foundations of ideas 
themselves, this thesis has provided a discussion of free speech during the 
nineteenth century which cuts across academic boundaries in that the relevant 
whole is studied rather than the particular. 
7.2: Key Arguments Summarised 
Within the context of this conclusion, it is worth summarising the mam 
achievements of this thesis. Chapter One provided an important introduction to 
this work in highlighting the focus and methodology of the thesis. In 
methodological terms, borrowing from Habermas and aided by the work· of 
Curran and Seaton, this work has sought to combine a stI'qctural and procedural 
analysis of the mechanisms of censorship, both official and unofficial, with a 
textually and contextually grounded exploration of political praxis. The official 
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components of censorship are highlighted with reference to press legislation and 
taxation. The unofficial components of censorship can be observed within the 
context of the middle-class fight for control of the press and an assertion of 
control over the so-called 'lower orders'. In addition to addressing some key 
definitional issues and reviewing relevant literature, Chapter One also outlined 
key theoretical arguments, or types of arguments for free speech, that would form 
the conceptual framework on which the main substantive chapters would be 
based. For clarity's sake, it is worth restating these three types of free speech 
argument. 
Firstly I identified the political, or as I have termed it, the accountability 
argument. This argument is thus named as it is an argument for freedom of 
speech which at its core underpins representative democratic systems of social 
organisation. Such an argument asserts that governments should be held 
accountable by those whom they represent by public scrutiny of their decision 
making processes. However, as we saw, the epistemological basis of the 
accountability argument can differ. For example Thomas Paine's argument for 
accountability in democracy stems from a belief in the natural rights of man to 
have a say in the way he lives his life. For Bentham, as I have demonstrated, such 
a notion of natural rights is posited as 'nonsense on stilts'. For Bentham, 
democracy and accountability are sought after as they are the best political system 
for promoting utility, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. After a 
discussion of the accountability argument, I moved on to discuss the liberty 
argument for freedom of speech. This type of argument is best summarised by 
noting that freedom of speech is a necessary expression of the 'natural rights' of 
man. From this position any restrictions on freedom of speech, are against man's 
natural rights, unless the free speech in question would mean that liberty of the 
individual was in imminent harm. The final orthodox type of freedom of speech 
argument outlined in Chapter One is the truth argument. Stemming from the 
Enlightenment belief in the search for knowledge and the belief in human 
progress, the truth argument is in essence based on a foundation of a belief in the 
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rational character of man. Freedom of speech in this context is necessary to 
ensure that progress through rationality is achievable for mankind. These 
orthodox types of argument thus outlined, we were better placed conceptually get 
to grips with the praxis of these arguments in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
Finally, in this section of Chapter One, I raised the possibility of identifying a 
fourth typology of freedom of speech within the context of my discussion of 
socialist arguments for freedom of speech in Chapter Six. 
The primary purpose of Chapter Two and Chapter Three was to provide a 
historical and contextual backdrop to the main substantive chapters of this thesis. 
In Chapter Two, I highlighted the historical character of arguments for freedom of 
speech, noting the rise of mechanisms of censorship from the Stationers' 
Company and the Star Chamber to the stamp tax. Moreover, the rise of arguments 
for freedom of conscience and toleration coincide with a new found belief in 
rationality and progress, a theme which reverberates throughout nineteenth 
century arguments for freedom of speech but are more developed and intricate, 
and bound explicitly to particular sectional interests. In a similar contextual vein, 
Chapter Three highlights the social, economic and cultural context of the 
nineteenth century, noting the specific historical conditions which impacted on 
nineteenth century arguments for freedom of speech. In particular we see the 
development of a strong middle-class elite and the drive towards industrialisation 
and capitalisation of the press, which severely undermined working-class 
organisations and which eventually gave rise to a strong middle-class elite. 
Chapter Four explored the utilitarian arguments for freedom of speech. The 
chapter highlighted Bentham's conception of utility and outlined how his 
commitment to representative democracy underpinned his belief in freedom of 
speech. This was highlighted with reference to the accountability argument, 
which stressed freedom of speech as a necessary component of truly democratic 
systems of government. From an exploration of Bentham's view, I then examined 
the contributions to freedom of speech as provided by Bentham's so-called 
'disciples'. Here we see a shift in emphasis in utilitarian arguments for freedom 
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of speech which I argue provide evidence of a drive to assert dominance over the 
working-classes. The accountability argument remains intact, but is tempered by a 
strong paternalist sentiment. In the arguments of the likes of James Mill, John 
Arthur Roebuck and Francis Place, we see a strong emphasis on the role and 
function of education in providing 'useful knowledge' to the masses. This 'useful 
knowledge' though posited as a means of escape from their miserable plight, was 
in fact intended to socialise the working class into a passive acceptance of laissez-
faire. By arguing that the taxes on knowledge were the root cause of the sorry 
condition of the working classes, the utilitarian praxis of freedom of speech 
provided the means to shift the emphasis away from the market as the cause of 
their plight, and place a middle-class elite in a position of dominance. In the tracts 
of pamphlets and journals, I demonstrated the explicit paternalism of the 
utilitarian praxis of freedom of speech which placed the emergent middle class in 
a position of ideological dominance. Such an assertion of ideological dominance 
was evident within the utilitarian praxis of freedom of speech in its discussions 
about political economy, education and moral censorship. Indeed it was 
demonstrated how easily arguments for freedom of speech can be transformed 
into those of censorship, by focussing on the notion of the Panopticon and 
applying its formula to the moral character of man. It has been demonstrated that 
although utilitarian articulations of free speech theory are among the first to 
actively influence policy and provide a model of political participation, the 
paternalistic tone and the assertion of middle-class hegemony over both working-
class interests and those of the landed gentry are bound together within the theory 
and praxis of freedom of speech, and as such, resonate with the particularist 
interests that were prominent at the end of the eighteenth century and well into 
the beginning of the nineteenth. 
Chapter Five sought to explore the liberal praxis of freedom of speech. Here we 
saw half of the chapter devoted to John Stuart Mill's arguments, with the other 
half of the chapter concentrating on the arguments of the more mainstream 
liberals. After a brief discussion of the main tenets of liberalism, the chapter 
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moved on to analyse Mill's early newspaper articles which provided examples of 
his developing view on freedom of speech. From this, a brief outline of Mill's 
arguments in On Liberty was provided which highlighted Mill's strong 
commitment to free speech as a means to uncovering the truth and as a necessary 
component of individual human flourishing. Following this, we examined the 
implications of Mill's arguments in the light of some of his other works. I argued 
that Mill's stress on individuality and his commitment to laissez-faire, coupled 
with his distrust of socialism, had severe implications for his arguments in On 
Liberty. The problem is highlighted in the following question: how can people be 
free to express themselves to their full potential, if they are not truly free because 
of the economic constraints placed on them by the market system? Because Mill 
asserts the primacy of the individual above all else, and asserting that the market 
system is the best form of economic organisation, he is undermining any real 
commitment to freedom of speech, as the consequences of the market system 
impedes freedom for the great mass of people. Though Mill's arguments allow' 
for freedom of speech for a small privileged minority, they are meaningless for 
the great mass of people in Mill's day. In Mill's argument, the liberty and truth 
arguments are brought together, only to be undermined by the consequences of 
the market system Mill supported. Having discussed Mill's arguments and their 
implications, I shifted my analysis to explore the mainstream liberal argument 
and praxis for freedom of speech in the nineteenth century. Here we saw 
examples of movements, primarily the Association for the Repeal of Taxes on 
Knowledge, and individuals - Richard Cobden, Collet D. Collet and John Bright, 
who articulated arguments for freedom of speech and freedom of the press 
primarily on commercial grounds. In highlighting and exploring these arguments, 
I asserted that a strong middle-class ascendancy was taking place which 
undermined working-class organisations by incorporating the language of the 
working-class radical press into their arguments but with an overriding emphasis 
on the virtues of the market as providing an answer to their problems. Similarly to 
that of utilitarianism, the paternalism inherent in mainstream liberal arguments 
for freedom of the press provided a means to break down organised labour whilst 
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at the same time attack government controls of the press. Thus after the end of the 
'taxes on knowledge', the industrialisation of the press made it nearly impossible 
for a radical working-class press to exist as costs and prices soared. Thus the 
middle-class arguments for freedom of the press should not be separated from the 
middle-class interests that they sought to promote. Though the mainstream liberal 
arguments for freedom of speech have elements of the accountability argument, 
the truth argument and the liberty argument, these arguments in praxis allowed an 
enculturation process to take place which undermined working-class interests and 
asserted middle-class dominance. Finally, in this chapter I noted that the 
arguments from Mill and those from mainstream liberalism should be separated. 
The 'thin' free speech arguments provided by the liberals such as Cobden and 
Bright, are shallow and self serving in comparison to those of Mill. 
The liberal perspective has demonstrated the vast difference in analysis of those 
who are representative of nineteenth-century liberalism. It is clear that John Stuart 
Mill is distinct in terms of level of analysis and scope from his 'liberal' 
contemporaries, many of whom, as we have seen, viewed Mill as a dangerous 
radical. However, Mill's unease at notions of community and equality raise 
difficulties in terms of his view of an idealised political community, and these 
difficulties of course, have implications for Mill's arguments for freedom of 
speech. The overt language of social control is clear in the social engineering 
sentiment of mainstream liberal arguments for freedom of speech. The force of 
enculturation of the so-called lower orders and the opening up of markets via the 
end of monopolisation of the newspaper trade buttress calls for an end to the 
ancient regime. Rather than opening up a world of discovery and potential for the 
mass of people, the middle-class argument for freedom of speech served to divide 
and quash working-class movements and assert a middle-class hegemony over the 
movement for a free press. 
The final substantive chapter of this thesis focussed on socialist arguments for 
freedom of speech and their praxis in the nineteenth century. After a brief 
discussion of the parameters of the socialist sphere of analysis, I analysed the 
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work of early socialist agitators such as William Cobbett and William Hone. In 
analysing these arguments, we see a strong emphasis on democracy as a key 
demand for the working masses and thus a version of the accountability argument 
is demonstrated. However, even in these early examples, we observe an emerging 
emphasis placed on identifying the working classes acting in their interests as a 
class as a whole, which is distinct feature of early working-class radicalism at this 
time. After briefly looking at the work of Carlile, who sought freedom of speech 
almost as a right in itself, I explore the arguments provided by a more mature 
socialist analysis. These are to be found most resonantly in the works of George 
Jacob Holyoake, Henry Hetherington and Julian Harney. In their arguments for 
freedom of speech, these agitators demonstrate a much more critical analysis of 
the capitalist system, identifying the market as a key instrument of working-class 
oppression. Furthermore, in the pages of the Red Republican and the Friend of 
the People, we see a much more clearly defined notion of class and class 
cohesion. The arguments represented here are, on the surface, derivative of the 
main orthodox arguments for freedom of speech; however, I argue that in mixing 
with the distinct features of socialist political thought, we see these arguments 
taking on a new and sufficiently distinct character. This point is developed by my 
exploration of the work of Marx and his commitment to unmasking the 
contradictory nature of capitalism and asserting a more rational mode of social 
organisation. Attention is drawn also to the socialist conception of freedom which 
is most clearly developed in Marx's conception of man as a species being. This 
being that the essence of man is to be free, to be part of the social whole, to be 
productive and creative, but importantly man must also be free from want, 
oppression and exploitation. This essential characteristic of freedom implies a 
distinction between liberal notions of freedom, which stress individuality and 
competition amongst individuals, and the socialist emphasis on freedom for the 
entire mass of society, the social whole, which is not compromised or placed 
under threat by what socialists would term the narrow individualism of 
liberalism. In highlighting these relatively distinct elements of socialist arguments 
for freedom of speech, I am asserting that the socialist praxis of freedom of 
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speech during the nineteenth century could in fact be identified as a type of 
argument in its own right, as it is sufficiently different in its emphasis from the 
orthodox arguments. I will return to this point again in my concluding comments 
below. Finally in Chapter Six I speculated on the role and function of freedom of 
speech within the context of an idealised socialist society. Here I stressed the 
importance of democracy to the socialist vision and as such, freedom of speech is 
essential to the operation of this mode of social organisation. Furthermore, even 
though the truth about the real nature of man has been uncovered and is 
articulated in the existence of a true socialist society, the drive for greater 
understanding of, for example, the scientific and natural world, necessitates a 
continuing commitment to the free and open search for knowledge, which as we 
have seen is facilitated by freedom of speech. However, the actual limits of 
freedom of speech within socialist society provide us with a more difficult 
conceptual problem. In terms of defining the limits of freedom within our 
supposed socialist utopia, we are restricted by ontological claims in the same way 
as liberalism is constrained by its ontological foundation, namely, we must limit 
freedom only if it threatens or undermines the foundations of socialist belief 
systems; contra liberalism, which sees liberty being restricted only when 
individual freedom is threatened or undermined. Though we have a theoretical 
impasse, I assert finally in Chapter Six, that within the context of a pluralist, 
tolerant and democratic community, the needs of the culturally diverse do not 
need to become relations of domination over the social whole, rather I argue that 
the socialist free speech argument has a stronger rational, moral and ontological 
basis than the arguments which emanate from liberalism. 
Although against the weight of a middle class seizure of the radical political 
space, working-class agitation still developed a sharp focussed critique of 
capitalist society which encompassed implicit and explicit political philosophies 
of free speech. The gradual maturing of the socialist critique is testament to the 
insight and determination of radicals such as Hetherington, Harney and Holyoake. 
The working-class assertion of free speech, in philosophical terms if not in 
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political terms, is powerful in that the emphasis on the social whole cancels out 
any tensions which emerge within even the more sophisticated liberal 
justifications which implicitly (in the case of Mill) and explicitly (in the case of 
mainstream liberalism) endorse levels of inequality within their 'ideal' systems 
thus restricting freedom. The Marxian dimension adds further to the socialist 
analysis in that it provides the means to demystify capitalist production relations; 
an analysis that socialists such as Harney were close to, but never articulated in 
such a sophisticated way. 
7. 3: Concluding Remarks: Reasserting Modernity 
The role and force of the radical newspaper and pamphlet as expressions of 
political praxis has been well emphasised within this work. Moreover, the ideas, 
the arguments and of course the political activity manifested within these works 
provide us with an understanding of the importance and power of political debate 
and argument expressed through these media during the nineteenth century. 
Although it is also clear that the ideas represented within such linguistic artefacts 
may not be as sophisticated as what we may call the classic texts (the contrast 
between the relatively unsophisticated arguments of Roebuck and the cultivated 
discourses of Bentham springs to mind), we can observe the role by which ideas 
permeated through political culture to force themselves on the political agenda. In 
Habermasian terms, I this we might describe as the assertion of some level of 
communicative rationality which was generated within the literature cited 
throughout this work. Such communication practices sought to develop and 
influence a massively changing social, political and economic landscape and the 
battle for the ascendancy was probably won by the middle class by the defeat of 
Chartism in the mid-nineteenth century. From then on, the power dynamic 
I See Chapter One. Section Six. 
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eventually established by the middle class helped to maintain their hegemonic 
control over the influence and levels of debate for the rest of the century. The 
middle class hold on the forces which shaped the social, economic and political 
reality of Britain during the nineteenth century has been relatively unshakeable 
ever since. 
The arguments analysed above, however, are not to be perceived as existing in a 
historical or cultural vacuum, and as such we see the orthodox arguments for 
freedom of speech overlapping and combining in political practice across the 
range of political perspectives. Moreover, even the assertion of a relatively 
distinct type of free speech argument, to be found in Chapter Six on Socialism 
and freedom of speech, must be seen in view of the fact that no political ideas are 
entirely distinct, or exist in a pure ontological form. The orthodox arguments for 
freedom of speech, after being infused with socialism, are altered in such a way 
as to create a sufficiently different type of argument. This example of ideas 
developing and transforming also emphasises the importance of the power of 
human intellect in shaping ideas as a means to progress through praxis. This is a 
significant point, as I suggest the socialist arguments for freedom of speech 
provide far stronger rational and moral justifications for freedom of speech; 
stronger arguments that might not have developed unless some sense of human 
agency and belief in rationality had been asserted. 
Of primary importance to this study is to show ideas in practice, and as such, 
echoing Skinner,2 I make the assertion that for political philosophy to have any 
impact on the way in which we view history, we must examine the context and 
articulation of these ideas in practice. This study has highlighted the role and 
function of ideas in political philosophy as providing the armoury of political 
2 See Chapter One. Section Six. 
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activity. Praxis, expressed in the radical literature above, is a feature of 
nineteenth-century political culture and this should be celebrated. This feature of 
nineteenth-century political culture is in stark contrast to the political culture of 
recent years, in that ideas and their connection to politics seem to be less a feature 
of modem political life. The faith asserted by nineteenth-century radicals, from all 
political perspectives, the faith in humanity itself to work through its 
contradictions and difficulties, is something that seems lost in the 'post-
modernisation' of political discourse. 
I believe this faith should be re-ignited. As we saw in the nineteenth-century it 
was this faith in human intellect and spirit that was asserted as a means of 
confronting despotism, injustice and oppression. It was this faith in human 
rationality that made politics meaningful, as ideas impacted on the real world of 
politics in such a way as to bring these ideas to life and help shape history. In 
doing so, rationality and humanity were affirmed as one. In this sense, political 
ideas were transformed into political action, the results of which helped shape and 
affirm a sense of humanity in those for whom political struggle was sometimes as 
important as matters of life and death; for some of course, it was more than that. 
In attempting to reclaim some sense of modernist agency, I am hoping to show in 
this thesis that historically at least, we were not all separate subjective agents, 
with identities that have no context or social power. The thesis is itself full of 
examples of ideas springing to life with a purpose and conviction that is now 
seemingly lost in our so-called post-modem times. Freedom of speech and the 
assertion of modernity seen during the nineteenth-century is just one such area 
which is an exemplar of the assertion of human rationality above all else. To 
quote Marshall Berman, in what might seem as timely encouragement for those of 
us who wish to reclaim belief in human agency: 
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[ ... ] for all of us modernism is realism. This will not resolve the 
contradictions that pervade modem life; but it should help us 
understand them so that we can be clear and honest in facing and 
sorting out and working through the forces that make us what we 
are. 3.4 
3 M. Berman, All tlUlt is Solid Melts into Air (London: Verso, 1999 [1982]), page 14. 
4 I have asserted elsewhere similar concerns about post-modem analyses. See my chapter on 
nineteenth century political thought applied to contemporary pedagogy and technology in -
'Critical Reflections: Political Theory and Web Technology' in Issues in Web Based Pedagogy, 
edited by R. A. Cole (Westport, CT: Greenwood press, 2(00). 
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